# The Road to Glory or Edge of a Cliff



How Pakistan's Automobile Parts Industry Can Become Globally Competitive

Pakistan Association of Automotive Parts & Accessories Manufacturers (PAAPAM)

# Automobile Parts Manufacturing Industry in Pakistan

# Roadmap to Develop a Globally Competitive Parts Manufacturing Industry in Pakistan

**Pakistan Association of Automotive Parts & Accessories Manufacturers**
**(PAAPAM)**

**August 14th, 2025**

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# ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| 3S | Sales, Service, Spare Parts network |
| ACD | Additional Custom Duty |
| ADP | Automotive Development Policy |
| AIDEP | Auto Industry Development and Export Policy |
| APAC | Asia-Pacific |
| AIDP | Auto Industry Development Policy |
| APM | Automobile Parts Manufacturer |
| BEV | Battery Electric Vehicle |
| CBU | Completely Built Unit |
| CKD | Completely Knocked Down |
| FED | Federal Excise Duty |
| FTA | Free Trade Agreement |
| HEV | Hybrid Electric Vehicle |
| ICE | Internal Combustion Engine |
| ISO | International Organization for Standardization |
| LCV | Light Commercial Vehicle |
| NEVAL | New Electric Vehicle Adoption Levy |
| NTB | Non-Tariff Barrier |
| NTP | National Tariff Policy |
| OEM | Original Equipment Manufacturer |
| OICA | International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers |
| PAAPAM | Pakistan Association of Automobile Parts and Accessories Manufacturers |
| PAMA | Pakistan Automotive Manufacturers Association |
| PES | Pakistan Economic Survey |
| PLI | Performance Linked Initiative |
| RD | Regulatory Duty |
| SEZ | Special Economic Zone |
| SKD | Semi Knocked Down |
| ST | Sales Tax |
| UN | United Nation |
| WHT | Withholding Tax |

# 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Automobile Parts Manufacturing Industry in Pakistan – Why Policy Stability Matters Now**

Pakistan's auto-parts ecosystem has been built painstakingly over decades. It binds together 1,200 Tier-1, Tier-2 and Tier-3 suppliers, supports 1.83 million skilled jobs, out of which 300,000 are directly in the auto parts industry, and anchors localized production now worth well over PKR 300 billion per year—savings that the economy would otherwise pay out in foreign exchange.

In this detailed and diagnostic report, the Pakistan Association of Automotive Parts & Accessories Manufacturers (PAAPAM) has presented facts and hard evidence to establish how our automotive parts industry has survived despite all odds and challenges, sub-scale volumes, inadequate FDI, uneven macro conditions and policy stop-starts, but it will not survive a fresh round of abrupt tariff changes and the normalization of used-car imports and will be forced to shut-down.

The thrust of the report is simple: **without predictable policy and a coherent tariff architecture that rewards local value-addition, Pakistan will slide back into import dependence, thousands of jobs will be lost, industrialization will come to a halt and investment confidence in engineering and allied industries will erode**.

**Pakistan's starting point: capability under constraint**

PAAPAM's narrative is not defensive; it documents a vendor base that has proved competitiveness "against the odds." Vendors have localized hundreds of parts across stampings, plastics, precision machining, wiring harnesses and safety systems, earned validations from leading Japanese, Korean and European OEMs, and invested more than PKR 100 billion in plant and tooling.

This is the backbone for any transition from assembler to exporter, particularly into nearby markets in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia. But the policy pre-condition is stability: predictable tariffs, raw-material facilitation, investor-friendly climate, stable security, and region-comparable energy costs.

The report situates Pakistan against peers. Motorization in Pakistan is **20 cars per 1,000 people**—well below India (33), Vietnam (46) and Thailand (147)—a "national wake-up call" that reflects sustained policy and financing gaps rather than an absence of industrial

capability. Low per-model volumes keep plants under-utilized and make it hard to justify fresh localization, R&D or export-oriented tooling.

The report also underlines a structural reality: **mass motorization follows income growth**. Countries typically see vehicle ownership take off once per-capita income crosses a threshold near USD 2,500; Pakistan continues to struggle below USD 2,000, lagging peers like India and Bangladesh, and our long-run growth has under-delivered. How can we then expect a complex industry like automobile parts, which is highly dependent on volumes and scale, to become more efficient than countries like India, Thailand and Indonesia, when our income levels remain low and financing remains costly. Surely, this is no fault of the industry, but of poor economic policies and consistently unstable environment for business. No tariff tweak can substitute for macro stability, household purchasing power, and access to auto-financing, nor will it revive automobile demand on a large scale. What will ultimately happen is industry shut down, job losses, social unrest and further shattering of confidence in Pakistan's industrial foundation.

**What is actually holding the sector back**

PAAPAM's diagnosis is that **structural and policy failures can clearly explain Pakistan's missed opportunity, whereas "industry under-performance" is more a myth than a fact**. Testing and homologation infrastructure is still missing (forcing costly overseas certifications); energy and working-capital costs are uncompetitive; policy execution has been uneven across successive auto policies; FDI and integration into global value chains have been constrained by security and perception barriers; and used-car inflows routinely cannibalize volumes when the cycle turns down. Exports are not constrained by duties—since 2021, exporters can import raw materials at zero duty under the Export Facilitation Scheme—so "flattening" tariffs will not fix the real bottlenecks of scale, cost and credibility.

The after-sales base is deep: nearly four decades of vehicles on the road create a large parts and service market; but weak enforcement and informal imports divert this spend away from documented, quality-compliant local suppliers. The result is a sector that has proven what it can do—but is kept sub-scale by the policy environment around it.

**Why abrupt tariff flattening will break the system**

Pakistan's tariff framework was designed as a **cascade**: lowest tariffs for raw materials, higher for non-localized parts, higher for CKD kits, and highest for CBUs—with a separate, stricter regime for used CBUs. This is the lever that drives vendors every time a part is localized. This report warns that recent and proposed "flattening" steps nullify that signal:

- Assemblers can import broad semi-knocked-down kits—including items already made domestically—at the same rate as raw materials, erasing the incentive to buy local. Vendors with over PKR100 billion sunk into tooling for dashboards, wiring, suspension and more are already running below capacity or idle. Vendors pay ~15% on inputs while imported kits also face ~15%—a structure that **penalizes domestic value-addition**. With used-car imports already taking roughly a quarter of sales in weak years, volumes starve further and the export path ultimately closes.

Peers liberalized after scale. Thailand and Vietnam kept their cascades through the "infant-to-exporter" transition and dismantled them later; Pakistan is doing the reverse, **flattening before scale, maturity, or export readiness**. Unless the cascade is restored and paired with export-linked incentives and testing infrastructure, vendors remain trapped in a low-volume, low-tech equilibrium.

The macro cost is not abstract. Current localization substitutes about US$1.25 billion in imports annually; cutting tariffs prematurely without parallel measures for productivity, energy, finance and exports risks swapping a self-sustaining industrial ecosystem for a wave of consumer imports—a predictable strain on the balance of payments and fiscal revenues.

**"Myths vs Reality": resetting the narrative**

A large section of the report addresses common claims about automotive manufacturing in Pakistan and contrasts them with data. It notes, for example, that Pakistan does not merely "screwdriver-assemble" cars: there is a full-fledged parts ecosystem producing 40–60% of a vehicle's components locally under ISO and UN-Reg compliant systems, employing 300,000 directly and supporting 1.83 million direct and indirect employment. It also shows that automotive margins are modest relative to other domestic sectors, a function of small volumes, high fixed costs and policy volatility rather than excess profits. In short, **the problem isn't protection—it's predictability.**




The "Myths vs Reality" list spans quality, technology, pricing, delivery lead times, "own-money" premiums, protection levels, the effect of used-car imports, and survival prospects without protection—collectively arguing that policy should be built on evidence, not anecdotes.

**PAAPAM's comments on the IMF prescriptions—and why they are misaligned**

PAAPAM contests key recommendations in IMF Country Report No. 25/109 and related structural benchmarks that urge tariff flattening, phasing out additional duties on localized items, and legalizing commercial used-car imports. The Association points to the IMF's own earlier guidance—MEFP ¶27 (2021)—which endorsed rationalization but within a **cascading structure** that keeps input tariffs lower than finished goods to promote value-addition. The new prescription, by contrast, seeks uniform low rates and normalizes used-car imports, directly dismantling localization incentives and pitching local producers against five-year-old imports rather than like-for-like new vehicles.

PAAPAM also stresses that exports aren't duty-constrained: since 2021, exporters can import raw materials at zero duty under the EFS. The binding constraints are security, FDI, favorable FTAs, scale, energy and finance— bottlenecks that tariff cuts alone cannot solve. Liberalizing used cars in particular would entrench a distortion that already costs local vendors an estimated **PKR 60 billion** per year in lost parts demand, while pushing the market away from documented, safety-compliant local production.

**Comments on the National Tariff Policy (NTP) 2025–30**

The proposed NTP embraces a textbook liberalization agenda—phasing out additional/custom duties and special provisions like the 5th Schedule and SRO 655—but without regard to ground realities. The model appears to assume steady FX, clean execution and high compliance; yet Pakistan faces high energy costs, currency volatility, shallow credit, security perceptions, and weak enforcement. Flattening the cascade under these conditions exposes SMEs to mass-produced imports from Thailand and China before domestic volumes or raw-material industries could flourish. It also risks meaningful fiscal leakages without a credible plan to broaden the direct-tax base.

Crucially, insufficient consultation and lack of stakeholders engagements are deep concerns any investors would face, despite the existential impact of these changes. A rational path would phase reform alongside vendor upgrading, export incentives, testing labs, and safeguards against used-vehicle inflows—not ahead of them.

| Aspect | Pakistan | India | Thailand | Vietnam |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Allowance** | Yes (gift, baggage & personal use) | Yes (strict, personal) | Effectively banned | Yes (strict controls) |
| **Age Limit** | 3 yrs (cars), 5 yrs (SUVs, Vans) | 3 yrs | N/A (banned) | 5 yrs |
| **Main Route** | Gift / Transfer of Residence | Returning NRIs / residence | Diplomats or rare exemptions | Individual import |
| **Duties/Taxes** | USD slabs (Asian makes):<br>• 800cc: $4,800<br>• 801–1000cc: $6,000<br>• 1001–1300cc: $13,200<br>Depreciation of up to 60% allowed before duty calculation (based on fixed Retail Selling Price), then applicable duty/taxes applied on depreciated value. | 70% Basic Customs Duty + 67.5% AIDC (≈137.5%) + GST (28%) = 180-200% effective | imports prohibited; if allowed, tariffs can exceed 200% (Import Duty 80% + Excise 50% + VAT 7%) | 0–80% Import Duty + 50–150% Special Consumption Tax (SCT) + 10% VAT = 150–200% effective |
| **Used Cars Volume** | 38,520 | Negligible | 0 | Negligible |




**The opportunity cost of the status quo**

Pakistan sits adjacent to a US$131 billion regional automobile trade corridor in which even a 5% share would yield US$6.5 billion in annual exports, over 70 times current levels, leveraging geography and an already-validated vendor base. What is missing is the enabling framework: export incentives akin to India's PLI, testing infrastructure, FTAs with key importers (GCC/EU/ASEAN), and policy consistency that signals "invest and scale."

**Pertinent questions to policymakers**

The report further seeks to ask some very pertinent questions any rapid tariff flattening must answer in advance:

1. What is the plan for ~1.83 million livelihoods and the associated income loss?
2. Can the external account absorb a permanent US$1 billion import shock as localization unravels, and this gap will continue to widen with demand?
3. How will the exchequer replace duty revenues in a low tax-to-GDP economy?
4. If consumer welfare is the goal, why ignore auto-financing—the real-lever for affordability— instead of focusing on duty alone?
5. And if Pakistan sidelines one of the few scalable, high-value manufacturing sectors, where will the missing capacity come from to reach the US$100 billion export target and can we even reach that target without a solid industrial backbone?

| Particulars | | OEMs | Auto Parts Industry | Allied Industries | **Total** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Employment Multiplier | Times | 1 | 10 | 5 | **15** |
| No. of Employees | No. | 30,000 | 300,000 | 1,500,000 | **1,830,000** |
| Average Income per Annum | PKR Mn | 14,400 | 144,000 | 720,000 | **878,400** |

### Immediate actions—stabilize now, reform smartly

PAAPAM proposes urgent steps to halt the damage while designing a credible medium-term framework:

- Suspend NTP 2025–30's cascade-flattening for auto-parts and restore a transparent cascade that rewards localization.
- Regulate used-car inflows with mandatory JAAI certification and close loopholes for commercial imports through personal schemes.
- Pilot a scrappage and end-of-life policy to create demand for safe, efficient new vehicles and localized parts. A modest scrapping rate of 30% could induce additional demand of 1.8 million vehicles per year. This can cumulatively add 9 million vehicles to additional demand over the next five years.
- Use auto-financing as a policy lever—longer tenors, first-buyer support—to expand volumes sustainably.
- Freeze policy/tariff shocks through FY27 to restore investor confidence and unlock deferred capex.
- Provide immediate relief to parts-SMEs (working-capital lines, energy tariff alignment, expedited refunds).

For **AIDEP 2026+**, PAAPAM asks to codify the cascade in law, eventually place a permanent ban on commercial used-car imports, build WP.29-compliant labs, link export incentives to performance, mandate EV/HEV localization, require service ("3S") obligations for importers, and deliver "tax-neutralization through volumes." These are the policy complements that peers used to move from infant industry to global exporter—and they are the conditions under which Pakistan's proven vendor base can do the same.

**Conclusion: a choice point**

PAAPAM's case is ultimately pragmatic. Today's localization already saves roughly US$1.25 billion per year, supports 300,000 direct jobs and a total of 1.83 million direct and indirect jobs across the value chain, and contributes meaningfully to the exchequer. Flattening tariffs now—without parallel measures on scale, energy, finance, testing and exports—will undo those gains and trap the industry in a low-volume, low-tech cul-de-sac. The smarter path is predictable, performance-linked reform: keep inputs cheaper than finished goods, regulate used-car inflows, deliver long-promised infrastructure, and use financing to unlock demand. That is how Pakistan turns a resilient import-substitution base into an export-ready engine—and how industrial policy can deliver consumer welfare and growth together.

# 2.
# GLOBAL AUTOMOBILE
# &
# AUTO PARTS INDUSTRY

## 2.1. Global Automobile Industry – an Overview

The global automobile industry has grown with a CAGR of 3.5% since 2020 and is estimated to be sized at 92.5 million vehicles as of 2024. Out of nearly 200 countries in the world, only 46 countries are currently producing automobiles, a fact that indicates how exclusive the industrial capability required to develop automobiles is. The reason for this exclusivity is that automobile production is not just about assembling metal parts. It sits at the intersection of advanced engineering, precision manufacturing, complex supply chains, skilled labor, and long-term capital investment. The auto industry stimulates demand across a wide range of upstream and downstream sectors, including steel, plastics, electronics, rubber, logistics, finance, and aftermarket services; thus, making it a high-multiplier industry with deep forward and backward linkages.

[1]Production is heavily concentrated in Asia Pacific, which accounts for 59% of the global output, followed by North America (17.41%) and Europe (15.5%). China has led the total production with 31.2 million units followed by USA (10.6 million), Japan (8.2 million), and India (6 million) (see Annexure A).




*Figure 1: Global Automobile Production 2024*

[1] Source: OICA




*Figure 2: Global Automobile Production Concentration*[2]

## 2.2. Global Behavioral Archetypes of Automotive Economies

From a structural standpoint, global automotive economies can be grouped into four archetypes based on two defining characteristics: whether they produce automobiles and whether they are net exporters or importers. This typology allows for a structured understanding of each country's role within global automotive value chains.

1. Suppliers: Automotive producing countries who are also net exporters.
2. Domestic-oriented: Automotive producing countries who are also net importers.
3. Consumers: Economies that do not produce automobiles and rely entirely on imports to meet demand, thereby being net importers.
4. Re-exporters / Transit Hub: Economies that do not produce automobiles but are net exporters due to trade and logistical advantages.

[2] Source: OICA




*Figure 3: Automotive Archetype*[3]

When applying this lens to regional trade blocs, such as EU and ASEAN, the entire region/bloc becomes a supplier. These blocs treat other countries as unified counterparts in trade relations, with their member states entering into direct FTAs with an individual country only when the terms offer a greater advantage than the bloc-wide arrangement. Where no such incremental benefit exists, the bloc acts collectively to protect its market.

Within the Asia Pacific (APAC), this framework reveals two distinct clusters of producing nations. The supplier economies — including China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand — dominate both regional and global automotive exports. They are characterized by large-scale production, extensive localization, and strong integration into international markets. By contrast, domestic-oriented producers such as Pakistan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines manufacture primarily for local consumption and remain net importers, highlighting a different stage of industrial development and market orientation within the same region.

[3] Source: OICA, UN Comtrade




*Figure 4: YoY Auto Exports Change (Value)*

Pakistan is among the 8 countries in APAC with domestic automobile production but belongs to the domestic-oriented cohort, serving local demand and relying on imports to meet broader requirements. It ranks 35$^{th}$ among the 46 global auto producers. This contrasts sharply with regional peers such as India and Thailand which have moved into the supplier category and established themselves as key exporters within global value chains and with countries like Vietnam, which, despite also being classified as domestic-oriented, has been rapidly scaling production and exports in recent years and is widely regarded as being on the cusp of transitioning into the supplier category. Vietnam's trajectory offers important lessons for Pakistan, as it demonstrates how a domestic-oriented producer can reposition itself toward export-oriented growth through targeted policy support and integration into regional supply chains.

This classification sets the foundation for the chapters that follow. The subsequent analysis will benchmark Pakistan against these regional peers to examine structural differences in production scale, trade patterns, and tariff frameworks. Understanding these dynamics is essential to position Pakistan accurately within the global automotive landscape and to assess its comparative standing among leading Asian economies.




*Figure 5: Global automobile producers are mainly domestic-oriented*[4]




*Figure 6: Global Production Volume by Country*

[4] Source: OICA

## 2.3. Industry Structure

Before diving deeper into this report, it is essential to understand the core structure of the industry itself. Globally and in Pakistan, the auto industry operates as a vertically integrated value chain, with interlinked participants spread across four broad tiers. Each tier plays a critical role in value creation, capital investment, and employment generation. Understanding this structure is fundamental for identifying bottlenecks, investment opportunities, and policy gaps — particularly when assessing Pakistan's positioning in auto and auto parts ecosystem.




*Figure 7: Automotive Industry Structure*

1. **Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs):** These are the apex players in the value chain — major automotive brands responsible for assembling finished vehicles, managing supply networks, and maintaining control over design, quality, and brand. OEMs often outsource a significant portion of component manufacturing to Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers while retaining final assembly in-house or via joint ventures. Pakistan has over a dozen registered assemblers, many operating through technical licensing agreements or joint ventures. Prominent OEMs include Indus Motor Company (Toyota licensee), Honda Atlas Cars, Pak Suzuki Motors, Kia Lucky Motors, among others.

2. **Tier 1 Suppliers:** These are large-scale component manufacturers that produce complex, mission-critical systems such as engines, brake systems, transmissions, suspension systems, electronics, airbags, and infotainment units. Tier 1 firms often work closely with OEMs on R&D, product integration, and quality assurance. Their operations require significant capital investment, precision engineering, and often meet global quality and safety standards (like ISO/TS certifications). Pakistan has very few Tier 1 suppliers, and those that do exist are typically OEM-dependent and domestically focused. However, they are export competitive but face constraints in scaling due to lack of policy support.

3. **Tier 2 & 3 Suppliers:** These tiers encompass a wide base of supporting manufacturers that produce smaller components, subassemblies, and raw or semi-finished inputs through processes like machining, forging, casting, and molding. Globally, these suppliers ensure flexibility and responsiveness across the supply chain. In addition to core automotive parts suppliers, mature automotive ecosystems also rely on a broader set of service and input providers — including IT, logistics, packaging, HR training, skill enhancement services, tool suppliers, machinery suppliers, and raw material providers. While these categories may not link directly to vehicle assembly, they form an interconnected value chain that supports competitiveness and resilience.

In Pakistan, this segment forms the bulk of the vendor ecosystem, with total 1,200 parts manufacturers across these three tiers, largely concentrated in industrial hubs such as Karachi, Lahore, Gujranwala, Daska, and Hub. Most are small to medium-sized enterprises serving a single or limited number of OEMs. However, Pakistan lacks depth in many of the ancillary service and input supplier categories, limiting the development of a fully integrated value chain.

Tier 1, 2, and 3 suppliers are central to domestic value addition and represent the greatest opportunity for export diversification — provided targeted policy and investment support is introduced.

4. **Aftermarket/Service Networks:** This segment includes parts distributors, dealerships, service providers, and recyclers. While it plays a critical role in sustaining the lifecycle of vehicles, it is often informal and poorly regulated in Pakistan. The market is dominated by grey imports (especially from Japan), unauthorized dealers, and parallel spare parts markets, limiting traceability and quality assurance. Moreover, reliance on designs and R&D developed by others prevents Pakistan from independently competing in the global aftermarket. Building self-reliance in design, engineering, and product development is therefore essential to establish a credible presence in international aftersales markets.

Taken together, these four tiers form the structural backbone of the automotive industry, but it is the auto parts manufacturers — particularly those in Tier 2 and Tier 3 — that anchor its long-term sustainability and growth. While OEMs drive final assembly and brand visibility, it is the depth, capability, and integration of the parts manufacturing base that ultimately determine the industry's capacity for value addition, supply chain resilience, and export competitiveness. As global supply chains evolve and localization gains priority, the strategic importance of a well-developed vendor base becomes increasingly central to the industry's overall trajectory.

Governments around the world have long recognized the transformative role of this sector. The auto industry consistently ranks among the top three contributors to GDP, tax revenue, employment, and R&D investment in most industrialized nations. In countries like India, the automotive sector accounts for 7% of GDP and 49% of manufacturing output, while in Thailand, it is the largest export-oriented manufacturing sector, with over 1 million vehicles exported annually and a highly localized vendor base. Vietnam, though a newer entrant, is fast emerging as a strategic parts exporter, with strong policy incentives for localization and integration into global value chains.

## 2.4. Global Auto Parts Industry

While the glamour and attention often go to the car brands and final assemblers (Toyota, Hyundai, BMW), it is the auto parts industry that forms the backbone of this sector's true economic contribution. According to IMARC Group, the automotive parts industry reached $2.3 trillion in 2024 and is set to grow to $2.8 trillion by 2033, reflecting a CAGR of 2.3%. Beyond its sheer size, the parts segment represents the most technically diverse and globally traded segment of the automotive value chain (55% of total auto trade)[5].

Critically, the auto parts segment is where the deepest value addition happens, and where emerging economies have the greatest opportunity to participate. For every car assembled, there are thousands of engineered components — often manufactured across dozens of countries — that must be designed, tested, and produced to high-precision standards. The parts industry is thus a natural gateway for industrializing economies to enter the global auto value chain.

The employment impact of the auto parts industry further reinforces its strategic importance. In most industrialized nations, the auto sector is among the largest non-agricultural employers, with the parts manufacturing segment contributing the overwhelming majority of these jobs. Globally, it is estimated that for every direct job created in vehicle assembly, an additional three to five indirect jobs are generated across the supply chain — including parts suppliers, toolmakers, logistics providers, raw material processors, aftermarket service firms, and other ancillary industries. The employment multiplier tends

[5] Source: UN Comtrade

to be even higher in parts manufacturing compared to assembly, due to the labor-intensive nature of fabrication, sub-assembly, and specialized machining, particularly within Tier 2 and Tier 3 segments.

In countries like India, 37 million people are employed in the auto sector. Thailand, now a global export hub for auto parts, has seen similar dynamics — with 880,000 jobs in the auto sector and over half a million from these jobs tied to just its parts ecosystem (520,000), many of them located in secondary cities. Vietnam, despite its relatively recent entry into the industry, has prioritized labor-intensive parts manufacturing as a strategic entry point into global value chains, supported by vocational training and supplier development programs.

These examples offer relevant lessons for countries like Pakistan, where the majority of existing vendors operate in Tier 2 and 3 segments and possess significant employment potential — provided they are linked to structured localization policies, skills development initiatives, and long-term vendor upgrading frameworks. In this context, the expansion of a well-integrated parts manufacturing base presents not only an industrial opportunity but also one of the most effective levers for inclusive, regionally dispersed job creation.

# 3. CASE STUDIES FROM REGIONAL PEERS

**Preamble**

The transformation of countries like Japan in the 1960s, South Korea in the 1980s, and China in the 2000s cannot be understood without examining the central role played by the automobile sector in their development narratives. In each case, governments did not treat the auto industry as a luxury or a consumption-driven market. Instead, they saw it as a strategic tool for import substitution, industrial base development, global value chain integration, and innovation acceleration.

While the sequencing and speed of reforms varied across countries, the underlying policy architecture shared common features — a deliberate effort to use the auto sector to scale up domestic manufacturing, deepen engineering capabilities, and gradually integrate into global supply chains.

The policy playbook followed by these nations was remarkably consistent:

- Long-term industrial policies (10–20 year horizons) that provided predictability to investors and confidence to OEMs and Tier-1 and Tier 2 auto parts suppliers.
- Deep localization incentives, not just for final assembly, but across the entire value chain including tooling, machining, electronics, and advanced components.
- Human capital investment in engineering education, vocational training, and industry-academia linkages.
- Aggressive integration into global value chains (GVCs) — attracting global auto parts manufacturers to set up local operations and use these countries as regional hubs for supply.
- Protection from used vehicle imports, especially in the early stages of industrialization, to provide a stable demand base for local manufacturers and parts makers.

These lessons are not confined to the early industrializers of Asia. More recently, emerging economies such as India, Thailand, and Vietnam have adapted similar playbooks to their own contexts, with varying degrees of success. Each of these offer a distinct pathway, such as India leveraging its vast domestic market and engineering base to achieve localization and become a top global auto exporter, Thailand transforming into the “Detroit of Asia” through aggressive regional integration and supplier development, and Vietnam using targeted industrial zones and gradual liberalization to enter the automotive value chain at scale. Examining these case studies shall offer valuable insights into how policy design, sequencing, and execution has enabled these economies to close the capability gap and position themselves into global automotive value chains.

## 3.1. India

### Pre-Policy Industry

In the decades following independence, India's automotive industry was tightly controlled under the "License Raj." Production licenses, import quotas, and steep tariffs effectively insulated the market from foreign competition but also locked it into technological stagnation. By the late 1970s, the sector was dominated by a few legacy domestic players — Hindustan Motors (Ambassador), Premier (Fiat-licensed models), and Mahindra (Jeep variants). Annual passenger car production hovered around 50,000 units, and the market was almost entirely domestic, with negligible exports or foreign OEM presence. Localization existed but was rudimentary, focused on basic bodywork and assembly rather than advanced components or powertrains.

The first significant disruption came in 1983, when Maruti Udyog (a state-owned enterprise) partnered with Suzuki of Japan. This joint venture introduced modern small cars, catalyzing modest improvements in productivity and technology transfer. However, the broader ecosystem remained inward-looking; auto components were fragmented, dominated by Tier-2 and Tier-3 suppliers with low quality and limited economies of scale. Used car imports were effectively non-existent — not by active policy design but due to foreign exchange constraints and high import barriers.

### Key Policies and Initiatives

**Liberalization and Strategic Reforms (1995-2005)**

The 1991 economic liberalization was a watershed moment for India. Facing a balance-of-payments crisis, India dismantled licensing controls and allowed 100% foreign direct investment (FDI) in automotive manufacturing, and reduced tariffs on components. Crucially, while imports of completely built units (CBUs) remained highly taxed (often above 100%), components faced far lower duties (10–15%), which created a policy-induced incentive to localize. This shift attracted foreign OEMs, specifically Hyundai, Honda, Toyota, Ford — who entered via joint ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries, setting up manufacturing clusters in Tamil Nadu, Haryana, and Maharashtra.

These experiences now form the basis for cross-country benchmarking throughout this report — providing a clear lens to assess Pakistan's current position, identify capability gaps, and outline the policy and institutional reforms required for industrial upgrading.

The government's Auto Policy 2002 and subsequent Automotive Mission Plan 2006–2016 provided long-term direction:

- Transform India into a global manufacturing and export hub

- Gradually raise localization beyond assembly to include powertrains, electronics, and tooling
- Develop dedicated supplier clusters in regions like Chennai, Pune, and NCR (National Capital Region)

Export incentives during this period included:

- Duty drawback schemes (refund of custom duties on inputs used for export production).
- Export Promotion Capital Goods (EPCG) scheme (duty-free capital imports for exporters)
- Focus Production Scheme (FPS) which offered duty credit for auto components
- Tax holiday for units in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and automotive clusters.

During this phase, India also began signing **Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)** with ASEAN nations and bilateral pacts (e.g., with Thailand and Japan) that facilitated two-way component trade and integration into regional value chains. Simultaneously, India also maintained strict bans and high tariffs on used car imports in order to shield its nascent local manufacturers and parts suppliers from disruptive second-hand inflows – a key factor in stabilizing domestic demand and encouraging scale.

**Global Integration and Export Push (2006-Present)**

From the mid-2000s, India pivoted toward becoming an export-oriented auto hub. The **Automotive Mission Plan (2006–2016)** and its successors (2016-26) aimed to triple industry output, double its exports, and integrate deeply into Global Value Chains (GVCs), making India among the world's top five producers. Supplier parks such as Pune–Aurangabad, Chennai, and NCR matured into full-fledged ecosystems with Tier-1 to Tier-3 integration. Localization rates had also rose steadily: by the 2010s, most mass-market models achieved 70–80% local content, with some like Maruti Suzuki exceeding 90%.

Government initiatives in this phase included:

- Make in India (2014), position India as a global manufacturing hub
- Atmanibhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) 2020, self-reliance agenda emphasizing domestic value addition
- PLI (Performance Linked Incentive) Scheme for Automobiles and Auto Components (2021), with USD $3.6bn (INR 25,938 Crore) allocated to incentivize advanced component and EV manufacturing.
- Phased Manufacturing Program (PMP) for EV parts, progressively increasing local content thresholds, and,

- Continuous support for SEZs and Export-Oriented Units (EOUs) enabling duty-free imports for re-export.

On the export front, India has leveraged FTAs with ASEAN, Japan, and Korea to expand markets for components and small cars. Hyundai's Chennai plant became a global export hub, shipping to over 100 countries while Suzuki has designated India as its EV export base for Asia and Africa. Renault-Nissa, Kia, and Toyota has scaled capacities for both domestic and export markets. Through FTAs and cost competitiveness, India had become a preferred sourcing destination for wiring harnesses, casting, and powertrains. Annexure B details down these initiatives

### Outcomes

Today, India ranks as the third-largest automotive market by sales and the fourth-largest producer by volume worldwide. The sector contributes around 7% to GDP and 49% of manufacturing output, employing over 37 million people directly and indirectly. Auto component exports surged from US $13 billion in FY21 to over US $23 billion in FY25, with projections to reach US $60 billion by 2030. India maintains a trade surplus in auto components, reflecting its shift from a net importer to a net exporter.

Localization remains a core strength: mainstream passenger models routinely achieve 70–80% domestic content, while luxury and EV segments are climbing via targeted policy support. The ban and high tariffs on used vehicle imports continue, shielding domestic production and enabling scale efficiencies. Combined with an aggressive EV roadmap, battery gigafactories, and global OEM R&D centers, India has positioned itself as both a demand-driven giant and a supply-chain hub, bridging domestic needs with export competitiveness.

## 3.2. Thailand

### Pre-Policy Industry

Thailand's automotive industry began in the 1960s as a small assembly base for Japanese OEMs. Initial production was almost entirely CKD assembly, with imported kits and minimal local content — often below 20%. Domestic demand was low, centered on light trucks and basic passenger cars, while exports were negligible.

By the early 1980s, Thailand's industry was fragmented, dependent on imports, and technologically shallow. However, the government recognized automotive manufacturing's potential as a growth driver and began pursuing policies to deepen local content and reduce import dependence.

## Key Policies and Initiatives

**Localization Mandates and Trade Integration (1990s – 2005)**

In the 1990s, Thailand aggressively enforced local content requirements, initially requiring 25–45% domestic content in assembled vehicles and raising this to 70% by the late 1990s. This forced OEMs to build supplier networks and stimulated investment in local tooling, metal stamping, and engine production. By the 2000s, localization in many models exceeded 80%. Additionally, Thailand established the Board of Investment (BOI) as a central agency to attract FDI with tax holidays, tariff exemptions on machinery imports, and duty reductions on locally sourced parts. Japanese OEMs — Toyota, Honda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Isuzu — established large-scale plants. By 2005, cumulative FDI in automotive exceeded US $10 billion, concentrated in the Eastern Seaboard industrial zone.

Thailand signed ASEAN Free Trade Agreements (AFTA), slashing tariffs within Southeast Asia and positioning itself as a regional export base. The government also maintained high tariffs and strict restrictions on used vehicle imports, preserving domestic demand for new vehicles and parts. Furthermore, Thailand's export push leveraged tax rebates on exported vehicles and components, duty drawbacks, and investment-linked incentives for export-oriented manufacturers. These policies coincided with rising regional demand, enabling Thailand to become a major supplier to ASEAN and Australia.

**Becoming "Detroit of Asia"**

By the mid-2000s, Thailand was producing over 1 million vehicles annually, with exports surpassing domestic sales. The government launched the Eco-Car Program (2007) to attract investment in small, fuel-efficient vehicles. Incentives included up to 8-year corporate tax exemptions and reduced excise duties, provided OEMs met criteria like fuel efficiency and local content. Nissan, Honda, and Mitsubishi invested billions to produce eco-cars in Thailand for global markets.

Thailand also became a hub for pickup trucks, accounting for nearly 50% of global 1-ton pickup production by the 2010s, led by Toyota Hilux and Isuzu D-Max. Localization rates for pickups and small cars stabilized around 80% — among the highest in Asia.

**EV Policy Pivot**

In the 2020s, Thailand pivoted toward EVs, launching the EV 3.0 and 4.0 schemes with cash subsidies (70,000–150,000 THB per vehicle), excise tax reductions (from 8% to 2%), and import duty cuts for EV components. Chinese OEMs (BYD, Great Wall Motors) committed over US $1.5–2 billion to Thai EV production by 2024. The government targets 30% EV production share by 2030. Annexure C breaks down the policy actions that resulted in Thailand's transformation.

## Outcome

Thailand is now the largest automotive producer in ASEAN and ranks among the top 10 globally by exports. In 2023, it produced 1.5 million vehicles, exporting over 1 million units to 100+ countries. The automotive sector contributes roughly 11% of GDP and over 850,000 direct jobs, with total employment in the ecosystem exceeding 1.5 million.

Localization remains high (70–80% across most segments), supported by dense supplier clusters in the Eastern Economic Corridor. Export incentives and FTAs allow Thailand to dominate ASEAN markets and penetrate developed markets like Australia and Japan. Used car imports remain tightly restricted, safeguarding local production volumes.

## 3.3. Vietnam

## Pre-Policy Industry

Prior to the 1990s, Vietnam had virtually no domestic auto industry. The market was dominated by imported second-hand vehicles, especially from neighboring countries, and small-scale repair workshops rather than true manufacturing. Vehicle penetration was extremely low (fewer than 5 cars per 1,000 people), and there was no established supplier base for components.

By the mid-1990s, Vietnam began attracting limited foreign assembly investment — Toyota, Ford, and Mercedes-Benz entered via joint ventures — but production was mostly CKD (completely knocked down) assembly with very low localization (<10%). Domestic demand remained constrained by low incomes and high car prices, and there was no export orientation.

## Key Policies and Initiatives

**Gradual Opening and Protectionist Foundations (1990s-2015)**

Vietnam's reform era (Doi Moi) in the late 1980s set the stage for industrialization. By the mid-1990s, the government began inviting foreign OEMs — Toyota, Ford, Mercedes-Benz — to establish joint ventures for local assembly. Production, however, was limited to CKD kits with very low domestic content (<10%).

To nurture domestic capability, the government adopted protectionist policies:

- High import tariffs on CBUs (50–90%) to encourage local assembly.
- Localization targets (40–60% content by 2010), backed by excise tax reductions for vehicles meeting thresholds.
- Strict controls on used car imports, including age limits and heavy surcharges, to shield nascent manufacturers.

These policies helped modestly grow domestic production — mostly trucks and buses through THACO and Vinamotor — but passenger car localization lagged due to low volumes and fragmented supplier networks.

Simultaneously, Vietnam signed ASEAN FTAs and joined the WTO in 2007, committing to gradual tariff reductions. By 2018, ASEAN import duties on cars fell to zero — flooding Vietnam with Thai and Indonesian imports and exposing the weakness of its domestic industry.

**Leapfrogging into EVs (2016-Present)**

Facing competitive pressure from ASEAN imports and the failure to meet localization targets, Vietnam pivoted toward a new growth model: leveraging electric vehicles (EVs) and a vertically integrated domestic champion. To this extent, VinFast, founded by Vietnamese giant Vingroup in 2017, invested US $3.5 billion in a Hai Phong auto complex, targeting not just domestic demand but global markets. Its strategy: compress decades of catch-up by building EVs and e-scooters from the ground up, with in-house battery plants and plans for 60–80% localization by 2026. VinFast rapidly launched EVs for the U.S. and European markets, positioning Vietnam as an unexpected player in global EV supply chains.

**Incentives and Industrial Policy**

Vietnam's government aligned behind this pivot by offering the following incentives:

- Corporate tax holidays (up to 15 years) for automotive and EV projects.
- Duty exemptions for imported equipment and parts used in localization.
- Excise tax cut for EVs (from 15% to 3%) and registration fee waivers to stimulate adoption.
- Special economic zones providing land and infrastructure subsidies for supplier clusters.

Localization mandates were formally rescinded in 2022 to comply with WTO rules, but implicit incentives (tax, tariff, and procurement preferences) continue to favor domestic assembly and EV production.

**FTA Leverage**

Vietnam's 15+ FTAs — including CPTPP, EU-Vietnam FTA, and RCEP — give it tariff-free access to key markets. While exports are still nascent, wiring harnesses, tires, and now VinFast EVs are entering global supply chains under these agreements. Annexure D explains the timeline of these initiatives in details

## Outcome

Vietnam's automotive industry remains small by regional standards — about 175,000 vehicles produced in 2024, compared to 1.5+ million in Thailand and 6+ million in India. Passenger car localization is still ~10%, while trucks and buses reach 40–55%, reflecting THACO's commercial vehicle focus. However, the EV segment is a wild card: VinFast's localization push and export ambitions could rapidly elevate Vietnam's position in global value chains, especially as EV demand surges.

The sector contributes roughly 3% to GDP and employs over 120,000 people, concentrated in northern and southern clusters near Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. While Vietnam has yet to become an export powerhouse, its FTA-enabled market access, EV-first industrial pivot, and state-backed champion model signal a distinctive path — one that leapfrogs traditional ICE (internal combustion engine) strategies followed by India and Thailand.

# 4.
# PAKISTAN'S FOOTING WITHIN THE ECOSYSTEM

## 4.1. Auto and Auto Parts Industry Overview

Pakistan's automotive industry is a cornerstone of its manufacturing base. The sector contributes 2.8% of GDP and supports 1.83 million livelihood, consisting of 330,000 jobs directly in automobile and parts industry, and additional 1.5 million jobs across allied industries. The sector's fiscal footprint is equally significant, generating around PKR 302billion annually in taxes through customs duties, GST, FED, CVT, Income Tax and related levies. The industry is organized around two interconnected pillars: vehicle assembly and auto parts manufacturing. On the assembly side, there are currently 13 operational OEMs, 5 of which are top 10 OEMs globally (remainder fall within in top 30). Long-established Japanese brands — Toyota Indus, Pak Suzuki, and Honda Atlas — continue the market since 2016. Combined, these assemblers have an installed capacity of approximately 500,000 passenger vehicles per year, yet actual production remains under 200,000 range, while new entrants like Hyundai, Kia, Changan, and MG have added diversity to a level that has seen little growth over the past two decades. Including motorcycles, tractors, and commercial vehicles, total annual output exceeds 37 million units, but the mix is skewed toward two-wheelers.

**Not Just a Car Assembling Country**

The auto parts ecosystem is far larger and more diffused, comprising over 1,200 auto parts manufacturers across Tier-1, Tier-2, and Tier-3 levels. These suppliers manufacture over 5,000 localized components, including 60+ engine and transmission parts, supplying all major assemblers operating in the country including Toyota, Honda, Suzuki, Hyundai, Kia, Changan, and MG.




*Figure 8: Pakistan's Auto Industry Structure*

These parts are not generic or low-grade. Local vendors must pass strict global quality tests set by Japanese, Korean, and Chinese automakers. Each part undergoes a 12–18 month development cycle and is sent to overseas R&D labs for testing and approval. Vehicles built using these local components are often shipped to Japan or Korea for full vehicle quality

certification. Pakistani auto parts are ISO certified, comply with the UN Regulations adopted in 2024, and meet the same standards required in developed markets.

The ecosystem isn't limited to basic body parts either. Local manufacturers produce sophisticated components for suspensions, steering, electrical systems, seats, glass, and even infotainment. Firms like Agriauto, Thal Engineering, Plastech Autosafe, and Baluchistan Wheels have long-standing technical collaborations and joint ventures with global Tier-1 suppliers such as Kayaba, Aisin Seiki, Toyoda Gosei, Koito, and Toyota Boshoku.

Yet, these capabilities remain under-leveraged due to insufficient domestic volume, fragmented policy, and unfair import competition. Pakistan's parts manufacturers can localize everything from suspension and steering systems to wire harnesses and infotainment modules — and in many cases already do. But without the policy push and demand pull, the ecosystem remains subscale.

Consequently, it is ironical that the total production of automobiles in Pakistan in the year 2025 is almost the same as the year 2005. The primary reason for this stagnation is the set of Government policies that could not trigger economic growth in the country or provide the necessary impetus to expand automobile demand in Pakistan.




*Figure 9: Pakistan's Total Automobile Production*[6]

### Joint Ventures and Technical Collaborations

The technical capabilities of Pakistan's APMs are not hypothetical — they are well proven and globally benchmarked. Across hundreds of vendors, the range of localized components

[6] *Source: PAMA*

now include engine and transmission brackets, wheel hubs, axle assemblies, control arms, dashboards, AC systems, infotainment units, bumpers, lamps, seat structures, airbags, wiring harnesses, mufflers, and fuel tanks.

These components are manufactured not only to serve local OEMs, but also to meet stringent quality parameters of principals in Japan, Korea, and Thailand. In fact, several components undergo final testing and validation in R&D labs of Toyota, Honda, Hyundai, and Suzuki. The fact that vendors meet these standards is testament to their discipline, manufacturing acumen, and access to global-grade tooling and support.

In models like Suzuki Alto and Toyota Yaris, locally made parts cover complex domains — from plastic injection molded instrument panels and HVAC ducts to stamped body parts and localized electricals. Even engine and drivetrain-related components like drive shafts, exhaust pipes, mountings, and cylinder head gaskets are partly localized. And as the 50% CKD duty concessions for new entrants expire in 2026, the incentives for localization — long suppressed — are likely to revive.

Pakistan's auto parts ecosystem is globally connected — but domestically constrained. Many vendors maintain Technical Assistance Agreements and Joint Ventures with global brands (Annexure E), such as Continental for tires, Denso for alternators, Koito for lighting, Sumitomo for electronics, and Toyota Boshoku for seat structures. Despite these deep linkages, exports remain marginal.

This is not due to lack of ambition or skill. The bottlenecks are structural, which includes:

- 100% dependence on imported steel, plastics, aluminum, and sheet metal increases cost unpredictability
- Poor law and order condition in the country, leading to travel restrictions of foreign investors and engineers, restricting FDI potential in Pakistan
- No FTAs with major markets (e.g., EU, ASEAN, USA) reduce export competitiveness
- Pakistan lacks a single internationally certified part testing laboratory — making part validation costly and slow
- There are no rebate programs like India's PLI scheme, which gives 4–6% back on exports
- High logistics costs and port inefficiencies further erode competitiveness
- No system for obtaining export concessions, if duty-paid goods initially imported for home consumption is used for export.

Several APMs already export modest volumes to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. But without a support framework and scale volumes, these shipments remain sporadic. The

dream of global vendor integration will remain unfulfilled unless the state steps in with targeted export facilitation — from financing and tooling support to market access and regulatory alignment.

Ultimately, the government must recognize the APM ecosystem not as a passive adjunct to assemblers, but as a national industrial asset. With the right policy framework, these manufacturers can not only deepen domestic capabilities but emerge as globally competitive suppliers.

**Contribution to Employment and GDP**

The parts industry is the largest employer within the automotive sector. Against the 30,000 direct employees at OEM plants, APMs generate over 300,000 jobs, spanning technicians, engineers, supervisors, and unskilled workers. This does not include indirect jobs in steel, plastics, rubber, logistics, and retail, all of which depend on the parts ecosystem.

As per PAAPAM and the World Bank, the broader auto sector supports around 1.83 million livelihoods. This includes tractors, motorcycles, and aftermarket ecosystems. The sector contributes Rs 302 billion in taxes and accounted for 2.8% of Pakistan's GDP. This economic engine, however, has received little policy support in return. There are no dedicated export zones, no subsidized testing labs, and no fiscal schemes to encourage tool and die development, despite repeated promises under AIDP (2007), ADP (2016), and AIDEP (2021).




*Figure 10: Employment & Employment Multiplier Effect of Auto Industry*[7]

## 4.2. Domestic Orientation and Missed Opportunities

From the vantage point of Pakistan's Automobile Parts Manufacturers (APMs), the country's automobile sector represents deeply frustrating tale of missed opportunities. Despite decades of assembly activity and the presence of a capable vendor base, Pakistan has been

[7]Source: PAAPAM Research

unable to transform its industry into the dynamic export engine seen in regional peers like India, Thailand, and now Vietnam.

While local suppliers have localized thousands of components, including engine and transmission parts, they remain confined to domestic volumes because no serious export framework, vendor development program, or global integration plan has been implemented.




*Figure 11: Auto Parts Exports as % of total auto exports – 2024*[8]

The impact is highly visible in trade performance with Pakistan's auto parts exports, which remain a fraction of India's US $15 billion or Thailand's US $8.8 billion. This gap does not reflect differences in talent or capability — Pakistani vendors already operate under technical assistance agreements as mentioned above, but rather the absence of consistent industrial policy, export incentives, and market access through FTAs.

In contrast, countries like India and Vietnam explicitly designed policies to boost local content. Pakistan, by comparison, has yet to build even the most basic infrastructure for parts testing or technology support.

## 4.3. Untapped Consumer Markets in the Region: A Trade Corridor Worth $131bn!

Pakistan sits at the crossroads of Asia, Middle East, and Africa, a location that places it next to some of the largest automotive auto consumer markets in the world. Collectively, countries across these regions import over US $131 billion worth of vehicles and auto components annually, this is 7% of the total global automobile exports. Yet, despite its

[8] Source: PBS, UN Comtrade

proximity and technically capable vendor base, Pakistan remains largely absent from these trade flows — a void that competitors like India and Thailand are actively capitalizing on.




*Figure 12: The $131bn Import Corridor*[9]

The Middle East alone accounts for US $87 billion (67% of the total) of this import demand, dominated by the GCC economies — Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain — all of which rely almost entirely on imported vehicles and parts. Africa contributes another US $28 billion (22%), with key markets like South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Egypt sourcing large volumes of vehicles and components from Asia. A further US $15 billion comes from non-producing Asia-Pacific markets such as Afghanistan, Central Asia, and parts of Southeast Asia.

[9] Source: UN Comtrade

These regions share two defining characteristics: high automotive import dependency and product overlap with what Pakistan already manufactures. Components such as suspensions, wire harnesses, steering assemblies, and dashboards — currently localized for domestic OEMs — are directly relevant for these aftersales markets. Yet Pakistan's vendors remain largely excluded from these lucrative trade flows.

**Peers' Penetration vs Pakistan's Absence**

India's US $22 billion auto exports already send 20% (US $4–5 billion) to Middle East and Africa, while Thailand globally exports over 1 million vehicles annually, with significant volumes flowing into these very markets. Pakistan, by contrast, exports only around US $108 million annually due to lack of FTAs, export incentives like PLI, policy inconsistency, and testing labs — effectively missing out on a trade corridor worth US $131 billion annually.




*Figure 13: Total Auto Exports USD Mn - 2024*[10]

India and Thailand are already deeply embedded in the Middle East and African supply chains. India exports US $1.5 billion annually to Saudi Arabia and nearly US $1 billion to the UAE, with total exports to MENA and Africa exceeding US $4–5 billion. Thailand ships over US $3 billion into the same markets, including US $1.6 billion to Saudi Arabia alone.

Pakistan, in contrast, exports less than US $10 million to this entire $131bn corridor. Half of its total exports are concentrated in Afghanistan (US $45 million) — a low-income market

[10] Source: PBS, UN Comtrade

with limited growth potential — while exports to high-value GCC markets like Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain under US $4 million combined.

Even Vietnam, which only recently entered automotive manufacturing, has already scaled to US $5.2 billion in exports, primarily targeting the U.S., Japan, and Thailand. Its trajectory signifies how quickly newer entrants can integrate into global value chains when supported by coherent policy and trade agreements. This is particularly relevant given that automobile parts rank 202 out of 1,224 products on the Product Complexity Index, placing them firmly on the higher end of global product sophistication. Such products require advanced manufacturing, design, and organizational capabilities — qualities that directly contribute to a nation's broader economic complexity.




*Figure 14: Product Complexity Index ranking of automobile parts industry*[11]

The gap becomes even clearer when viewed through the lens of the Economic Complexity Index (ECI). Thailand, with an ECI rank of 29th, and India, at 44th, possess the sophisticated industrial ecosystems needed to dominate high-complexity automotive exports. Vietnam, ranked 48th, is rapidly improving its capabilities in line with its export growth. Pakistan, however, stands at 99th, reflecting significant structural gaps in the diversity and sophistication of its production base. This disparity explains why peers have successfully penetrated high-value markets with complex automotive products, while Pakistan remains largely absent.

[11] [11]Source: Harvard Growth Lab, Atlas of Economic Complexity




*Figure 15: Country Complexity Ranking*[12]




*Figure 16: The Stark Contrast of Auto Export Destinations USD Mn*[13]

### Scale of the Missed Opportunity for Pakistan

If Pakistan were to capture even a 5% share of this USD $131 billion regional import market, it would translate to USD $6.5 billion in annual exports — more than 70 times current levels. This would rival India's present performance and transform the sector's role in foreign exchange generation and industrial employment.

Pakistan's geographic advantage amplifies this potential further as it is closer to GCC and Central Asian markets than India or Thailand, offering inherent logistical savings. Combined

[13] Source: UN Comtrade

with a vendor base already validated by Japanese and Korean OEMs, Pakistan has the capability to compete — but lacks the enabling policy framework.

**Why Pakistan Remains Absent**

This absence is not due to lack of vendor capability; Pakistani suppliers produce export-grade components certified to ISO and UN vehicle regulations. The bottlenecks are structural, as we will explain in the subsequent chapters:

- No export-specific incentives or rebates comparable to India's Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes.
- Absence of homologation and testing infrastructure, forcing costly overseas certifications.
- Heavy dependence on imported raw materials, tools, machinery, energy, and technology; without domestic control or ownership of patents, scaling competitive exports remains challenging.
- No FTAs with major auto importers (GCC, EU, ASEAN) to reduce tariff barriers.
- Policy inconsistencies, often limited to domestic assembly rather than export-oriented parts manufacturing.

## 4.4. Motorization Ratio Should Be a National Wakeup Call

From our standpoint, there can be no clearer indictment of failed automotive policy than the country's dismal motorization ratio. With fewer than 20 vehicles per 1,000 people, Pakistan ranks among the lowest in the world — trailing far behind regional peers like India, Indonesia, and Vietnam, all of whom had comparable starting points but chose a fundamentally different policy path.

This is not merely a statistical gap, rather it is the cumulative result of short-sighted decisions, misplaced priorities, and a sustained failure to grow the domestic market. Instead of supporting local manufacturing to enable affordable vehicle ownership, policymakers have chosen to subsidize importers — whether through low-duty CKD concessions or the continued allowance of used car imports. The result is a pricing structure that keeps vehicles out of reach for millions of Pakistanis, suppressing demand and denying scale to local manufacturers.

For APMs, this artificially constrained market has had devastating consequences. With low per-model volumes, even highly capable domestic vendors are unable to achieve the economies of scale needed to justify investment in tooling, localization, and R&D. Plants

remain underutilized, technical capabilities go untapped, and entire production lines operate below breakeven.

The low motorization ratio is not just a consumer affordability issue — it is a national policy failure. In every successful industrial economy, mass motorization was driven by strong local manufacturing, anchored by policy. Here, despite the presence of a technically mature and quality-compliant vendor base, APMs are asked to compete in a market structurally rigged against them.

*Table 1: Motorization rates*[14]

| Particulars | | Pakistan | India | Thailand | Vietnam |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDP/Capita | USD | 1,824 | 2,878 | 7,767 | 4,806 |
| Population | Millions | 247 | 1451 | 72 | 101 |
| Annual Production | No. | 148,209 | 6,014,691 | 1,468,997 | 175,661 |
| Motorization | Cars per 1000 persons | 20 | 33 | 147 | 46 |

The Government must stop treating this figure as a footnote. The motorization ratio should be tracked, targeted, and tied to policy outcomes. Until that happens, Pakistan's auto sector will remain trapped in a cycle of fragmentation, import dependence, and missed opportunity — despite the proven capability of its parts manufacturers.

[14] Source: OICA, PBS, World Bank

**Box – I: The Inextricable Link Between GDP Growth and Motorization Levels**

**1. Motorization Levels Rise with Increase in Per Capita Income**

A clear and empirically supported pattern exists across global economies: motorization levels rise in direct correlation with per capita income. The relationship is not only strong and positive, but also non-linear. In countries with low-income levels, motorization remains subdued. However, once per capita income crosses a threshold, typically around USD 2,500, the rate of vehicle ownership begins to grow sharply. This reflects a structural shift in affordability and consumer capacity, not merely the result of supply-side or regulatory interventions. Countries with low income per capita tend to exhibit flat or modest motorization levels until a critical threshold, commonly around USD 2,500, is surpassed. Beyond this point, motorization begins to grow rapidly, reflecting improved household purchasing power and rising consumer confidence.

This threshold dynamic is visible across multiple income groups and geographies. Countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, and China experienced slow growth in vehicle ownership until their per capita income crossed this tipping point. Thereafter, motorization expanded swiftly and sustainedly. These trajectories reflect a structural link between income growth and private vehicle demand, rather than a policy-induced or supply-driven outcome.



**Box – I: The Inextricable Link Between GDP Growth and Motorization Levels**

**2. Pakistan Remains Below the Income Threshold for Motorization Growth**

Pakistan, with a per capita income of USD 1,825 and a motorization level of 20 vehicles per 1,000 people has yet to enter the income band where large-scale private vehicle ownership becomes economically viable. In this context, expectations of substantial growth in vehicle demand remain structurally unsupported.




Historically, Pakistan's GDP growth has stayed around 3%, reaching a maximum of 8% at its highest since 2000s, which is very mediocre and subpar compared to the region, emerging market standards, and is not enough to grow sustainably. Persistent currency depreciation, inflationary pressures, and external account vulnerabilities further erode purchasing power, leaving households with limited demand for vehicles.

**3. Motorization Will Not Rise Until the Macroeconomic Governance is Addressed**

In such an environment, motorization cannot be expected to increase through administrative targets or fiscal measures alone. The challenge is not one of market structure or policy incentives—it is a function of macroeconomic conditions. Without sustained economic expansion, broad-based income growth, and financial stability, the demand base for vehicles will remain narrow and constrained. To cross the income threshold that typically triggers motorization, Pakistan would require sustained GDP growth of at least 7% annually over the next five years. This is not an arbitrary benchmark, but a necessary condition to enable broad-based income growth, restore purchasing power, and unlock demand across the middle-income consumer base. Any framework aimed at expanding vehicle access or deepening motorization must therefore begin with a clear recognition of this income constraint. The relationship between macroeconomic strength and vehicle ownership is not incidental, it is foundational. Unless economic fundamentals improve, structural limitations on demand will persist, and motorization will remain low, regardless of policy ambition or duty cuts.

## 4.5. Localization

Pakistan's auto parts manufacturers have built a strong technical base for localization over the past three decades. What began with basic sheet-metal parts and interior trims has matured into a supplier network capable of producing sophisticated assemblies such as suspensions, steering systems, dashboards, wire harnesses, HVAC ducts, fuel tanks, and even drivetrain components like drive shafts and cylinder head gaskets. These components are not entry-level; they are manufactured to stringent Japanese and Korean OEM standards, validated through multi-year testing cycles, and certified under ISO and UN vehicle regulations.

Localization levels achieved in Pakistan vary by model but are significant by parts count — typically between 50% and 70% — particularly for long-running high-volume models like the Toyota Corolla, Honda City, and Suzuki Alto. Value-based localization, however, remains lower, around 40% to 60% on average, because high-value powertrain and electronic systems, including engines, transmissions, hybrid ECUs, and advanced infotainment units, remain largely imported. his split is typical for emerging auto industries, where structural constraints — not technical capacity — determine which components can be localized first. Even so, the ecosystem has proven its ability to manufacture technically demanding parts through joint ventures and technical assistance agreements with global Tier-1 suppliers such as Aisin Seiki, Toyoda Gosei, Koito, and Denso.

The expansion of OEMs following the Auto Development Policy 2016–21 was widely expected to accelerate localization by bringing in new investment, technology transfer, and vendor development. Instead, the opposite occurred. New entrants relied heavily on Completely Knocked Down (CKD) kits, taking advantage of five-year duty concessions that made imported assemblies cheaper than local sourcing. Rather than boosting demand for domestic parts, the proliferation of OEMs fragmented the market across too many models, diluting per-model volumes and undermining the economies of scale required for further localization.

Despite this policy setback, Japanese brands — which have decades-long supplier relationships — continue to drive most localization. Toyota's Corolla, for instance, achieves 60–65% localization by count and about 60% by value. Honda's City maintains similar levels, while Suzuki's Alto, the best-selling small car in the country, exceeds 60% by count and roughly 30–35% by value. These achievements underscore the maturity of Pakistan's vendor base and the ability to meet global quality benchmarks when supported by stable volumes and long production cycles.

The next phase of localization will hinge on policy realignment. As duty concessions for Korean and Chinese OEMs expire in 2026, these brands will face stronger incentives to

*Figure 17: Automotive components localized in Pakistan*




source locally. Targeting higher-value components — powertrains, electronics, and safety systems — will not only deepen industrial value-addition but also create a natural bridge into export markets. With the technical groundwork already in place, the opportunity is to shift from fragmented, model-specific localization to a more integrated national auto parts strategy that leverages Pakistan's cost competitiveness and geographic advantage.

*Table 2: Localization achieved by automobile industry*[15]

| OEM | Model | Localization Achieved |
|---|---|---|
| Pak Suzuki Motor Company | Alto | 73% |
| | Cultus | 69% |
| | Pickup | 70% |
| | Bolan | 68% |
| | Swift | 38% |
| | Cargo | 68% |
| | Wagon | 32% |
| Toyota Indus Motor | Corolla XLI/GLI (M/AT) 1.3CC | 65% |
| | Corolla A/T 1.6CC | 60% |
| | Corolla M/T 1.8CC | 60% |
| Honda Atlas Cars | Civic VTI MT/AT 1.3/1.5 | 58% |
| | City MT/AT 1.3/ASP 1.5/1.3 | 68% |

[15] *Source: Ministry of Industries, PAAPAM*

The Japanese cars produced in Pakistan have the highest level of localization. The new entrants i.e. Korean and Chinese brands have hesitated to localize parts due to 50% reduced duty rates. However, as their incentives expire in the year 2026. Here, policy consistency is paramount as government needs to ensure Korean and Chinese OEMs should start their localization process.

## 4.6. Aftersales Market Remains an Untapped PKR 155bn Goldmine

The aftersales market typically generates 5-10 times the volume of OEM supply as vehicles require recurring parts replacement over their lifecycle. Unfortunately, this huge market is virtually inaccessible to local manufacturers due to rampant under-invoicing, misdeclaration and smuggling of imported auto parts. Furthermore, the government has not enforced sales tax at retail stage due to which tax compliant local manufacturers are forced to compete with sales tax evading products.

To put the opportunity in perspective, Pakistan currently has 39 million vehicles on road. Out of this, the major chunk is dominated by LCVs – 2/3 wheelers, cars, pickups (96% of total) with motorcycles dominating with a total of 81% of total LCVs followed by cars (13%). Even under a highly conservative assumption that only 1% of per-capita expenditure flows into the aftersales market for these LCVs, the potential market size is approximately PKR 155 billion or USD $544 million annually.




*Figure 18: Pakistan average on road vehicle distribution*

Despite the stagnant volumes and lack of support promised by the Government under the various automobile policies (2007, 2012 and 2021), the auto parts manufacturers have performed admirably to survive and contribute towards localization. This is despite the duty reductions provided for 5 years to new entrants for import of locally manufactured parts under the Auto Development Plan 2016-2021 which meant near zero localization of components by these new assemblers.

# 5.
# PAKISTAN AUTO PARTS INDUSTRY: MYTHS VS REALITY

Before examining the deeper structural challenges confronting Pakistan's automobile parts industry, it is important to first dispel the misconceptions that have clouded perceptions of this sector. Over the years, a series of allegations — often rooted in preconceived notions rather than evidence — have shaped an unfair narrative around the industry. This bias has seeped into policy design itself, influencing decisions like those embedded in AIDEP 2021–26 and the proposed NTP 2025–30. These policies, rather than supporting industrial growth, have inadvertently harmed not only the vendor ecosystem but also the broader economy. A more objective assessment, grounded in actual data and outcomes, would reveal an entirely different reality — one where Pakistan's auto parts manufacturers stand as a key enabler of industrialization, value addition, and job creation.

## Myth 1: Car Assemblers Merely Join the Parts Imported from their Principals

**Fact:** Pakistan hosts a full-fledged auto parts manufacturing ecosystem that produces between 40% and 60% of a vehicle's components locally, including critical assemblies such as engines and transmissions. This network provides livelihood to 1.83 million people, of which 300,000 are directly employed in auto parts industry. Far from being "screwdriver plants," the industry represents decades of investment in tooling, technology, and quality systems that meet global standards (ISO-certified, UN Regulation compliant), forming the backbone of Pakistan's automotive value chain.

## Myth 2: Car Assemblers Enjoy Unreasonably Large Profits

**Fact:** Profit margins in Pakistan's automobile and auto parts industry are modest, averaging 10% gross. This is significantly lower than many other domestic industries: cement sector averages around 32%, oil and gas over 70%, and FMCG around 36%. Despite heavy investment in tooling, compliance, and localization, auto manufacturers face thin margins due to small volumes, high fixed costs, and frequent policy reversals — a reality often overlooked in public discourse.

*Table 3: Financial margin comparison*[16]

**Year Ended FY24**

| Company | Revenue PKR 000 | PAT PKR 000 | GPM % | NPM % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Automobile** | | | | |
| Atlas Honda Limited | 159,292,229 | 9,708,045 | 8 | 6 |
| Indus Motor Company Ltd | 152,481,025 | 15,072,426 | 13 | 10 |
| **Cement** | | | | |
| Lucky Cement | 115,324,942 | 28,106,539 | 34 | 24 |
| Bestway Cement | 103,922,263 | 13,768,575 | 31 | 13 |
| Fauji Cement | 80,026,226 | 8,223,116 | 32 | 10 |
| Kohat Cement | 38,647,768 | 8,893,455 | 29 | 23 |
| **Oil & Gas** | | | | |
| Oil & Gas Development Company Limited | 463,697,861 | 208,975,771 | 61 | 45 |
| Mari Energies Ltd | 181,828,621 | 77,288,111 | 88 | 43 |
| Pakistan Petroleum Limited | 288,797,413 | 114,309,077 | 66 | 40 |
| **Commercial Banks** | | | | |
| United Bank Limited | 260,908,948 | 80,527,534 | N/A | 31 |
| Meezan Bank Ltd | 315,917,305 | 101,507,524 | N/A | 21 |
| MCB | 186,526,748 | 57,614,510 | N/A | 16 |
| **FMCG** | | | | |
| Nestle Pakistan | 193,205,756 | 14,807,971 | 36 | 8 |
| Colgate-Palmolive | 113,230,777 | 17,292,230 | 33 | 15 |
| Unilever | 33,712,049 | 6,974,631 | 39 | 21 |

## Myth 3: The Local Parts Used in Passenger Cars Are of Low Quality & Old Technology

**Fact:** Pakistan's locally manufactured parts comply with European safety regulations and stringent Japanese Inspection Standards (JIS), the same benchmarks applied in advanced automotive markets. Global OEMs such as Suzuki, Toyota, and Honda only approve a locally produced part after it passes rigorous laboratory testing and validation, often including certification in Japan. Far from being "low-tech," local vendors have invested in modern tooling and quality systems that meet ISO and UN regulatory standards, enabling these parts to compete globally on safety and performance (see Annexure F).

## Myth 4: Local Industry Offers Obsolete Models Carrying Little Social Appeal & Leaving Little Choice for Customers

**Fact:** Pakistan's automotive market spans the full spectrum of modern vehicle technologies — from Internal Combustion Engines (ICE) to Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs), Plug-in

[16] *Source: Company Financials*

Hybrids (PHEVs), and Battery Electric Vehicles (BEVs). Far from being outdated, the current lineup includes a diverse range of models: Suzuki Alto and Swift, Toyota Corolla and Yaris, Honda City and Civic, Hyundai Elantra and Tucson, and GWM Haval H6, among others. This breadth ensures Pakistani consumers have access to both entry-level and premium options, comparable to offerings in regional markets.

## Myth 5: Local Cars Are Exorbitantly Costly & Beyond the Reach of Market Segment Below Upper Middle Class

**Fact:** The perception of "expensive local cars" arises primarily from taxation, not production costs. Government levies other than custom duties, including Federal Excise Duty, GST, withholding tax, and registration fees, cumulatively account for 35–58% of the retail price of vehicles in Pakistan. When these taxes are stripped out, locally assembled models are competitive, and often cheaper than regional counterparts due to high localization, despite custom duty protection. It is paramount that these other taxes in the form of ACD, RD, FED, Sales Tax, WHT, AST and CVT be reduced or removed in order to kick in consumer demand which will increase industry volumes and its competitiveness by virtue of economies of scale. On the flipside, slashing custom duties would strip away crucial competitive advantage without necessarily reducing the burden on end consumers due to other taxes, and hence yield no significant economic benefit but result in industry closures and unemployment.

*Table 4: Duty structure of Passenger Cars & LCV (ICE)*[17]

**CBU Duties Structure for Passenger Cars & LCV (ICE)**

| Engine Band | CD | ACD | RD | FED | ST | WHT | AST | CVT | NEVAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Upto 850cc | 50% | 0% | 0% | 2.5% | 25% | 6% | 0% | 0% | 1% |
| 851-1000cc | 55% | 6% | 10% | 2.5% | 25% | 6% | 3% | 0% | 1% |
| 1001-1299cc | 60% | 6% | 10% | 10% | 25% | 6% | 3% | 0% | 1% |
| 1300cc only due NEVAL | 60% | 6% | 10% | 10% | 25% | 6% | 3% | 0% | 2% |
| 1301-1500cc | 60% | 6% | 10% | 10% | 25% | 6% | 3% | 1% | 2% |
| 1501-1799cc | 75% | 6% | 10% | 10% | 25% | 6% | 3% | 1% | 2% |
| 1800cc only due FED | 75% | 6% | 10% | 30% | 25% | 6% | 3% | 1% | 2% |
| 1801-3000cc (Petrol) | 100% | 6% | 50% | 30% | 25% | 6% | 3% | 1% | 3% |
| 1801-2500cc (Diesel) | 100% | 6% | 50% | 30% | 25% | 6% | 3% | 1% | 3% |
| >3000 cc (Petrol) | 100% | 6% | 50% | 40% | 25% | 6% | 3% | 1% | 3% |
| >2500cc (Diesel) | 100% | 6% | 50% | 40% | 25% | 6% | 3% | 1% | 3% |

[17] *Source: Finance Bill*




*Figure 19: Incidence of duties and taxes*

For instance, on a pre-tax basis, locally assembled models such as the Toyota Corolla, Honda City, and Suzuki Alto are priced competitively due to strong localization (60%-65% by parts, and 30%-50% by value) and cost-effective vendor production. The real cost-saving contribution of domestic parts is routinely overlooked in public discourse and current policies that reward CKD imports risk undermining this progress. (See Section 7 for price comparison).

## Myth 6: Auto Assemblers Have Made Arbitrary Increases in Vehicle Prices

**Fact:** Vehicle price adjustments in Pakistan are primarily driven by foreign exchange fluctuations, tax changes, and rising input costs, rather than arbitrary decisions by assemblers. When exchange rates and taxes remain stable, many models have seen extended periods of unchanged pricing.

Between 2019 and 2025, the prices of most essential commodities and construction inputs in Pakistan surged between 127% and 170% — fertilizer rose 170%, cement 160%, rice and sugar 151%, and petrol 127%. In comparison, automobile prices increased by 104% over the same period — broadly in line with wheat (90%) and electricity (98%) and significantly lower than several essentials. This indicates that local assemblers have not imposed disproportionate price hikes; rather, vehicle price increases mirror Pakistan's broader inflationary environment and heavy rupee depreciation.

*Table 5: Price comparison across commodities*

| Commodity/Article | Indices (June-2019) | Indices (June 2025) | Change % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wheat | 104.69 | 198.41 | 90% |
| Rice | 125.21 | 314.81 | 151% |
| Sugar | 113.69 | 285.31 | 151% |
| Cotton Cloth | 122.23 | 297.99 | 144% |
| Petrol | 154.48 | 350.16 | 127% |
| Fertilizer | 101.48 | 273.77 | 170% |
| Cement | 108.73 | 282.38 | 160% |
| Electricity | 112 | 221.44 | 98% |
| Cars | 129.34 | 264.37 | 104% |

*Source: PBS*

## Myth 7: Assemblers Suppress Production and Utilize Supply Shortage to Charge Premiums from End Users

**Fact:** Pakistan's auto industry currently has surplus installed capacity, with 13 OEMs competing across multiple segments. No assembler benefits from underutilizing capacity — reduced production directly increases unit costs and erodes competitiveness. The premiums (commonly called "own money") often blamed on assemblers are, in reality, a product of speculative investors and brokers who hoard vehicles and exploit impatient buyers.

*Table 6: Pakistan Auto Industry Capacity utilization*[18]

| Particulars | | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Installed Capacity | No. | 500,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 |
| Production | No. | 109,958 | 182,867 | 270,854 | 133,317 | 100,674 | 148,209 |
| Capacity Utilization | | 22% | 37% | 54% | 27% | 20% | 30% |

These premiums arise in periods of high demand and limited supply — often due to import restrictions, forex shortages, or policy shocks — rather than deliberate actions by OEMs. In every functioning automotive market, it is the government's role to regulate speculative trading, such as by taxing resale within a fixed holding period or mandating registration in the first buyer's name. Without addressing this loophole, premiums will persist regardless of assembler pricing or production volumes. FBR already possesses data of such instances, and this phenomenon can easily be investigated and suppressed.

[18] Source: PAMA, PAAPAM, Industry Reports

## Myth 8: The Auto Industry Is Unfairly and Unnecessarily Protected. Increased Competition and More Players Is the Right Answer

**Fact:** Contrary to the perception of "protectionism," Pakistan's automotive tariff regime has already been liberalized significantly over the past few years. Regulatory and Additional Customs Duties on built-up vehicles have been steadily reduced since 2022 under tariff rationalization and the National Tariff Policy 2025. At the same time, used car imports enjoy heavy duty concessions, i.e., under the Gift, Baggage, and Transfer of Residence schemes, up to 60% depreciation is applied on imported vehicle value, effectively slashing payable duties by more than half.

This policy imbalance has allowed used imports, many 3–5 years old and exempt from local safety and localization requirements, to capture as much as 20–25% of the passenger car market in recent years (discussed in detail in 6.3.). Used car share spikes during downturns in local production, further destabilizing vendor volumes.

Crucially, Pakistan is less protected than its regional peers. Countries like India, Thailand, and Vietnam maintained higher CBU tariffs and strict NTBs during their industrial growth phases, banning used imports outright and tying tariff reductions to localization milestones. Thailand, for example, retained tariffs above 70% and banned used imports since 1978, enabling it to scale to over two million vehicles annually, half for export. Pakistan, by contrast, has reduced protections while permitting mass used imports, the opposite of what successful auto economies have done.

Framing this as "healthy competition" ignores the reality. Local assemblers and parts manufacturers invest heavily in plants, tooling, and compliance, while used imports enter at depreciated values, bypass quality standards, and contribute little to jobs or tax revenue.

## Myth 9: Pakistan Stands More to Benefit from the Importation of Automobiles as Compared to Their Manufacturing

**Fact:** The idea that imports benefit Pakistan more than local production ignores the bigger picture. When a car is imported — new or used — the transaction ends at the port. There are no factories running, no workers employed, no skill transfer, and no local suppliers involved. It is a one-time outflow of foreign exchange with no multiplier for the economy.

Local manufacturing is the opposite. It sustains over 330,000 direct jobs and another 1.5 million in allied industries, from steel and plastics to logistics and services. It builds a vendor base, creates technological linkages with global OEMs, and generates multiple layers of tax revenue along the supply chain. This is why every serious auto-producing country — from

India to Thailand to Vietnam — chose industrialization over imports; it is the only path that turns cars into an engine of growth rather than a drain on foreign reserves.

## Myth 10: The Import of Used Cars Has No Adverse Effect on the Volumes of the Domestic Industry

**Fact:** Over the last decade, Pakistan has imported an average of 34,000 used vehicles annually, making used imports the second-largest source of cars in the market, rivaling or exceeding volumes of major OEMs. Because total market demand is finite, every used vehicle imported represents a direct loss of sales for domestic assemblers and parts vendors.

This isn't just about final assembly, it strips away demand for locally produced tires, seats, wiring harnesses, lamps, and hundreds of other components that sustain 300,000 direct jobs in the vendor ecosystem. In markets like India and Thailand, used car imports are negligible, which allows local industries to scale. Pakistan's high import share (20–25%) is an anomaly and a major factor behind underutilized vendor capacity.

## Myth 11: Automobile Industry Stands an Unlikely Chance of Survival Given Government Protection Removal

**Fact:** As noted in Myth 8, there is no "excessive protection" for the industry. In reality, duties on CBUs have been reduced while used imports enjoy up to 60% duty depreciation, creating intense competition for local manufacturers. At the same time, the government collects a tax burden of around 35-58% of the vehicle price through customs duties, FED, GST, WHT, and registration fees, making the industry a net contributor to revenue, not a drain.

## Myth 12: Local Cars Have Very Long Delivery Lead Periods

**Fact:** In normal market conditions, most locally assembled models are delivered within 60 days of booking. Extended lead times occur only for a handful of high-demand models, often during exceptional periods such as supply chain disruptions or import restrictions. Importantly, government regulations require assemblers to compensate customers at KIBOR +3% for any delay beyond 60 days, which serves as a safeguard that discourages prolonged waiting times and compels timely production. Refer to Annexure G for the S.R.O notification.

## Myth 13: Pakistan Is Dependent on Foreign Technology for Car Manufacturing

**Fact:** It is true that Pakistan currently relies heavily on foreign technology, but this dependence is the result of policy inconsistency rather than lack of capability. Local entrepreneurs have attempted indigenous development — most notably Adam Motors'

800cc Revo in 2005, launched at just Rs 269,000. Despite its potential, the project collapsed within a year due to the flood of used car imports and absence of protective industrial policy.

With consistent support — as seen in India, Thailand, and Vietnam, where governments nurtured local R&D alongside foreign collaborations — Pakistan could gradually reduce its reliance on imported technology. The vendor base already manufactures engines, transmissions, and critical components locally; scaling this into full vehicle platforms requires stable policy, R&D incentives, and protection against disruptive used imports (see Annexure H).

## Myth 14: Import of Used Cars is Beneficial for Consumers & Government of Pakistan

**Fact:** As explained in Myth 9, used car imports provide short-term consumer relief at best but create long-term economic harm — draining foreign exchange, displacing local jobs, and undermining tax revenue from domestic manufacturing. Any short-term price advantage for consumers comes at the cost of lost industrial growth and reduced government revenue.

# 6.
# PAKISTAN AUTO PARTS INDUSTRY: CHALLENGES

## 6.1. Why These Challenges Matter

Before diving deeper into the subject, we would like to reiterate that the APMs are the heart of Pakistan's automotive industry, generating 90% of all sectoral employment and driving technical know-how that feeds into broader engineering and manufacturing capabilities. Yet, despite its critical role, this backbone of industrialization remains chronically neglected by policymakers. The government has accused the sector of not performing despite being provided with a safety net, and therefore, increasing competition by slashing down CKD import duties from 50% to 15% by 2030.

In this section, we would highlight the key structural challenges that the auto parts sector faces and that the accusation is far from reality, i.e., the issues do not lie in the performance of the sector, but rather in the management of the sector by policymakers. While global peers have leveraged their parts industries to achieve scale, exports, and innovation, Pakistan's APMs continue to operate under capacity, trapped in cycles of policy inconsistency, weak enforcement, and market distortions created by used car imports.

This section dissects the structural and policy challenges holding back Pakistan's APM sector — from broken promises in successive auto policies to the corrosive impact of unchecked used car inflows — and argues why superficial measures like high duties have failed to spur competitiveness or exports.

## 6.2. Lack of Government Support, Policy Inconsistencies, and Frequent Shifts

For two decades, Pakistan's auto parts manufacturers have faced a policy environment that recognizes their importance on paper but abandons them in practice. Every major auto policy — AIDP 2007–12, ADP 2016–21, AIDEP 2021–26 — promised ambitious support measures: testing laboratories to meet UN and ECE standards, technology acquisition funds to help vendors modernize, cluster development to achieve scale, and technical training programs to close the skill gap. None of these materialized. Beyond minor tariff adjustments, no tangible infrastructure or institutional support was ever delivered.

This structural neglect has left APMs competing at a disadvantage, despite being the backbone of the industry and the primary source of its employment and value addition. Global peers took the opposite approach. India's ACMA, supported by government-backed R&D and supplier parks, embedded local vendors into global supply chains, driving auto component exports beyond US$20 billion. Thailand's Board of Investment (BOI) used targeted incentives and industrial clusters to transform the country into a regional manufacturing hub dubbed "the Detroit of Asia." Vietnam leveraged FTAs, political stability, and aggressive investment promotion to pull its suppliers into global automotive and electronics value chains, contributing to US$400 billion in exports by 2024.

Pakistan, despite its 247 million population and proven vendor capabilities, has failed to replicate any of these fundamentals. Without domestic testing facilities, local suppliers must send parts abroad for validation — adding months of delays and prohibitive costs that discourage localization. Without government-backed R&D or export incentives, vendors cannot climb beyond low-value segments. Without stable support programs, even well-capitalized suppliers avoid long-term investments in tooling or joint ventures with global Tier-1 players.

The result is a sector permanently stuck in survival mode. Pakistan's auto parts exports remain negligible by regional standards — not because local manufacturers lack capability, but because the state has never provided the enabling environment required to compete globally. This absence of support is more than a missed opportunity; it is a structural failure that has deprived Pakistan of industrial jobs, foreign exchange savings, and entry into global value chains.




*Figure 20: Auto Policies Performance - Policy Targets vs Actual*[19]

If the absence of support undermines the sector's growth, the lack of predictability destroys it. Pakistan's auto policies have not only failed to deliver promised initiatives — they have also been marked by constant reversals in duties, localization rules, and fiscal incentives, eroding whatever little confidence the industry had left. In an industry that requires three to

[19] *Source: AIDP (2007-12), AIDP (2016-21), and AIDEP (2021-26), PES, Industry Reports*

five years of stability to validate parts, invest in tooling, and achieve economies of scale, this volatility is catastrophic.

AIDP 2007–12 forecasted 500,000 units by 2012, yet midway through its implementation, duty structures were altered and planned initiatives like technology funds and cluster development were shelved. The four-year period from 2012–2016 offered no policy framework at all — an investment vacuum that froze expansion plans for vendors. The ADP 2016–21 then swung in the opposite direction, introducing aggressive incentives for new entrants, including duty concession on already localized parts. Rather than encouraging competition and localization, this policy rewarded import-heavy assembly and eroded the market share of existing vendors who had already invested in local tooling. The current AIDEP 2021–26 repeats similar pledges for exports and parts development, but mid-policy fiscal changes and selective enforcement have again left suppliers in a perpetual state of uncertainty.

For auto parts manufacturers, these constant shifts are more than an inconvenience — they are an existential threat. Suppliers cannot commit capital to new production lines or joint ventures when tariff rates and localization rules change unpredictably. Global Tier-1 suppliers, already cautious about Pakistan's macroeconomic risks, are unwilling to invest in a market where the rules are rewritten midstream.

**Box – II: Why Australia's Auto Industry Collapsed and Lessons for Pakistan**

Australia was once home to a significant automotive manufacturing ecosystem, supported by a robust auto-parts industry. However, by 2017, major automakers (Ford, Toyota, and Holden) ceased local production, leading to the collapse of much of the supplier base.

| Key factors | |
|---|---|
| 1. High Production Costs | ▪ Labor Costs: Australia's labor costs were among the highest in the world, making it difficult to compete with production hubs like Thailand or China.<br>▪ Economies of Scale: Domestic vehicle demand was too small to justify large-scale, cost-efficient manufacturing. |
| 2. Global Supply Chain Realignment | ▪ Multinational automakers shifted production to regional hubs (e.g., Thailand for ASEAN markets) where free-trade agreements, lower labor costs, and integrated supplier bases offered significant cost advantages. |
| 3. Strong Currency Impact | ▪ The Australian dollar's appreciation during the mining boom (2000s) made exports less competitive and increased the relative cost of locally made components. |
| 4. Declining Government Support | ▪ Reduced tariffs (from 57.5% in the 1980s to 5% by 2010s) exposed local producers to import competition without adequate adjustment measures.<br>▪ Limited industry-specific subsidies compared to what Asian competitors provided. |
| 5. Rigid Industrial Structure | ▪ A small domestic supply base over-reliant on a few Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) meant that when Ford, Toyota, and Holden exited, many suppliers lacked the diversification or scale to survive. |

**Box – II: Why Australia's Auto Industry Collapsed and Lessons for Pakistan**

**Lessons for Pakistan**

| Lesson | Rationale | Actions |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Build Scale Through Regional Integration and Exports | **Why:** Australia's industry collapsed because it relied solely on a small domestic market | ▪ Negotiate trade agreements with regional markets to make Pakistan a parts-export hub.<br>▪ Incentivize export-oriented production with tax breaks or rebates for firms achieving a minimum export threshold.<br>▪ Develop specialized supplier clusters for auto components to achieve economies of scale. |
| 2. Diversify OEM Supplier base | **Why:** Australia's reliance on three OEMs left suppliers vulnerable to their exit | ▪ Expand vendor industry reach to new automakers through policy initiatives focusing on localization across-board and not for select of legacy players like Toyota, Honda and Suzuki<br>▪ Support SME auto-part suppliers through access to credit, technology partnerships, and vendor development programs.<br>▪ Promote joint ventures with global Tier-1 suppliers for technology transfer and market linkages. |
| 3. Shift towards rationalization and R&D | **Why:** Australia dismantled protection too quickly; Pakistan risks industry closure likewise | ▪ Link tariff reduction to performance-based localization targets across all OEMs<br>▪ Offer R&D grants and productivity-linked incentives to help suppliers become globally competitive before trade barriers are lowered.<br>▪ Establish and implement a time-bound localization roadmap to ensure readiness for global competition. |
| 4. Institutional and Security reforms | **Why:** Unlike Australia, Pakistan faces security concerns that deter FDI | ▪ Provide dedicated security for industrial zones to mitigate investor risk perception.<br>▪ Create one-window investment facilitation authorities for the automotive sector.<br>▪ Strengthen legal enforcement for contracts and intellectual property, critical for attracting global suppliers. |
| 5. Technology Upgradation and Workforce Development | **Why:** Low productivity and lack of adoption of modern technology undermine competitiveness | ▪ Create auto-technology training institutes in partnership with OEMs.<br>▪ Facilitate automation and digital manufacturing adoption through subsidized financing.<br>▪ Establish vendor development programs modeled on Japan's keiretsu system to enhance quality and reliability. |

Source: PAAPAM Research

Two decades of this unpredictability have created a deep credibility gap between industry and government. Each new policy cycle is met with skepticism, not optimism, because experience shows that commitments are rarely upheld. Until Pakistan can demonstrate consistency — maintaining agreed frameworks, aligning fiscal measures with industrial goals, and resisting ad hoc reversals — the auto parts sector will remain trapped in low-value

survival mode while competitors like India, Thailand, and Vietnam continue to accelerate ahead.

Annexure I further depicts the key targets that were set in these policies vs how far they lagged from the actual. Annexure J depicts the policy timeline since 2010.

### 6.3. Used Car Imports Crisis: When APMs Pay the Price

The government policies over the past two decades have systematically tilted the playing field against local parts manufacturers. Starting from the Auto Development Policy (2016-21), new vehicle assemblers were granted a five-year, 30% duty concession on localized parts. These assemblers imported CKD kits with minimal localization. Despite selling in a domestic market that desperately needs industrial jobs, these companies remained focused on importing, not developing local supply chains.

Moreover, the influx of new OEMs (from 3 to 13 assemblers post-2016) did not expand market demand. Instead, the number of models per OEM increased, fragmenting demand and reducing per-model volumes — a critical factor in achieving localization feasibility. In a volume-sensitive industry like auto parts, low production runs render localization economically unviable. As a result, APMs faced business loss, underutilized capacity, and even closure.

At the same time, liberalized imports of used cars through schemes like Baggage and Transfer of Residence further decimated demand for new, locally assembled vehicles. In 2024–25, almost 40,000 used cars were imported, capturing nearly a quarter of the market. This single channel alone cost local parts manufacturers an estimated Rs 60 billion in lost revenues and over 40,000 potential jobs.

It is rather ironic that while the Government touts industrialization and employment, its own policies have subsidized importers and undermined domestic manufacturers who invest in plants, technology, and people.

No serious automotive manufacturing nation tolerates large-scale used car imports. From Thailand to Vietnam and India, every successful auto economy has treated second-hand vehicle inflows as an existential threat to domestic industrialization. These countries understood a fundamental truth: building a robust auto parts ecosystem requires scale, predictability, and demand for new vehicles. Allowing an unchecked influx of used cars, especially through backdoor channels, undermines all three.

*Table 7: Used car policy comparison*

| Aspect | Pakistan | India | Thailand | Vietnam |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Allowance** | Yes (gift, baggage & personal use) | Yes (strict, personal) | Effectively banned | Yes (strict controls) |
| **Age Limit** | 3 yrs (cars), 5 yrs (SUVs, Vans) | 3 yrs | N/A (banned) | 5 yrs |
| **Main Route** | Gift / Transfer of Residence | Returning NRIs / residence | Diplomats or rare exemptions | Individual import |
| **Duties/Taxes** | USD slabs (Asian makes):<br>• 800cc: $4,800<br>• 801–1000cc: $6,000<br>• 1001–1300cc: $13,200<br>Depreciation of up to 60% allowed before duty calculation (based on fixed Retail Selling Price), then applicable duty/taxes applied on depreciated value. | 70% Basic Customs Duty + 67.5% AIDC (≈137.5%) + GST (28%) = 180-200% effective | imports prohibited; if allowed, tariffs can exceed 200% (Import Duty 80% + Excise 50% + VAT 7%) | 0–80% Import Duty + 50–150% Special Consumption Tax (SCT) + 10% VAT = 150–200% effective |
| **Used Cars Volume** | 38,520 | Negligible | 0 | Negligible |




*Figure 21: Used car imports breakdown by category – 2025*[20]

[20] *Source: PAAPAM*

Historically, Pakistan's used car imports have outweighed its peers in the region and stands out as the singular anomaly to import used cars as an auto-producing country. Despite having a decade-old vendor base and active localization policies on paper, it continues to permit the mass import of used vehicles — total 38,272 units annually as of FY25, capturing 25% of domestic passenger car sales (excluding vans and SUVs). This is not a marginal leak but a structural distortion: a parallel car market, operating through loopholes intended for overseas Pakistanis, that competes directly with locally assembled vehicles and hollows out the country's vendor ecosystem.

For Pakistan's auto parts manufacturers, the stakes could not be higher. Every used vehicle imported represents a lost sale of locally manufactured parts, forgone tax revenues, and an opportunity cost in jobs and industrial capability. The crisis is not accidental; it is the consequence of policy neglect and misplaced priorities, where revenue collection and consumer appeasement have been allowed to trump industrial strategy.




*Figure 22: Average annual used car imports*[21]

**Prohibitions and Strategic Consumer Protection Measures: Lessons from Global Peers**

None of the 46 automobile manufacturing countries in the world allow unrestricted import of used vehicles. Used vehicle imports are non-existent in China, India, Indonesia, Thailand or Malaysia as these countries focus on using the auto industry to expand their level of industrialization.

[21] *Source: PAAPAM, SIAM, Thailand Automotive Institute, VAMA*

Thailand offers perhaps the most instructive case. As far back as 1978, Thai policymakers imposed an outright ban on used car imports. This was not a temporary measure; it was integral to a phased strategy aimed at forcing investment into local assembly and parts manufacturing. The ban was reinforced by local content requirements that climbed steadily from 25% in the mid-1970s to over 70% by the early 1990s. Combined with tariffs exceeding 150% on completely built units (CBUs) and targeted consumer protection measures such as excise tax incentives for specific vehicle segments, this policy framework enabled Thailand to achieve volumes of over two million vehicles annually, half of which are now exported.

Vietnam followed a similar path by prohibiting used imports while layering stringent consumer protection measures on new vehicles. Decree 116, introduced in 2018, mandated batch testing of every import lot, foreign-issued type approvals, and licensing requirements that effectively curtailed casual imports and pushed global OEMs toward local assembly. Tariffs on CBUs remained high — 70 to 90 percent — while CKD (completely knocked down) kits enjoyed lower rates, incentivizing local value addition. Crucially, these protective measures were gradually rolled back only as Vietnam's vendor base matured and export capability emerged.

India, while not banning used car imports outright, rendered them commercially unviable through consumer protection measures. Stringent homologation, emissions, and safety requirements — including Bharat Stage emission norms and BIS quality certifications — ensured that second-hand vehicles rarely met compliance thresholds. Combined with tariffs ranging from 60 to 100 percent, the result was a de facto prohibition that safeguarded local industry without an explicit ban.

Indonesia adopted an even more uncompromising stance, maintaining a blanket ban on used vehicle imports and aligning all policy instruments — tariffs, NTBs, and localization incentives — toward developing domestic manufacturing clusters. Today, these clusters form part of ASEAN's integrated automotive supply chains, exporting components and sub-assemblies across the region.

These countries' experiences converge on a single lesson: *protection, when strategically deployed and phased, is the foundation of competitiveness*. Used car bans and NTBs are not anti-consumer measures; they are industrial enablers that create the conditions for vendor scale, cost reduction, and eventual export competitiveness.

**Pakistan's Anomaly: A Market Captured by Loopholes**

Against this backdrop, Pakistan's policy appears almost self-sabotaging. Rather than banning used imports outright, it facilitates them through three loopholes — the Gift, Baggage, and Transfer of Residence schemes — ostensibly designed for overseas Pakistanis returning home. In practice, these schemes have been hijacked by commercial traders who

import vehicles in bulk under expatriate names, sell them in the open market, and bypass both industrial policy and tax scrutiny.

The numbers are equally damning each year. Unfortunately, due to low fixed duties applicable on used vehicles below 1300 cc and also permission to import 5-years old vans, these vehicles have captured almost 25% of total market with over 38,000 vehicles. This means that, combined as a group, used vehicles are now the second biggest player in Pakistan market volume after locally produced Suzuki vehicles and have a bigger share than locally produced Toyota, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Haval, MG or Changan. This influx is not a mere alternative for niche demand; it directly competes with locally assembled models in the most price-sensitive segments of the market. Interestingly, Pakistan is the only auto-producing country in the APAC region to import used cars to such an extent.




*Figure 23: Used car market share among APAC automobile producers*[22]

The impact on local assemblers is immediate: reduced production volumes, underutilized capacity, and diminished incentives to deepen localization. For parts manufacturers, the fallout is catastrophic.

Every used vehicle imported into Pakistan displaces the sale of a new localized vehicle. This displacement translates into hard losses for domestic vendors. We have estimated PKR 60

[22] *Source: OECD*
*Value for Pakistan is Jul-May25*

billion in potential annual parts sales are lost to these 5-year old used car imports. Components such as wiring harnesses, dashboards, suspension arms, seats, and infotainment systems, all manufactured locally to serve new assembly, find no market in a flood of pre-assembled used vehicles.

The employment cost is equally stark. Pakistan's auto parts industry sustains a large share of the manufacturing labor force, with each 1,000 localized vehicles supporting roughly 1,000 direct jobs and multiple indirect roles across logistics, raw material supply, and aftermarket services. By this measure, the 40,000 used cars imported annually represent **40,000 direct job losses** — a staggering blow in a sector prized for its labor intensity and multiplier effects.

*Table 8: Used car impact annual*

| | |
|---|---|
| Used car imports per year | 40,000 vehicles |
| Average value of local parts per vehicle | Rs 1.5 million |
| Annual loss of revenue for APMs | Rs 60 billion |
| Direct jobs lost at OEM & APM factories | 40,000 Pakistani jobs lost |

**Informal Channels are the Hidden Drain**

The most perverse aspect of Pakistan's policy is its implicit expectation that brand-new localized vehicles should compete with five-year-old fully built imports. New cars carry the cost of fresh manufacturing, compliance with current safety and emissions standards, and investment in localized parts. Used imports, in contrast, are fully depreciated, often sold below cost in their home markets, and enter Pakistan without contributing to local value addition or jobs. A summary of a former report published by PAAPAM on used car imports, specifically from Japan and its domestic impacts is attached in Annexure K.

No other auto-manufacturing country allows this. The competitive distortion is so severe that it depresses local assembly volumes, discourages investment in vendor upgrades, and traps Pakistan in a low-scale, low-tech cycle. Simply put, expecting new cars to compete against aged imports is industrial malpractice.

The used car import crisis is not merely an industrial issue; it is a fiscal and financial integrity issue. Investigations and surveys reveal that this misuse is characterized by purchase of third-party passports of overseas Pakistanis, remittance of payments to Japanese auction houses through illegal Hawala channels, sale of vehicles against cash to ultimate buyers and evasion of income tax on 10%-20% profit earned by importers.

These imports are financed through hawala channels, with payments settled offshore and vehicles declared under personal schemes to evade scrutiny. Once landed, these cars are

sold domestically through informal transactions, bypassing sales tax and documentation requirements. Prices of these vehicles auctioned through Japan are attached in Annexure L.




*Figure 24: The process of importing used cars*

The consequence is twofold: not only do these imports drain foreign exchange, but they also undermine Pakistan's formal financial system, fueling undocumented capital flows at a time when the country is struggling to stabilize its external account and meet IMF compliance benchmarks.

**Raising Duties Alone Will Not Work**

Raising duties on used cars addresses none of these problems. The majority of imports enter under personal schemes that are duty-exempt or heavily under-invoiced. Even where duties are collected, they fail to address the underlying industrial harm: new localized vehicles remain forced to compete against older imports, and local parts manufacturers see no benefit.

The only meaningful solutions are prohibitive NTBs and outright bans — the approach taken by every successful auto economy. Age limits (three years or less), mandatory pre-shipment inspections for safety and emissions compliance, and digital verification of overseas Pakistanis are basic first steps. Without these, duties alone simply raise consumer prices without solving the structural distortion.

## 6.4. Boom-Bust Cycles and Stagnation

Pakistan's APMs have been forced to operate in lockstep with the country's broader economic volatility. Every few years, macroeconomic booms — marked by brief surges in consumption and vehicle sales — are followed by deep busts triggered by balance-of-payments crises, currency collapses, and fiscal tightening. Instead of a steady upward growth trajectory, the auto sector has endured repeated start-stop cycles that prevent long-term planning and investment.

The result is stagnation. The first AIDP (2007–2012) was launched in the aftermath of a remarkable surge — auto production had grown 400% from 40,000 units in 1999 to over 160,000 by 2006, and policymakers projected 500,000 units by 2012. That milestone was never reached. The global financial crisis of 2008, combined with domestic energy shortages and political instability, derailed momentum. Recovery during the mid-2010s proved short-lived, as currency depreciation and policy reversals triggered another slump in 2019,

followed by an even deeper collapse in 2023. By 2024, total production volumes remained virtually unchanged from 2005 levels, despite Pakistan's population having grown by nearly 90 million people in that time.




*Figure 25: Automobile production over different economic periods*[23]

For parts manufacturers, this volatility is punishing. Localization is scale-dependent: dies, tooling, and validation processes only make sense when production runs are predictable and sustained. Every downturn forces vendors to idle plants, lay off skilled workers, and abandon planned investments which keep capacity utilization chronically below 50%. Instead of climbing the value chain, suppliers remain stuck producing low-value components, unable to justify upgrades or pursue joint ventures with global Tier-1 players.

The broader costs are immense. Each downturn reverberates through allied industries — steel, plastics, logistics, retail — and erodes the skilled labor pool needed for future growth. Global suppliers, observing these swings, avoid committing to Pakistan, preferring stable markets like India or Thailand, where volumes scaled into the millions over the same period. While Pakistan's auto output flatlined, India grew from 1 million to over 4 million units annually, and Thailand built an export base of more than 2 million vehicles per year.

Breaking this cycle requires more than another auto policy. It demands sustained macroeconomic stability — predictable exchange rates, coherent fiscal measures, and demand-side incentives that make new vehicles affordable for first-time buyers. Without

[23] Source: PAAPAM, PAMA

addressing this deeper boom-bust trap, the auto parts sector will remain locked in reactive survival mode, unable to achieve the economies of scale critical for competitiveness and exports.




*Figure 26: GDP growth trend Pakistan vs its peers*[24]

## 6.5. Limited FDI and Global Integration

Pakistan's auto parts sector does not exist in isolation; it is part of a fiercely competitive global supply chain where multinational Tier-1 suppliers determine where to invest based on scale, stability, and strategic incentives. In this contest, Pakistan has been conspicuously absent. While Thailand, Vietnam, and India have successfully attracted global giants — embedding them into their domestic ecosystems and leveraging them for exports — Pakistan's market remains an afterthought, bypassed in favor of more predictable manufacturing hubs.

Over the last decade, Pakistan's net FDI inflows have averaged less than US$2 billion annually, with manufacturing receiving only a fraction. Additionally, FDI as a % of GDP has also remained very low, with 0.7% of total GDP. Vietnam, by contrast, attracted over US$4 billion in January 2025 alone, channeling the bulk into high-value manufacturing and automotive supply chains and has an FDI/GDP of 4.23%, this is 6 times higher than what Pakistan currently attracts. This divergence is not due to geography or labor cost — Pakistan's wages are competitive, and its population exceeds Vietnam's — but rather policy and perception. Investors prize consistency and safety, and Pakistan offers neither, because of which the investment climate has been impacted.

[24]Source: World Bank, PBS




*Figure 27: FDI inflows Pakistan and its peers (USD Mn)*[25]

Global Tier-1 suppliers — Denso, Continental, Bosch, Koito — operate in markets where policy frameworks are stable for decades, where industrial clusters reduce costs, and where governments actively co-invest in tooling, testing, and R&D. Pakistan offers none of these. Its policies oscillate every few years, duties shift midstream, and localization targets are unenforced. Infrastructure deficits — from certified testing labs to supplier parks — further deter investment. Even where domestic vendors have forged technical collaborations (e.g., Agriauto with Kayaba, Thal Engineering with Toyota Boshoku), these remain limited to supplying local OEMs, never scaling to export-oriented operations.

The result is a vicious cycle: without Tier-1 presence, local vendors struggle to access global technology and markets. Without local vendor capability, Tier-1s see no reason to invest. Pakistan's auto parts exports languish below US$200 million annually — a rounding error compared to India's US$21 billion auto exports or Thailand's US$33 billion. For a country of 247 million people, this is an indictment of industrial strategy, not market potential.

[25] Source: World Bank

| Category | KPI | Pakistan | India | Thailand | Vietnam |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Macro**[26] | GDP Growth (%) | 2.70% | 6.20% | 1.80% | 5.20% |
| | Per capita Income | $1,840 | $2,880 | $7,770 | $4,232 |
| | Inflation (%) | 4.10% | 2.10% | 0.25% | 3.57% |
| **Export Performance** | Auto Parts Exports ( US$ Mn) | $1.33 | $14,822 | $8,883 | $4,057 |
| | Auto Parts Exports (% of Auto Exports) | 1% | 68% | 26% | 77% |
| | Top Export Markets | Afghanistan, Nigeria | North America, GCC | US, Japan, EU | US, Japan, EU |
| **Policy & Trade Ecosystem** | Trade Access (FTAs) | Limited (China, SAARC) | ASEAN, UAE, EU under negotiation | ASEAN, Japan, China | CPTPP, EVFTA, RCEP |
| | Export Incentives | Sales tax refunds delayed, few dedicated | PLI scheme + SEZs | BOI tax holidays, rebates | Strong SEZ incentives |
| | Policy Consistency | Low — frequent reversals | Moderate to High | High | High |
| **Industrial & Business Base** | No. of Auto Parts Manufacturers* | 1,200 | 800 | 2,400 | 600 |
| | R&D / Testing Infrastructure (WP.29 Recognized)** | N/A | ARAI and other labs | TAI Testing and R&D Centre, ATTRIC | VR Testing Facilities, VAI R&D Centre |
| | Ease of Doing Business Rank (2020) | 108 | 63 | 21 | 70 |
| **Security & Political Stability** | Political Stability Rank (1= Highly Unstable, 100=Highly Stable) | 7 | 21 | 36 | 45 |
| | Mobility of Foreign Staff | Low | Medium | Medium–High | High |
| | Security Protocols Required | Yes, in many zones | Rarely | No | No |
| | Violence/Protest Risk | Frequent & unpredictable | Moderate | Low | Minimal |

[26] Source: World Bank, SBP

*As per official numbers and associations

**WP.29 labs are important for testing parts manufactured for ensuring they meet international criteria

Breaking this impasse requires more than inviting FDI; it demands de-risking Pakistan as an investment destination. That means credible policy continuity, improved law and order to provide sense of safety to investors while travelling, incentives tied to export performance, fast-track approvals for joint ventures, and government-backed testing and certification facilities to meet UN/ECE standards. Without these reforms, Pakistan will remain locked out of global value chains — condemned to assemble cars for a captive domestic market while peers integrate into the world's automotive supply networks.




*Figure 28: Pakistan Business Readiness*[27]

## 6.6. Lack Of Testing and Certification Facilities

For Pakistan's auto parts manufacturers, one of the most crippling barriers to competitiveness is the absence of internationally accredited testing and validation facilities. Every major auto-producing nation — from India and Thailand to Vietnam and Indonesia — invests heavily in domestic labs that certify parts to global standards. Pakistan, despite decades of promises across multiple auto policies, still compels its vendors to ship components overseas for testing — adding months of delay and prohibitive costs that make localization unviable and exports nearly impossible.

The cost implications are severe. Each new component developed for the local or export markets requires validation against UN/ECE safety and performance standards — a process that can cost tens of thousands of dollars per test and add three to six months to development timelines when outsourced abroad. For vendors already operating at thin margins, these costs become a deterrent to entering higher-value segments like airbags, ABS, advanced electronics, or hybrid components. The result is predictable: Pakistan's

[27] Source: World Bank
*Scale: 1= Extremely poor business environment, 100= Ideal business environment

vendor base remains concentrated in low-value parts, while critical safety and electronic systems continue to be imported at high cost.

This failure is not due to lack of awareness. The first Auto Industry Development Plan (2007–2012) explicitly promised the establishment of local testing centers. Subsequent policies — ADP (2016–2021) and AIDEP (2021–2026) — reiterated the same commitment. Yet, nearly two decades later, not a single facility meeting global standards exists. In contrast, India operates a network of Automotive Research Associations (ARAI), Thailand's Automotive Institute runs multiple accredited labs, and Vietnam's MOT-approved centers provide type-approval for both domestic and export markets.

The absence of testing infrastructure perpetuates a vicious cycle:

- **For local OEM supply:** Vendors face delays and added costs, discouraging OEMs from sourcing high-value components locally.
- **For exports:** Without local certification, Pakistani parts struggle to access even regional markets, let alone the EU or North America.
- **For investment:** Global Tier-1 suppliers view the lack of accredited labs as yet another signal that Pakistan is unprepared for serious industrial integration.

Without urgent government intervention to establish internationally accredited testing and homologation centers, Pakistan will remain excluded from the higher-value segments of the global auto supply chain. This is not a matter of convenience — it is a prerequisite for industrial survival in an era where safety, emissions, and quality compliance define market access.

## 6.7. Auto Financing Remains an Integral Blockade

When it comes to understanding domestic car demand, one may be tempted to assume that per capita income increase should proportionally translate into higher car sales. On the contrary, empirical evidence finds that domestic demand for cars deeply depends on the availability of credit to finance the car. Having said that, Pakistan's domestic credit to private sector remains very low at 11% of the total GDP whereas its peers like India, Thailand, and Vietnam has a penetration of 50%, 148%, and 125% respectively. This stark contrast highlights the very picture of Pakistan's financial system, i.e., it is not a deep financial system, nor does it have a strong credit market. Additionally, around 40% of the country's total population is representative of the middle class with more than half of the total population representing individuals under 30 years old. With these numbers in mind, one begs to question then exactly how would this demographic finance a car, if not through credit?




*Figure 29: Domestic credit to private sector (%GDP)*[28]

To add to this dilemma, Pakistan, over the last 5 years, has faced uncertain macroeconomic environment, with highest ever inflation recorded in its history (38%), currency depreciation (28.6%) and interest rate of 23%. It is not surprising that such a macroeconomic environment has made auto financing less accessible to consumers. Perhaps, policies need to focus on improving the demand for cars and investigate reasons for such stagnation rather than focusing on just the supply side.

*Table 9: Pakistan interest rate vs consumer financing as percentage of GDP trend*[29]




[28] Source: World Bank
[29] Source: State Bank of Pakistan

It is also interesting to note that auto-financing makes up 29% of the total consumer financing. However, consumer financing itself just makes up 1.8% of total credit financing. Interestingly, the share of auto financing within total consumer financing in Pakistan remains stable over time and is broadly aligned with or higher than the trends observed in regional peers. This emphasizes the quintessential need for the government to prioritize measures that can further expand access to vehicle loans and ensure affordability and growth in the domestic automotive market.




*Figure 30: Consumer financing as percentage of total credit vs auto financing as percentage of total consumer financing*[30]

## 6.8. The Policy-Execution Gap

Pakistan's auto parts manufacturers are not starved of promises; they are starved of delivery. Every auto policy since 2007 — AIDP, ADP, AIDEP — has outlined a blueprint for transforming the vendor base: testing labs, technology acquisition funds, auto clusters, human resource programs, and export facilitation. These commitments, if honored, would have built a globally competitive ecosystem. Yet nearly two decades later, none of these measures materialized beyond paper. APMs have developed high-quality, export-grade components despite zero state support. It is policy neglect — not capability — that limits their global integration."

This chronic execution gap has eroded trust between industry and policymakers. Announcements are made with fanfare; implementation rarely follows. Testing labs pledged under AIDP 2007? Still absent. Vendor financing schemes under ADP 2016? Never launched.

[30] Source: SBP, RBI, BOT, World Bank

Export incentives under AIDEP 2021? Stalled in committee. Meanwhile, policies are constantly undermined by ad-hoc decisions — abrupt duty changes, tolerance for used car loopholes, and selective concessions for CKD-heavy new entrants.

For auto parts manufacturers, this inconsistency is debilitating. Tooling investments require long lead times and predictable demand; instead, vendors are forced to navigate a stop-start environment where industrial strategy changes with every budget cycle. The consequence is clear: while India, Thailand, and Vietnam climbed the value chain and embedded their suppliers into global platforms, Pakistan's vendors remain locked in survival mode — competitive in capability but denied the scale and policy support needed to reach export readiness.

The lesson is unmistakable. Pakistan's problem is not the absence of policy frameworks; it is the state's inability to implement them. Without credible follow-through — enforcement of localization targets, establishment of promised infrastructure, and consistent protection from destabilizing imports — no new policy will reverse the cycle. The credibility gap must be closed, or the auto parts sector will remain perpetually on the sidelines of Pakistan's industrial ambitions.

## 6.9. Factors Affecting Export Competitiveness

### 6.9.1. Duties Do Not Equate Exports

A recurring argument that has been advanced and echoed by consultants and studies is that reducing import duties on automobiles and parts would "increase competition" and "push vendors toward export competitiveness." This view misdiagnoses the root of Pakistan's auto sector malaise and prescribes a cure that would, in practice, accelerate de-industrialization rather than reverse it.

Competitiveness is not born from exposure alone, it is built on scale, technology, and integration into global value chains. Pakistan's vendors do not lack capability — they lack the ecosystem. Slashing duties in an environment with no accredited testing labs, no structured FDI pipelines, no vendor financing, and no export-linked incentives simply opens the floodgates to CKD imports and used vehicles, crowding out local parts production and eroding the very base needed for export takeoff.

The empirical further reinforces this. Pakistan's own experience post-2016 is instructive: duty concessions for new entrants under the Automotive Development Policy spurred CKD imports, not localization. Despite a proliferation of assemblers, domestic parts producers saw no uplift in demand — volumes fragmented, investments stalled, and the industry slid further into subscale inefficiency. Far from boosting exports, liberalization hollowed out local supply chains.

Contrast this with Thailand and Vietnam, now global automotive export hubs. Their journey to competitiveness followed a deliberate three-step playbook:

1. Protection and NTBs — Shielding local industry during infancy to achieve minimum scale.
2. Structured FDI — Attracting Tier-1/Tier-2 suppliers through joint ventures, industrial parks, and technology transfer mandates.
3. Export-Linked Incentives — Rebates and PLI-style schemes rewarding firms for meeting localization and export targets.

Only once domestic capacity and quality benchmarks were met did these countries gradually lower barriers — by then, their vendors were globally competitive and embedded in regional supply chains.

Pakistan has attempted only the first step — tariffs — and even these are inconsistently applied, riddled with loopholes for CKD and used imports. It has neglected the harder but necessary work of building infrastructure, enforcing policy commitments, and creating scale

economies. To suggest that further duty reductions alone will catalyze exports is to confuse exposure with readiness.

For auto parts manufacturers, the stakes are existential. A premature tariff rollback — absent testing labs, export rebates, or integration into OEM export programs — would not spur innovation; it would decimate the local vendor base. It is not higher or lower duties that determine export potential, but whether Pakistan can replicate the Thailand/Vietnam model: protection phased with FDI, backed by NTBs, and tied to measurable export outcomes. Without this triangle, tariff debates are a distraction — and a dangerous one.

### 6.9.2. Material Dependency and Cost Penalty

Pakistan is unique among major auto-producing nations in having no domestic raw material industry for automotive-grade steel, plastics, rubber, copper, or aluminum. Every input required by vendors — from cold-rolled steel sheets for body panels to plastic resins for dashboards and wiring insulation — must be imported.

This creates a handicap where freight, customs clearance, and port handling add 10–15% to input costs relative to regional competitors.

By contrast, India and Thailand subsidize raw material availability for their automotive sectors:

- India operates domestic steel and polymer industries, exempting exports from duties.
- Thailand offers zero-duty zones for raw materials within its auto clusters, ensuring that localized production always undercuts import alternatives.

Without similar structural support, Pakistani vendors enter export markets carrying an inherent cost disadvantage — before productivity, scale, or quality even come into play.

### 6.9.3. Low Domestic Volumes

Export competitiveness in auto parts is a function of scale. Vendors must amortize tooling and fixed costs over large production runs to reach competitive price points in global markets. Industry consensus places the threshold for competitive scale at 500,000 vehicles annually; below this, per-unit costs remain uncompetitive.

Pakistan's market, despite being the world's fifth most populous country, hovers under 200,000 vehicles annually and has even dipped lower during economic crises. By contrast:

- India's Maruti Suzuki produces 2 million units annually, providing a domestic base to support $20 billion in parts exports.

- Thailand manufactures 1.5 million vehicles annually, half exported, sustaining a globally integrated parts ecosystem.

Without scale, Pakistan's vendors remain trapped in sub-economic volumes. Worse, used car imports (see Section 6.3.) siphon demand from new vehicles, further depressing volumes for local parts and preventing the scale-up needed for exports.

### 6.9.4. Uncompetitive Utilities

Energy is a core cost driver in parts manufacturing, especially for metal stamping, plastic molding, and paint operations. Pakistan's electricity tariffs are among the highest in Asia, regularly exceeding regional averages by 30–40%. Gas tariffs, similarly uncompetitive, disrupt both cost structures and production scheduling, with frequent supply interruptions exacerbating inefficiencies.

Regional peers have turned energy pricing into a competitive advantage:

- Vietnam and Thailand offer industrial tariffs as low as 13–14 cents/kWh, subsidized for export-oriented sectors.
- Pakistan's energy costs of 22 cents/kWh penalize exporters and add volatility through frequent surcharges and quarterly adjustments.

Without reliable, competitively priced energy, vendors struggle to bid on global contracts where cents per component determine contract viability.




*Figure 31: Energy price (cents/kWh)*[31]

[31] Source: World Bank

### 6.9.5. Security And Perception Barriers

Security concerns remain a significant, if under-discussed, export barrier. Foreign Tier-1 suppliers — particularly Chinese and Japanese firms — often cite Pakistan's security environment as a deterrent to joint ventures or technology transfers. Visiting engineers require bulletproof vehicles, armed escorts, and special clearances, adding logistical friction and cost to partnerships.




*Figure 32: Political stability trend*[32]

This perception gap undermines structured FDI, a cornerstone of Thailand and Vietnam's success. Both countries actively marketed themselves as safe, investment-ready hubs for automotive supply chains. Pakistan's inability to project similar stability discourages high-value collaborations, keeping vendors isolated from technology upgrades and global OEM relationships.

[32] Source: World Bank

### Box – III: Terrorism – A Bane for Pakistan's Industrial Growth and Economic Development

**1. Introduction**

Pakistan's struggle to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) is not merely a reflection of poor industrial competitiveness or inadequate incentives. Evidence from academic research and policy commentary suggests that institutional weakness—particularly in ensuring security and the rule of law—is the fundamental constraint. Terrorism has played a central role in shaping investor perceptions, inflating Pakistan's risk premium, and diverting capital to safer competing markets.

This section integrates:

- Commentary, insights and analysis by Dr. Ali Hasanain – famous economist and associate professor at LUMS University
- Ali et al. (2017) "How Terrorism Affects Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan" (published by International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues)

**2. All things are NOT equal**

Ali Hasanain argues that security of life and property is the baseline requirement for a functioning market economy. Without it, Pakistan's industries face a substantial structural disadvantage compared to competitors in countries such as India, Vietnam, and Thailand.

Key observations include:

- Security as a prerequisite: Economic reforms or sector-specific policies will not deliver results if terrorism persists.
- Misplaced blame on industry: Sectors such as automotive manufacturing are often criticized for underperformance, but this ignores the institutional handicap created by persistent insecurity.
- State responsibility: The burden of reform lies on the state and its security institutions, not on individual industries, which cannot thrive in a high-risk environment.
- Illustrative incidents: Attacks targeting foreign workers (e.g. Japanese auto-sector employees) reinforce Pakistan's "high-risk" image and discourage long-term investment commitments.

### Box – III: Terrorism – A Bane for Pakistan's Industrial Growth and Economic Development

***"The negative relationship shows that fatalities and injuries which happened due to terrorist activities highly affect the flow of foreign inflows into Pakistan. The investors change their sentiment due to these events and divert their investment into the economy where there are secure conditions. They feel hesitation to invest in Pakistan. In Pakistan, such kind of attacks diverts more of the foreign investors to neighbor countries" – Ali et el. (2017) International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues***

**Figure 3: World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (2022)**




Source: Dr. Ali Hasanain – Institutions for Growth: A Roadmap for Pakistani Reforms

**4. Integrated Analysis**

| Factor | Impact on Investment |
|---|---|
| Terrorism | Raises risk premium, deters long-term commitments |
| Weak security institutions | Prevent industries from scaling despite competitiveness |
| Investor confidence | Shaped by both objective risk (casualties) and reputational impact |
| Capital Flows | Diverts to safer regional competitors |




Source: South Aisa Terrorism Portal

## Box – III: Terrorism – A Bane for Pakistan's Industrial Growth and Economic Development

### 3. Empirical Evidence Linking Terrorism to FDI

The findings of Ali et al. (2017) empirically validate Hasanain's arguments, showing a direct and statistically significant relationship between terrorism and reduced FDI inflows.

Key results:

- **Severity matters more than frequency:** Fatalities and injuries from terrorism significantly reduce FDI, while the number of incidents alone is not a significant factor in the long term.
- **Volatility in capital flows:** Variance decomposition shows terrorism as a major contributor to FDI volatility, introducing uncertainty that discourages large-scale investments.
- **Risk perception effect:** Elevated security risks increase the "risk premium," pushing investors toward alternative destinations such as India, Vietnam, and Thailand.
- **Economic costs:** Terrorism adds operational burdens such as higher insurance, security, and compliance costs, undermining the viability of new projects.

**Figure 1: Pakistan is a hotspot for most violent terrorist activity in the region**



Source: Global Terrorism Index 2024

### 6.9.6. Absence of Export Incentives and Infrastructure

Perhaps the most decisive factor behind Pakistan's export underperformance is the absence of any coherent export-enabling framework. While regional competitors have systematically used rebates, tax credits, and institutional infrastructure to nurture global competitiveness, Pakistan offers virtually nothing comparable.

India's Production Linked Incentive (PLI) program is a striking benchmark. It provides 6% cash rebates tied to production and export milestones, coupled with low-interest financing and strict localization targets. Thailand built dedicated automotive parks offering subsidized land, zero-duty raw materials, and tax holidays for joint ventures with global Tier-1 suppliers. Vietnam's Decree 116 imposed stringent local content mandates while facilitating technology transfer and export linkages, propelling its parts exports to over $2 billion.

By contrast, Pakistan lacks even the basics:

- No UNECE WP.29-compliant testing labs to certify parts for international markets.
- No mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) to smooth entry into export destinations.
- No vendor financing mechanisms tied to export orders or performance.
- No tax rebates or duty drawbacks tailored to incentivize exports of localized components.

These void forces Pakistani vendors to shoulder full certification and compliance costs individually — an insurmountable burden for most small and medium enterprises. Without government-backed enablers, vendors remain excluded from global value chains even when capable of meeting quality standards.

### 6.9.7. The Parallel Crisis: Flattening Of Cascading Tariffs

An equally significant drag on Pakistan's export competitiveness is the collapse of its cascading tariff structure — once the backbone of the country's localization policy. For decades, Pakistan used a tiered duty system:

- non-localized CKD parts at 15%
- localized parts at 30%, and
- fully built CBUs at 50% or higher

This differential created a powerful incentive for assemblers to buy from local vendors. Every part localized reduced the cost of domestic assembly relative to importing it. Vendors had put their confidence and trust in this policy stability and invested in specialized tooling for dashboards, wiring harnesses, suspension systems, HVAC units, and other components validated by Toyota, Honda, and Hyundai's overseas labs, to the tune of over PKR100 billion. These investments were not opportunistic; they were long-horizon bets predicated on policy

continuity. Vendors scaled capacity, hired skilled labor, and built entire supply chains around the expectation that localized parts would retain tariff protection.

Additionally, this system mirrored what Thailand, Vietnam, and India did in their industrial take-off phases: use tariff differentiation to shield local suppliers while building capacity and scale, then gradually liberalize once vendors were globally competitive.

**Liberalization of Tariffs is Very Premature and Contradictory**

The National Tariff Policy 2019–24, followed by the 2025–30 iteration has dismantled this framework in the name of "rationalization." Duties on all CKD parts, regardless of localization status, are flattened to 15% across the board. By labeling this flattening as "cascading," the policy creates a contradiction: it preserves the language of localization while erasing the very mechanism that incentivized it. The cascading tariff collapse also exposes a deeper contradiction between two cornerstone policies. The Automotive Industry Development and Export Plan (AIDEP) 2021–26 prioritizes localization and export preparation — explicitly stating that tariff structures will continue to reward local value addition as vendors invest in higher-value components. It commits to providing a predictable policy framework to justify long-term vendor capex.

Overnight, the incentive to procure from local vendors has vanished: assemblers can now import entire semi-knocked-down kits — including parts already made locally — at the same rate as raw materials. The decades-long policy signal that once rewarded domestic value addition has effectively been nullified.

**Fallout for Vendors and Export Competitiveness**

The flattening of tariffs is already triggering cascading effects across the sector:

- **Sunk Investments at Risk:** Over PKR 123 billion invested by vendors in localized tooling and production lines is being undermined, with plants for dashboards, wire harnesses, and suspension systems operating below capacity or lying idle.
- **Demand Contraction:** Assemblers, now indifferent to localization, are bypassing domestic suppliers in favor of full CKD kits. Combined with used car imports consuming roughly 25% of annual sales, this is starving vendors of the volumes they need to survive, let alone scale for exports.
- **Cost Disadvantage:** Vendors face raw material duties averaging 15% and some of the region's highest energy tariffs yet compete against imported kits taxed at just 15%. Policy now perversely penalizes domestic value addition.
- **Export Deadlock:** Without domestic scale or a supportive tariff signal, vendors cannot achieve the per-unit cost and volume thresholds needed to penetrate global

value chains — a path Thailand and Vietnam followed precisely by retaining cascading tariffs until maturity.

The result is an industry **trapped in low-volume, low-tech equilibrium** — unable to achieve the scale needed for exports and perpetually vulnerable to import competition.

Global peers have followed the opposite trajectory. Thailand and Vietnam retained cascading tariffs well into their export growth phase, dismantling them only after domestic suppliers achieved global cost and quality benchmarks. Pakistan, by contrast, has liberalized prematurely, flattening tariffs before scale, vendor maturity, or export readiness were established.

Unless cascading tariffs are restored — and paired with export-linked incentives and NTBs — Pakistan's vendors will remain squeezed between low domestic volumes and cheap imported kits, with no pathway to compete internationally. The credibility of future industrial policies, including AIDEP's localization goals, also hinges on addressing this contradiction: investors will not commit capital if policy signals remain unstable.

Pakistan's auto parts industry stands at crossroads. Despite proven vendor capabilities and over PKR 100 billion in sunk investments, structural barriers — material dependency, subscale domestic volumes, uncompetitive utilities, absence of export incentives, and the collapse of cascading tariffs — have locked the sector in a low-volume, low-tech equilibrium.

The contradiction between AIDEP's localization vision and NTP's tariff flattening has further eroded policy credibility, discouraging fresh investments and joint ventures critical for export growth. While regional peers shielded vendors until maturity and only liberalized after achieving scale, Pakistan has liberalized prematurely, hollowing out its domestic supply chain before it could integrate into global value chains.

For PAAPAM members, this is not an academic debate — it is existential. Without immediate restoration of cascading tariffs, introduction of export-linked rebates, establishment of WP.29-compliant testing labs, and coherent alignment between industrial and tariff policies, Pakistan risks permanently crippling the industry and missing the window to evolve from assembler to exporter.

# 7. PAKISTAN AUTO PARTS INDUSTRY: LOCAL COMPETITIVENESS DESPITE STRUCTURAL HEADWINDS

## 7.1. Pakistan's Paradox: Achieving Localization & Competitiveness Without Scale

In the global automotive industry, cost competitiveness is generally derived from scale. Countries that have become leading export hubs, such as India producing over five million vehicles annually, Thailand producing around two and a half million, and Vietnam exceeding one million, leverage high production volumes to spread fixed costs, justify advanced tooling investments, and secure globally competitive pricing. By this measure, Pakistan's annual production of fewer than two hundred thousand vehicles should place it at a structural disadvantage, perpetually reliant on imported components and unable to sustain a viable domestic supply base.

Yet Pakistan's auto parts industry has defied this conventional logic. Despite operating under severe scale constraints, repeated policy shifts, and one of the most volatile macroeconomic environments in its history, the country's auto parts manufacturers have achieved two critical milestones that are rarely seen together in subscale markets: meaningful localization and cost competitiveness. This dual achievement has not only restructured Pakistan's automotive value chain but has also preserved vital foreign exchange at a time when the external account remains under chronic pressure.

**Proven Price Competitiveness**

Contrary to assumptions that small markets cannot deliver competitive pricing, localized components in Pakistan frequently match or undercut offshore alternatives reasonable amount when accounting for freight, duties, and lead times. Models such as the Corolla, Alto, and Swift already rely on local dashboards, harnesses, and suspension assemblies that are cost-effective and meet global benchmarks.

*Table 10: Car Price Comparison USD*[33]

**Car Prices USD Net of VAT**

| Category | Pakistan | India* | Indonesia | Thailand |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| <1000cc | $ 8,617 | $ 3,501 | $ 7,432 | $ 14,565 |
| 1001cc-1300cc | $ 12,832 | $ 5,868 | $ 9,143 | $ 20,002 |
| 1301cc-1600cc | $ 15,708 | $ 12,744 | $ 15,062 | $ 25,582 |
| 1601cc-2000cc | $ 18,497 | $ 17,241 | $ 31,299 | $ 35,884 |

[33] 1 USD = 285 PKR, 87 INR, 16,400 IDR, 32.50 THB

* It is important to note that India's lower car prices compared not only to Pakistan but also to Thailand and Indonesia stem from its massive production scale, higher localization levels, and a simpler tax regime. Stable policies and the absence of large-scale used car imports have allowed India to achieve cost efficiencies that other markets in the region cannot match.

The localized vehicles in Pakistan are competitively priced, and in cases like Indonesia and Thailand, even cheaper relative to its peers, falling short of 17%-50% in some cases. It is also important to note that India is an outlier, i.e., its car prices are exceptionally low due to massive economies of scale, supported by one of the largest domestic markets in the world and the presence of nearly all major global OEMs and tier-1 vendors. This dense supply chain allows fixed costs to be heavily amortized, driving prices down to levels unmatched in the region, to the extent that no other economy offers a meaningful comparison. Such intense competition has even pushed several global players to scale back or exit the Indian market altogether, depicting how unique India's price dynamics are.

*Table 11: Pakistan price trend comparison - Corolla and Yaris*[34]

| Particulars | Corolla 1993 (840 H) | Corolla 2003 (557 N) | Corolla 2008 (242L) | Corolla 2019 (178B) | Yaris 1.3MT-2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PKR Price | 545,000 | 849,000 | 1,239,000 | 2,533,000 | 4,338,500 |
| USD | 20,185 | 15,027 | 14,750 | 15,831 | 15,495 |
| Local - PKR | 90,000 | 206,506 | 425,081 | 1,213,329 | 2,087,090 |
| Import - PKR | 344,994 | 463,129 | 533,244 | 694,049 | 1,157,388 |
| Retail Taxes - PKR | 60,556 | 110,739 | 180,026 | 498,812 | 871,555 |
| Net off Retail Taxes - USD | 17,942 | 13,067 | 13,537 | 13,171 | 12,782 |
| Retail Taxes - GST, FED, CVT | 12.5% GST | 15% GST | 16% GST + 5% FED + 1% SED | 17% GST + 5% FED | 18% GST, 5% FED, 1% CVT |
| USD/PKR | 27 | 57 | 84 | 160 | 280 |

Domestic vendors in Pakistan, meanwhile, already meet stringent Japanese and European quality benchmarks and, with policy stability and predictable demand, have the potential to reach cost structures comparable to larger regional producers.

A key illustration of this potential lies in mold amortization costs for components such as bumpers. For example, the mold cost for a B-segment sedan bumper is uniformly around $1 million across Pakistan, India, and Indonesia. However, due to vastly different production volumes, the per-unit amortization cost varies sharply: $13.33 in Pakistan versus just $1.25 in India and $2.50 in Indonesia. This reflects the penalty Pakistan pays for low volumes, where the same fixed cost is spread over far fewer units—making localization inherently more expensive.

[34] Source: PAAPAM

*Table 12: B Sedan bumper cost*[35]

| B Sedan Bumper Cost | Pakistan | India | Indonesia |
|---|---|---|---|
| Product | Yaris | Dezire | Yaris |
| Mold Cost | $1,000,000 | $1,000,000 | $1,000,000 |
| Unit per Year | 15,000 | 160,000 | 80,000 |
| Amortization Period | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Total Amortization | 75,000 | 800,000 | 400,000 |
| Cost per Unit | $13 | $1 | $3 |
| USD/PKR | 285 | 285 | 285 |
| Cost per Unit (PKR) | 3,800 | 356 | 713 |

Yet, what is particularly remarkable is that Pakistan's automotive sector has managed to remain price competitive even without the economies of scale enjoyed by its peers. For instance, Thailand produces 10 times and Indonesia 8 times more vehicles than Pakistan—yet local vehicle prices in Pakistan are 1.7x cheaper than Thailand and 1.1x cheaper than Indonesia, net of taxes. This reflects a remarkable level of efficiency and resilience in Pakistan's cost structure, despite its volume constraints. Annexure P provides a detailed car price comparison between Pakistan and peers across different engine bands.

However, drawing direct comparisons with high-volume, export-oriented manufacturing hubs like Thailand or Indonesia overlooks the vastly different industrial contexts. These countries have mature, globally integrated auto ecosystems that have been built over decades with consistent policy and export-led growth. In contrast, Pakistan's industry remains nascent and domestically oriented. It is therefore misguided and unfair to benchmark Pakistan against volume-driven economies without acknowledging the fundamental structural differences.

[35] Source: PAAPAM Research




*Figure 33: Peer price and volume comparison vs Pakistan*[36]

The domestic vendor base has also evolved beyond basic components into complex, precision-engineered assemblies. Many suppliers operate ISO- and TS-certified facilities and have entered technical assistance agreements with Japanese, Korean, and European partners, embedding global production standards into local operations. A growing number of vendors are already exporting niche components — such as wiring harnesses and filters — to regional markets, signaling latent export potential that can be rapidly scaled with minimal policy support.

**Local Auto Parts Ecosystem**

The vendor ecosystem that supports this competitiveness has been decades in the making. Progressive localization policies, albeit inconsistently applied, provided the framework for domestic suppliers to upgrade capabilities and attract investment. Today more than three hundred Tier 1 and Tier 2 vendors are concentrated in Karachi, Lahore, and Faisalabad. These firms have collectively invested close to PKR 124 billion in capital equipment such as stamping presses, plastic injection molding machines, and precision machining facilities (see Annexure M).

[36] OICA, PAMA, PAAPAM

The scale of localized production achieved through this network is significant. The annual value of localized content in Pakistan's automotive industry now stands at roughly PKR 356 bn. This figure represents the cumulative value of hundreds of components — from engines and transmissions to dashboards, wiring harnesses, suspension assemblies, HVAC systems, bumpers, and safety-critical components such as airbags — that are now produced domestically rather than imported. Many of these parts are validated by Japanese, Korean, and European original equipment manufacturers, confirming that local suppliers meet global quality benchmarks rather than simply satisfying domestic cost considerations.




*Figure 34: Pakistan auto parts manufacturers geographical concentration*[37]

[37] Source: PAAPAM

## 7.2. AIDEP 2021-26 & NTP 2025-30 Risks Erosion of Local Industry

Pakistan's auto sector currently avoids an annual outflow of over PKR 300 billion through localized production. This arises because of two structural factors:

1. Lower cost of CKD kits compared to fully built CBUs, and
2. A cascading tariff regime that applies higher duties on fully built vehicles and lower duties on CKD parts — with a further tiered benefit for parts already localized in Pakistan.

This cascading framework was deliberately embedded into successive auto policies, including AIDEP 2021–26, to nurture a domestic vendor base. Under the present system:

- CBUs (new imports) face a cumulative tax load of 106–409%, ensuring that importing finished cars remains prohibitively expensive.
- CKD kits attract a differentiated customs duty:
  - 30% on parts already localized domestically (encouraging local sourcing), and
  - 10% on parts not yet localized (to enable new entrants and support gradual indigenization).

This tiering is the backbone of Pakistan's auto industrialization strategy. It ensures assemblers have a strong incentive to deepen localization rather than import entire kits or vehicles. However, The National Tariff Policy 2025–30 envisions rationalizing all duties into flat bands (0%, 5%, 10%, 15%) by 2030.

*Table 13: Tarif slab adjustment and reduction in CD rates*

**Tariff Slab Adjustment and Reduction in CD Rates**

| Current | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 3%[38] | 5% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 11% | 10% | 10% | 5% | 5% | 5% |
| 16% | 15% | 15% | 10% | 10% | 5% |
| 20% | 20% | 20% | 15% | 15% | 10% |
| >20% | >20% | 20%-50% | 20%-40% | 15%-30% | 15% |

For autos, by 2030 this could possibly translate into:

- **CBU imports**: Duties slashed from up to 156% to 15%, collapsing the protective barrier that justified local assembly.

[38] Source: National Tariff Policy 2025-30

- **Phase-out of Additional Customs Duty and Regulatory Duty**, further narrowing the cost gap between imported and local vehicles.

Flattening duties dismantle the core incentive structure for localization. If localized and imported parts face the same 15% duty, assemblers have no financial reason to purchase from domestic vendors. Similarly, with CBUs taxed at only 15%, the cost advantage of assembling locally disappears — making it cheaper for assemblers to import fully built cars instead of investing in local plants or parts sourcing.

The consequences would be equally severe:

- **Vendor viability collapses**: Over 400 Tier-1 and Tier-2 vendors, who have invested PKR 124 billion in local capacity, will face direct competition from cheap imports.
- **Industrial policy reversal**: A policy designed to nurture "Make in Pakistan" effectively pivots toward de-industrialization.
- **Employment and fiscal losses**: 1.83 million jobs tied to local parts manufacturing, including PKR 878bn in income losses, and PKR 302 billion in tax revenue from vendor operations, will be at risk.

*Table 14: CD structure current vs proposed*[39]

| Component Type | CD Current | Proposed Duty (2030) | Change in Incentive |
|---|---|---|---|
| CBU (fully built) | 50% – 100% | 15% | Imports become competitive vs local |
| CKD (localized parts) | 30% | N/A | No advantage for domestic vendors |
| CKD (non-localized parts) | 10% | N/A | Costs rise for new entrants; discourages localization |

However, under Pakistan's commitments in the National Tariff Policy (NTP) 2025–30 and the auto industry roadmap embedded in the AIDEP, this protective regime will be dismantled over the next five years. Both frameworks converge on a single target: a uniform 15% tariff ceiling for automobiles by 2030, with additional customs duties and regulatory duties phased out entirely. Used CBUs, currently subject to higher effective rates, will also converge to the same 15% level by the end of the transition period.

The current cascading tariff framework provides higher protection for localized CKD manufacturing by imposing significantly higher duties on CBU imports. This creates a natural incentive to source from domestic vendors. However, the National Tariff Policy (NTP) 2025–30 proposes to flatten customs duties to 15% by 2030 and phase out additional/custom/regulatory duties.

[39] Source: NTP 2025-30

The auto sector's localization effort currently substitutes roughly USD 1.25 billion in imports every year. If tariffs are cut prematurely without commensurate measures to enhance vendor productivity or reduce input costs, Pakistan risks replacing a self-sustaining industrial ecosystem with a surge of consumer imports. Such a shift would not only dismantle decades of incremental vendor investment but also reintroduce one of the largest structural drains on the country's balance of payments.

Localization has proven its macroeconomic value under high-tariff regimes; the challenge now is whether Pakistan can preserve that value in a low-tariff future. Without a parallel strategy to drive scale, improve energy and financing competitiveness, and support exports, the 15% tariff horizon by 2030 threatens to undo the very foundation on which current dollar savings are built.

## 7.3. Domestic Economic Contribution

The contribution of Pakistan's auto parts manufacturing ecosystem extends far beyond supplying components to vehicle assemblers. It plays a central role in creating employment, generating fiscal revenues, conserving foreign exchange, and building industrial linkages across multiple sectors.

This industry sustains 330,000 direct jobs in manufacturing, engineering and tooling, while another 1.5 million people are employed indirectly across logistics, raw material supply and retail networks. It also contributes around 3% of total revenue to the national exchequer, highlighting its importance to public finances.

The sector's economic value is anchored in localized parts production worth PKR 356 billion annually, equivalent to 1.25 billion US dollars.

The industry has also created strong industrial linkages with upstream sectors including steel, plastics and electronics, enabling broader manufacturing growth and capability development. It provides continuity of vehicle production even during periods of currency volatility or import restrictions, ensuring supply chains remain functional despite macroeconomic challenges.

Rather than being limited to a single part of the automotive value chain, Pakistan's auto parts sector has become a vital contributor to jobs, revenues and foreign exchange stability. Sustaining this contribution is essential for the country's broader industrial and economic development.

## 7.4. Auto Parts Industry is a Platform for Future Growth

Pakistan's auto parts industry has demonstrated that cost competitiveness can be achieved even without economies of scale, an outcome rarely seen in the global automotive landscape. Over the past decades, domestic vendors have steadily localized hundreds of critical components, upgraded their manufacturing capabilities, and secured validation from leading Japanese, Korean, and European original equipment manufacturers. This record is proof of resilience under challenging conditions and evidence of latent capacity for greater industrial contribution.

With more than 400 active Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers, cumulative investments exceeding PKR 100 billion, and over 5,000 components already localized, the vendor base forms the backbone of Pakistan's automotive value chain. These capabilities in stamping, plastics, precision machining, wiring harnesses and safety systems provide a solid foundation to scale from domestic supply toward regional exports, particularly to markets in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia.

Realizing this transition depends on maintaining the policy architecture that enabled this localization in the first place. Predictable tariff structures, raw material facilitation and alignment of energy costs with regional benchmarks are prerequisites for unlocking the next phase of growth. A stable policy environment will allow vendors to pursue scale efficiencies, diversify product offerings and achieve the certifications required to penetrate global value chains.

The success of the auto parts industry is therefore more than a domestic achievement. It represents Pakistan's best chance at leveraging automotive manufacturing for industrial growth, technology transfer and regional integration. Preserving this hard-won competitiveness is essential for transforming the sector from import substitution to a meaningful export contributor in the coming decade.

# 8.
# PAAPAM's COMMENTS ON IMF REPORT AND NATIONAL TARIFF POLICY 2025-30

PAAPAM has consistently aligned itself with the Government's Make in Pakistan vision, a vision rooted in building domestic industry, generating skilled employment, and integrating Pakistan into global value chains. This commitment is also embedded in the AIDEP)2021–26, which prioritizes localization, technology transfer, and export readiness as the cornerstones of sustainable growth.

Yet, the recent recommendations contained in the IMF's Country Report No. 25/109 (May 2025), alongside the proposed National Tariff Policy (NTP) 2025–30, run counter to this very vision. By prescribing tariff flattening, withdrawal of localization incentives, and facilitation of commercial used car imports, these measures – though framed as reforms for efficiency and consumer welfare — would dismantle the fragile vendor ecosystem that has taken decades to build. This would result in the erosion of hard-won localization gains, collapse of vendor investments, and the loss of livelihoods for over 300,000 direct workers and 1.5 million in allied sectors.

For an industry that already contributes 4% to the national exchequer and has achieved PKR 356 billion in annual value addition, such prescriptions are not merely technical adjustments; they threaten to reverse Pakistan's industrial progress and push the sector back into import dependence. This is precisely the opposite of what Make in Pakistan is intended to achieve.

We therefore respond below to the specific claims made in the IMF report and provisions in the NTP 2025-30, addressing each point in turn to highlight why these measures, if implemented without safeguards, would jeopardize both the auto parts industry and Pakistan's broader industrialization agenda.

## 8.1. IMF Report and PAAPAM's Comments

PAAPAM notes with concern the conclusions drawn in the IMF's Country Report No. 25/109 (April 2025) regarding Pakistan's automobile sector. The report asserts that protection under the current AIDEP 2021–26 is "particularly extensive," imposes "large welfare costs" on consumers, and contributes to inefficiency and high vehicle prices. It further cites an "anti-export bias" stemming from Pakistan's tariff regime and advocates for sweeping tariff rationalization to improve competitiveness.

This position stands in tension with the IMF's own earlier policy guidance. MEFP ¶27 (2021) (See Annexure N) explicitly recognized the need for tariff rationalization that *reduces protection while maintaining a cascading structure* — ensuring input tariffs remain lower than finished goods to promote domestic production and fair competition. The current prescription, by contrast, seeks uniform low tariffs and allows commercial used car imports — policies that dismantle incentives for localization and force local manufacturers to

compete not with “like-to-like” new vehicles, but with five-year-old used imports discarded by other countries.

The IMF’s argument also rests on the assumption that high tariffs alone explain Pakistan’s weak export performance. This is misleading. Since 2021, the Export Facilitation Scheme (EFS) has allowed exporters to import all raw materials at zero duty, even if those materials are produced domestically. The bottleneck to export growth lies not in duties but in chronic security challenges and low foreign direct investment. Unlike Thailand, India, or Vietnam — where investors freely integrated into global supply chains — Pakistan has faced decades of travel advisories and restricted mobility for foreign nationals, deterring investment in manufacturing clusters.

It is within this context that PAAPAM strongly opposes applying generalized IMF prescriptions to Pakistan’s auto sector without acknowledging local realities. The following section addresses, point by point, the specific claims made in the IMF report and explains why their blanket recommendations — tariff flattening, removal of localization incentives, and permissive used car imports — would undermine industrial policy goals, fiscal stability, and the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Pakistani workers. Refer to Annexure N for relevant excerpts from the IMF Country Report.

## Extract No. 1 from IMF Report (Page 20)

***“Trade barriers are particularly extensive in the automotive sector, and the next iteration of the automobile policy (covering FY26-31), on which consultations are still ongoing, should reduce tariffs and preferential support for local production.”***

**PAAPAM’s Response**

As the primary representative body of Pakistan’s auto parts manufacturers, PAAPAM respectfully disagrees with the assertion that trade barriers in Pakistan’s automotive sector are “particularly extensive.” This conclusion fails to account for the unique structural realities of Pakistan’s industry and ignores how comparable economies have historically nurtured their automotive sectors through even higher protective measures until scale and competitiveness were achieved.

1. **Cascading Tariff Structure Is Essential, Not Excessive**

Pakistan’s current tariff system reflects a graded cascading structure that differentiates between:

Raw materials imported by parts manufacturers

Parts not produced locally used by automobile assemblers

Completely built-up (CBU) new vehicles; and
Used CBUs (3–5 years old) — a unique policy distortion not seen in peer auto-producing countries.

This cascading is designed to reward local value addition and remains less protective than regimes historically applied in Thailand, India, or Vietnam during their industrialization phases (see Section 6.3 for peer comparisons). Flattening this structure, as proposed, would erase the incentive to localize and expose Pakistan's SMEs to unfair competition from both new and used imports.

2. **Low Volumes and Imported Raw Materials Justify Wider Cascading**

Pakistan's annual production is barely 150,000 passenger vehicles, a fraction of India's 6 million or Thailand's 1.5 million units. At such low volumes, per unit amortization of tooling and fixed costs is far higher, making wider tariff gaps essential to keep local parts viable. Compounding this challenge, Pakistan lacks domestic production of key raw materials — steel, plastics, rubber, aluminum, and copper — forcing vendors to import inputs at additional freight and logistics costs. Removing cascading without addressing these structural disadvantages would accelerate de industrialization rather than foster efficiency.

3. **Comparative Context Disproves "Extensive" Claim**

A fair assessment must compare Pakistan's tariff rates and volumes with peers. While Pakistan's maximum duty on CBUs may appear high in isolation, it is aligned with (and in some cases lower than) those maintained by Thailand and Vietnam at similar stages of industrial development. Both countries achieved localization above 70% only after decades of cascading protection — whereas Pakistan's industry, despite policy reversals, has achieved 40–60% localization by parts count and PKR 356 billion in value addition.
Labeling Pakistan's automotive tariffs as "particularly extensive" overlooks these structural realities. Rather than dismantling cascading protection prematurely, the next AIDEP must retain differential tariffs until vendor scale, raw material availability, and technology transfer reach competitive thresholds — the same approach that enabled peer economies to transform from importers to exporters.

## Extract No. 2 from IMF Report (Page 20)

***"Ahead of this, the authorities will remove the existing ban on commercial imports of used vehicles (new end-end-July 2025 SB for submission of legislation)."***

**PAAPAM's Response**

The entire automotive industry is deeply alarmed by this recommendation. There is no precedent — anywhere in the world — of an automobile-producing country allowing commercial imports of used vehicles. This measure would not only reverse Pakistan's modest industrial gains but actively discourage new investment in assembly and parts manufacturing.

Pakistan already suffers from a de facto used-car import regime: 3- to 5-year-old vehicles flood the market through baggage, gift, and transfer-of-residence schemes originally designed for overseas Pakistanis. These loopholes have allowed commercial traders to capture nearly 25% of domestic passenger car sales, hollowing out demand for localized parts and displacing new assembly volumes. As detailed in Section 6.3, this influx has been a major deterrent for both foreign and domestic investment — investors cannot justify capital outlays for tooling and localization when they must compete against depreciated, fully built imports.

The IMF's own MEFP ¶27 emphasizes *promoting domestic production and fair competition*. Permitting commercial imports of used cars contradicts this principle: it forces local manufacturers to compete not with "like-to-like" new vehicles, but with discarded stock from foreign markets that pay no taxes in Pakistan, generate no jobs, and contribute nothing to local value addition.

Beyond industrial damage, these used-car inflows have created what industry experts estimate to be a PKR 160 billion informal market — a parking lot for black money that bypasses banking channels and erodes tax compliance. Rather than formalizing this distortion, the IMF should have recommended closure of these loopholes, aligning with global best practice and Pakistan's own Make in Pakistan objectives.

## Extract No. 3 from IMF Report (Page 111)

***"We recognize that trade protection for the automobile sector under the Auto Industry Development and Export Policy (AIDEP) 2021–26 is particularly extensive and imposes large welfare costs on Pakistanis and are committed to implementing a substantial reduction in protection for this sector in the next auto policy, which will come into effect and be implemented from July 1, 2026."***

**PAAPAM's Response**

The IMF's assertion that protection under AIDEP 2021–26 imposes "large welfare costs" on Pakistani consumers — implying that local manufacturers are inefficient and overpriced — is a misreading of both the price structure of vehicles and the economic ecosystem this industry sustains.

**1. Misdiagnosing the Price Gap**
As demonstrated in Section 4 of this report, Pakistani vehicles are not fundamentally overpriced relative to peers. Before the imposition of heavy government taxes, including Federal Excise Duty, Additional Customs Duty, and Sales Tax, local vehicle prices track competitively on comparable models in other peer countries. The so-called "welfare cost" flagged by the IMF is therefore a taxation problem, not a localization problem. Tariff flattening on parts or legitimizing used imports will not meaningfully reduce consumer prices. It will simply replace locally generated value addition with imports while leaving the tax burden untouched.

**2. Scale, Not Inefficiency, Drives Higher Per-Unit Costs**
Pakistan's annual passenger vehicle production is far below the 500,000-unit threshold generally required for export-competitive cost structures. By comparison, Maruti Suzuki alone produces 1.7 million vehicles annually in India, while Thailand manufactures over 2 million. Economies of scale allow those markets to amortize tooling and development costs far more efficiently. Protection, therefore, is not shielding inefficiency; it is buying time for the vendor base to achieve scale, just as India, Thailand, and Vietnam did by maintaining high CBU tariffs until their industries matured.

**3. Structural Disadvantages Require Policy Offsets**
Unlike its peers, Pakistan lacks domestic production of key automotive raw materials — steel, plastics, copper, and rubber — all of which must be imported. These imports add an estimated 10–15% cost premium in freight, port handling, and duties. Without compensatory cascading tariffs, domestic vendors are forced to compete at a structural cost disadvantage. Protection in this context is not a subsidy, it is an offset for absent raw material ecosystems and subscale production volumes.

4**. Welfare Cannot Be Measured by Prices Alone**
The IMF's framing of welfare narrowly equates lower prices with greater consumer benefit, ignoring the jobs, skills, and foreign exchange savings created by domestic auto parts manufacturing. This ecosystem sustains over 300,000 direct jobs and 1.5 million more indirectly in steel, plastics, logistics, and retail. Localization has replaced USD 1.25 billion of dollars in imports with domestic production — a vital buffer for Pakistan's chronically

fragile external account. Any welfare analysis that excludes these contributions is incomplete and risks undermining both employment and macroeconomic stability.

**5. Contradicting IMF's Own Framework (MEFP ¶27)**
The IMF's own MEFP ¶27 (2021) advocates rationalizing tariffs through cascading structures that maintain reasonable protection for domestic production while lowering input costs. The current recommendation for blanket reductions — and even formalizing used car imports — runs counter to this principle and global best practice. No auto-producing nation, not India, Thailand, or Vietnam, has built exports while allowing 3–5-year-old used vehicles to compete with new domestic production. Introducing such competition prematurely would decimate vendors, deter investment, and hollow out the Make in Pakistan agenda.

## Extract No. 4 from IMF Report (Page 111)

***"Specifically, we are committed to addressing vehicle affordability by setting out a path to progressively reduce protection by 2030 in line with the principles and objectives of the NTP 2025–30, including by eliminating all ACDs and RDs in the sector and substantially reducing CDs."***

**PAAPAM's Response**

As detailed earlier in this report, vehicle affordability in Pakistan is not constrained by localization or protection levels but by high taxation and lack of affordable financing. Duties and taxes — including Federal Excise Duty, Sales Tax, Additional Customs Duty (ACD), and Regulatory Duty (RD) — cumulatively contribute 35–58% of a vehicle's retail price. Removing ACDs and RDs without addressing this broader tax burden or providing targeted credit access will do little to make vehicles affordable for the middle-class majority.

More critically, blanket tariff reduction ignores the purpose of cascading structures — a principle explicitly supported in MEFP ¶27. Cascading ensures that raw materials are taxed lowest, intermediate parts lower than CKDs, and CKDs lower than CBUs. This differential incentivizes local value addition while preventing import-driven deindustrialization. Flattening this structure, as envisaged in NTP 2025-30, removes the incentive to localize and would expose Pakistan's SMEs to unfair competition against fully depreciated imports.

Countries like Thailand, India, and Vietnam maintained high CBU tariffs and carefully phased reductions only after vendors achieved global competitiveness. Pakistan, still operating at one-tenth of their volumes and lacking a domestic raw material base, cannot

sustain such rapid liberalization without triggering widespread vendor closures and job losses for the 300,000 workers directly employed in the auto parts sector.

PAAPAM therefore urges policymakers and the IMF to align affordability goals with structural realities: preserve cascading tariffs until economies of scale are achieved, couple tariff rationalization with targeted financing reforms, and sequence liberalization with export-linked milestones rather than arbitrary timelines.

## Extract No. 5 from IMF Report (Page 111)

***"We will also remove all quantitative restrictions on the commercial importation of used motor vehicles (initially only for vehicles less than five years old, subject to meeting minimum environmental and safety standards) during FY26Q1 and will submit all required legislation to parliament by July 2025 (new end-July 2025 SB)."***

**PAAPAM's Response**

PAAPAM views this proposal as deeply misguided. Allowing commercial imports of used vehicles, even those under five years old, would create structurally unfair competition for domestic auto parts manufacturers. Localized vehicles would lose market share to fully built, depreciated imports that contribute nothing to domestic value addition, tax revenues, or job creation.

This approach also sets a dangerous precedent. If competition with used goods is the guiding principle, why limit it to automobiles? By this logic, Pakistan should allow commercial imports of all used consumer goods — air conditioners, televisions, refrigerators, furniture, tiles — undermining every local manufacturing sector in the process. Such a strategy is incompatible with any serious industrial policy and would push Pakistan deeper into a cycle of de-industrialization and import dependence.

More fundamentally, this measure contradicts the objectives outlined in MEFP ¶27 and the Government's Make in Pakistan agenda, both of which emphasize promoting domestic production, creating skilled jobs, and building globally competitive supply chains. Every used vehicle imported displaces demand hundreds of localized parts — wiring harnesses, suspension arms, dashboards, seats — and erodes the scale vendors need to remain viable. For an industry that supports millions of workers directly and indirectly, the stakes are existential.

Industrialization, not used-goods competition, is the proven path to sustainable prosperity. India, Thailand, and Vietnam all achieved automotive export success by banning used vehicle imports outright while nurturing local vendors until scale and quality parity were achieved. Pakistan deserves the same trajectory. Endorsing large-scale used imports now would not create competition; it would kill the very industry the IMF expects to reform.

## Extract No. 6 from IMF Report (Page 111)

***"During FY26, we will put in place regulation and a testing regime for safety and environmental standards of such imported vehicles, which will replace the vehicle age limit from July 2026 onwards."***

**PAAPAM's Response**

PAAPAM is skeptical of this assurance given the Government's track record on enforcing similar measures. Previous auto policies including AIDP 2007, ADP 2016, and AIDEP 2021 repeatedly committed to implementing safety and environmental standards, yet these frameworks were either delayed or only partially enforced. In practice, imported vehicles have often bypassed proper inspections through loopholes in existing schemes, undermining the objectives these standards were meant to achieve.

Allowing commercial imports of used vehicles while promising future testing regimes risks repeating the same cycle. Without strict enforcement, this policy will neither protect consumers nor the environment. Instead, it will provide regulatory cover for the continued inflow of depreciated vehicles that displace demand for locally produced parts. Assemblers, as global companies, may pivot to importing fully built vehicles, but Pakistan's auto parts industry, which is largely composed of domestic SMEs, would be unable to survive under these conditions. The collapse of local vendor capacity would erode industrial employment, foreign exchange savings, and hard-won localization gains accumulated over decades.

Countries such as Thailand and Vietnam only built competitive automotive sectors after instituting strict bans on used imports and robust compliance regimes for new vehicles. Pakistan must learn from these examples rather than repeat policy missteps that undermine industrialization and compromise consumer safety in the name of short-term liberalization.

## Extract No. 7 from IMF Report (Page 111)

***"For FY26, the tariff rates (incorporating CDs, ACDs and RDs) for such used vehicles will initially be set 40 percent above the corresponding rate for new vehicles, with this premium to be reduced by 10 percentage points per year, to reach zero by 2030."***

**PAAPAM's Response**

PAAPAM disagrees with this policy direction. It is based on flawed assumptions about the structure and capacity of Pakistan's auto parts industry. As discussed in Section 6.3., even with the existing duty framework, three- to five-year-old used cars already account for nearly a quarter of Pakistan's passenger car market. This has resulted in an estimated loss of PKR 60 billion annually in potential sales for local parts manufacturers.

Gradually eliminating the tariff premium on used cars, from 40% in FY26 to zero by 2030, would entrench this distortion and normalize used vehicle imports as a permanent feature of the market. Such a shift would erode demand for localized parts, reduce production volumes further, and discourage new investment in tooling and technology.

This policy also disregards the structural disadvantages faced by Pakistan's industry, including low annual production volumes and full dependence on imported raw materials such as steel and plastics. These factors already constrain economies of scale, making tariff cascading essential to maintain competitiveness until volumes grow and domestic raw material production develops.

Rather than phasing out the premium on used cars, policy should prioritize eliminating the loopholes that allow used imports to compete with locally produced new vehicles and focus on demand-side measures such as affordable financing and scrappage policies that expand the market for new vehicles.

## Extract No. 8 from IMF Report (Page 112)

***"We are committed to phasing out all additional duties (including through import and sales taxes) currently charged for "localized" items/inputs in the auto sector, and to removing the regime of special duties applied to imports used for the auto sector, including through the 5th Schedule to the Customs Act and SRO 655(I)/2006."***

**PAAPAM's Response**

PAAPAM supports rationalization of tariffs where it aligns with the principles set out in MEFP ¶27, which call for a cascading structure that promotes domestic value addition while lowering costs of non-produced inputs. However, a blanket phasing out of additional duties on localized parts risks undermining the incentive for assemblers to source from domestic vendors and would reverse gains made under successive auto policies.

The current system, including measures under the 5th Schedule and SRO 655(I)/2006, was designed to reward localization by imposing higher duties on imported equivalents of parts already manufactured in Pakistan. Removing this differentiation would place domestic SMEs in direct competition with mass-produced imports from regional supply chains in India, Thailand, and China, despite Pakistan's far lower production volumes and lack of raw material industries.

PAAPAM is also concerned that such major policy changes are being pursued without consultation with key stakeholders. As the representative body of Pakistan's auto parts manufacturers, PAAPAM was not engaged in these discussions. Any change to the tariff framework must involve structured consultation and be phased alongside complementary measures such as vendor upgradation programs, export incentives, and safeguards against used vehicle inflows. Abrupt tariff flattening would destabilize the existing supply chain, discourage investment in tooling and technology, and accelerate de-industrialization at a time when Pakistan's policy framework should be focused on expanding value addition and exports.

## Extract No. 9 from IMF Report (Page 121)

***Structural Benchmark: "Trade, Investment Policy, and Deregulation***

***11. Submit to parliament all required legislation for lifting all quantitative restrictions on the commercial importation of used motor vehicles (initially only for vehicles less than five years old, subject to meeting minimum environmental and safety standards)"***

***Rationale: Liberalize trade and increase vehicle affordability***

***Date: end-July 2025."***

**PAAPAM's Response**

PAAPAM does not agree with the approach of improving vehicle affordability through the import of used vehicles. This strategy would create unfair competition for a domestic industry already operating under challenging conditions. Local manufacturers are producing vehicles that meet global quality standards at competitive prices while sustaining hundreds of thousands of skilled and semi-skilled jobs across Pakistan. Rather than supporting this industrial base, the proposed policy would divert demand toward depreciated imports that contribute nothing to domestic value addition or long-term economic stability.

## 8.2. PAAPAM's Comments on National Tariff Policy 2025-30

The proposed National Tariff Policy 2025–30 reflects a liberalization agenda driven largely by IMF prescriptions and a textbook economic approach. While its stated objective is to rationalize tariffs and enhance export competitiveness, the policy disregards the ground realities of Pakistan's economy and manufacturing base. Structural weaknesses such as high energy costs, currency volatility, low foreign investment, governance gaps, and security challenges severely limit the effectiveness of tariff reforms in isolation. Without addressing these fundamentals, the policy risks accelerating deindustrialization, undermining revenues, and contradicting the government's own Make in Pakistan vision.

This risk is particularly acute for the automotive parts industry. As detailed in Sections 7 and of this report, local vendors have achieved significant localization milestones despite low production volumes and adverse policy shifts. The cascading tariff framework currently in place is central to sustaining this progress by taxing raw materials lowest, localized parts lower than CKDs, and CKDs lower than CBUs. Flattening this cascade under NTP 2025–30 would dismantle the very incentive structure that drives value addition and expose domestic SMEs to mass produced imports from high volume regional supply chains in India, Thailand, and China. Following are our key criticism of the policy:

### 8.2.1. Flawed Economic Modeling

According to publicly available documentation, NTP projections are derived from a macro econometric model of over 100 equations projecting impacts on GDP, trade, employment, and inflation. While such models provide broad directional insights, their accuracy depends entirely on the assumptions underpinning them and in this case those assumptions are detached from Pakistan's volatile realities.

The model assumes stable exchange rates, constant fiscal and monetary policy, and predictable external conditions, none of which reflect Pakistan's recurring crises and policy reversals. It does not incorporate institutional bottlenecks, corruption, or the 35 percent informal economy that distorts tariff transmission. The use of long term average elasticities

overlooks structural breaks caused by the 2022 current account shock and post COVID disruptions.

Most critically, the model ignores the fact that exporters already import raw materials at zero duty under the Export Facilitation Scheme introduced in 2021. For key sectors including textiles, leather, surgical instruments, and auto parts manufactured for export, further tariff reductions will not address binding constraints, which stem instead from energy prices that are among the highest in Asia, financing costs, and security related barriers to foreign buyer engagement (Section 6).

Basing a major policy shift on projections that disregard these realities risks repeating the failures of past liberalization efforts including ADP 2016–21, where optimistic projections for localization and export growth were missed due to flawed assumptions about scale and investment flows.

### 8.2.2. Structural Constraints Unaddressed by Tariff Cuts

Reducing tariffs on inputs alone will not solve the core competitiveness problems faced by Pakistani manufacturers. Energy and gas costs exceed those of Vietnam and India by 56% on average, eroding margins for auto parts vendors even when raw materials are duty free. High interest rates and limited access to credit choke SMEs, which form the backbone of the localization ecosystem. Chronic logistical inefficiencies, regulatory bottlenecks, and corruption in customs increase transaction costs and dilute any gains from tariff reductions.

These factors explain why Pakistan's leading export sectors including textiles, leather, and surgical instruments already enjoy zero rated imports but remain productivity constrained rather than tariff constrained. Without parallel reforms in energy pricing, credit access, and infrastructure, tariff cuts will have negligible impact on competitiveness while risking fiscal and external imbalances.

### 8.2.3. Risks to Cascading Tariffs Framework and Localization

The NTP's proposal to phase out Additional Customs Duties, Regulatory Duties, and special provisions under the 5th Schedule and SRO 655(I)/2006 would flatten the cascading tariff structure that underpins localization. This framework is designed to reward domestic value addition: raw materials attract the lowest duty, localized parts lower than CKDs, and CKDs lower than CBUs.

Eliminating these differentiations would place localized parts in direct competition with imports from regional supply chains that operate at far greater scale. As highlighted in Section 6, Pakistan's vendors face structural cost disadvantages, including full dependence on imported automotive grade steel, plastics, and copper. Removing protective differentiation without first achieving scale or domestic raw material capacity would destabilize local supply chains and discourage new investment in tooling and technology.

### 8.2.4. Revenue Loss and Fiscal Impact

The policy anticipates a PKR 228 billion revenue loss over five years, assuming increased economic activity will offset the shortfall. This assumption is risky in a low compliance environment where tax to GDP stands at just 10.2%. Reducing reliance on trade taxes without simultaneously broadening the direct tax base especially in retail and agriculture risks widening the fiscal deficit and undermining compliance with IMF primary balance targets.

Further, liberalizing tariffs on finished and intermediate goods risks stimulating non-essential imports, widening the trade deficit, and triggering another boom bust cycle in the current account — a pattern repeatedly observed in Pakistan's economic history.

### 8.2.5. Ignored Lessons from Global Peers

Global experience demonstrates that premature liberalization without parallel support measures leads to deindustrialization. Countries such as Ghana, Zambia, and Jamaica saw infant industries collapse under similar IMF prescribed reforms. Conversely, automotive leaders like Thailand, India, and Vietnam liberalized gradually, maintaining high CBU tariffs and targeted incentives while building scale and export readiness, then easing protection only after domestic vendors achieved competitiveness (Section 2).

Pakistan risks repeating the mistakes of the former group rather than following the proven trajectory of the latter.

### 8.2.6. Lack of Stakeholder Consultation

As mentioned before in Section 8.1., PAAPAM was not engaged in the formulation of recent automotive trade measures. This same gap persists in the NTP 2025–30, which has been developed without structured consultation with the domestic vendor base. Excluding primary stakeholders from the policy process risks measures that are misaligned with industrial realities and undermines confidence in their long-term implementation.

The NTP 2025–30, as currently framed, risks dismantling the incentive structure that sustains Pakistan's auto parts industry without addressing the deeper structural challenges to competitiveness. By focusing narrowly on tariff reduction while overlooking high energy costs, financing barriers, macroeconomic climate, and institutional weaknesses, it offers an incomplete and potentially counterproductive reform path. PAAPAM urges that any tariff rationalization be sequenced with industrial support measures, vendor upgradation programs, and strict safeguards against used vehicle inflows. Without these protections, the policy will accelerate deindustrialization, erode fiscal revenues, and undermine the government's own Make in Pakistan agenda.

# 9.
# PAAPAM'S PERTINENT QUESTIONS & STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

## 9.1. Pertinent Questions in the Event of Industry Shutdown

As we have emphasized earlier, we are on-board with the government's Make in Pakistan movement. PAAPAM in specific and APMs in general have continuously showed relentless support to Pakistan and policymakers when it comes to supporting the local industry. As a result, APMs have also made several sacrifices including complying with and absorbing frequent policy shifts and continued to stand by the government.

We believe it is deeply unfair to expect the auto parts industry to commit to and comply with policies, only for those very policies to be reversed, leaving the sector exposed to measures that could force it toward closure. In this report we have painted a detailed picture of the ground reality that lies in the sector itself. Should the government proceed to act upon its own curated policies, we would like to raise pertinent questions regarding the consequences of the same.

### 9.1.1. What is Alternate Plan for Displaced Jobs and Income Losses?

Given that the auto parts industry employs 300,000 workers, a potential industry shutdown would instantly displace this workforce. Additionally, every direct job lost in the auto parts industry would result in 5 jobs lost in allied industries. This puts an additional 1.5 million people's jobs at risk. Even if we restrict our estimates to direct employees to assess the magnitude of this economic fallout, the income loss alone is severe with a potential **PKR 144 billion income loss** per annum. Along with PKR 720 billion additional income losses in allied industries, and PKR 14.4 bn income losses in OEMs, this puts the total income losses at **PKR 878.4 billion!**

This is not just a number on paper, it represents the collapse of household income for hundreds of thousands of families, cascading into reduced consumption, higher poverty, and increased demands on social safety nets.

| Particulars | | OEMs | Auto Parts Industry | Allied Industries | **Total** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Employment Multiplier | Times | 1 | 10 | 5 | **15** |
| No. of Employees | No. | 30,000 | 300,000 | 1,500,000 | **1,830,000** |
| Average Income per Annum | PKR Mn | 14,400 | 144,000 | 720,000 | **878,400** |

To put this further into perspective, Pakistan's current labor force is around 72 million, with unemployment rate hovering at 6.3%, which puts the national number for unemployed workforce at 4.5 million. Adding another 300,000 unemployed from a single sector would push the unemployment rate by roughly 0.37% overnight. If the multiplier effect is considered, with 1.83 million total jobs lost, unemployment could rise by over 2%, a 33% jump in joblessness from a single sector's collapse and a systemic shock that no fragile economy can absorb without severe social consequences.

The government must therefore consider, can Pakistan's already strained job market and social fabric withstand such an abrupt and concentrated employment shock, especially from a sector that has historically been a backbone of industrialization? And has the government devised an alternative plan to provide employment for the displaced workforce? Additionally, the government itself has stressed consumer welfare in its policies. Has the government considered the welfare of these 1.83 million people?

### 9.1.2. Is the Economy Ready to Absorb $1Bn a Year Permanent Import Shock?

Pakistan's auto part industry, despite inconsistent policies and lack of support from the government, has achieved a level of self-sufficiency and global competitiveness that is rare among local manufacturers. Local manufacturers have secured ISO certification, comply with UN regulations, and supply components that meet the same standards demanded in developed export markets. More importantly, the industry has attained 65% localization by parts and 60% localization by value, translating into PKR 356 bn of annual import substitution.

Should this industry be dismantled, this entire USD 1.25 billion cushion would vanish, forcing the country to finance additional imports of components previously made domestically. At a time when Pakistan has managed to secure a USD $2.1 billion current account surplus (0.5% of GDP), its first in over a decade, and when Pakistan is operating under the IMF Extended Fund Facility and targeting macroeconomic stability, the question arises: *how will the government justify adding a new USD 1 billion annual import burden without derailing external stability?*

If history has been any indication, Pakistan's current account is prone to boom-bust cycles which is driven by increased consumer demand and imports. This leads to unsustainable growth, wider trade deficits, and depletion of forex reserves, eventually putting pressure on currency depreciation and resulting in economic crisis. Auto imports have historically surged during recovery phases (2006–08, 2016–18, 2020–22), destabilizing reserves and forcing sharp policy reversals. *Is the economy ready to absorb a permanent rise in import dependence from a single collapsed sector, and revive the same balance-of-payments volatility policymakers say they are trying to tame?* More importantly, *Can the IMF-defined stabilization targets withstand such a structural shock?*

By dismantling domestic auto parts manufacturing, the government would permanently raise the structural import requirement of the auto sector, ensuring that every cycle of vehicle demand translates directly into dollar outflows. This not only undermines the **Make in Pakistan** narrative but also erodes any long-term stability in the current account.

### 9.1.3. How Will Sustainability Goals be met by Allowing Inefficient Used Cars?

Pakistan's NDC 2021 submission to the UNFCCC commits to reducing projected greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2030 (15% unconditional, 35% conditional on international support). The transport sector is central to this pledge as it contributes 21–23% of total national emissions (= 55 million tons of $CO_2$ annually). To align with these targets, Pakistan introduced the National EV Policy 2020, which sets a goal of 30% EV penetration by 2030 and mandates Euro-V emission standards for new vehicles. This policy framework assumes a gradual modernization of the vehicle fleet — replacing older, high-emission technology with newer, cleaner, and increasingly electric models.

Additionally, these goals are central to Pakistan's access to international climate finance and part of its broader industrial modernization agenda.

Yet the continued influx of used car imports — typically 5 years old and built to Euro-II or Euro-III standards — runs directly counter to this strategy. Every used car added to the fleet not only displaces a localized Euro-V compliant vehicle but also locks in higher fuel consumption and $CO_2$ emissions for years to come. This policy contradiction erodes Pakistan's credibility in meeting its climate pledges, even as peer economies like Thailand and Vietnam have long banned or strictly curtailed used imports to align industrial growth with environmental targets.

The stakes go beyond emissions alone. Allowing outdated vehicles into the market perpetuates Pakistan's dependence on imported fuel, worsens urban air quality in cities already ranked among the world's most polluted, and undermines the very EV transition the government claims to champion. If Pakistan continues to allow used car imports, then on an annual basis it would contribute to 24,000 tons of additional $CO_2$ and will cumulatively lock in nearly a quarter million tons of avoidable emissions over a decade (240,000 tons $CO_2$).

If Pakistan is serious about achieving its 2030 sustainability milestones, how can it reconcile these commitments with policies that actively incentivize the entry of high-emission used vehicles? Without addressing this contradiction, the promise of a greener transport future risks becoming little more than rhetoric.

### 9.1.4. How Will the Government Meet Losses in Tax Collection?

The auto sector accounts for 3% of the total tax revenue generated by the FBR, or PKR 302 billion through GST, Custom Duty, FED, income taxes, WPPF, and CVT. Crucially, this tax contribution arises not only from assemblers but also from hundreds of domestic vendors producing components for OEMs and the replacement market.

Duty reductions on imported parts or CBUs may appear consumer-friendly in the short term, but they carry a significant fiscal trade-off: every imported part that replaces a locally manufactured component erodes the domestic tax base. Instead of collecting multiple

layers of taxes from local manufacturing (sales tax, income tax, withholding, FED), the government will be left with single-point customs duty.

Pakistan's tax-to-GDP ratio stands at 10.2%, still below the IMF target of 10.5% and already reflecting a shortfall. With IMF program benchmarks demanding stronger revenue mobilization and Pakistan consistently underperforming on its tax collection targets, any erosion of this 3% contribution is material. If duty reductions diminish APM output, how does the government plan to offset PKR 302 billion in lost taxes? Will this shortfall be passed on through higher indirect taxes elsewhere, or does it risk widening the fiscal deficit and jeopardizing compliance with IMF primary balance targets?

### 9.1.5. Is Reducing Duty the Only Way to Improve Consumer Spending?

The debate on vehicle affordability and consumer welfare in Pakistan has been reduced to the question of import duties or increasing competition. While this narrative dominates policy discussions, it misses the far larger constraint on domestic car demand, which is access to affordable auto financing.

As outlined earlier (see 6.7.), empirical evidence shows no direct correlation between rising per-capita incomes and higher car sales in Pakistan. Instead, the decisive factor is credit availability. Pakistan's domestic credit to private sector stands at just 11% of GDP, compared to 50% in India, 125% in Vietnam, and 148% in Thailand. This reflects a chronically shallow credit market, where consumer financing comprises barely 2.5% of total banking sector credit — and auto loans account for only 30% of that small pool.

Even if duties were reduced, the vast majority of potential buyers would remain credit-constrained. High interest rates (11% currently), short tenors, and lack of dedicated low-cost financing products mean that cars remain out of reach for most middle-class households — despite nearly 40% of Pakistan's population falling within this income segment and over half being under 30 years old, the very demographic most likely to seek mobility solutions.

The question policymakers must confront is therefore not simply whether duties should be lowered, but why Pakistan has failed to develop a deep and inclusive auto financing ecosystem. Without addressing this structural gap — expanding credit penetration, introducing targeted schemes for first-time buyers, and aligning interest rate policy with long-term industrial growth — no amount of tariff tinkering will meaningfully expand consumer spending or car ownership.

### 9.1.6. What Alternate Plan is There to Reach Export Target of $100bn?

Pakistan has publicly committed to reaching USD 100 billion in exports, yet the blueprint for achieving this target is conspicuously silent on the role of the auto parts industry — one of the few sectors with proven capability for high-value, high-volume exports. If Pakistan

sidelines one of its few scalable high-value manufacturing sectors, how does it intend to meet the USD 100 billion export ambition? Other sectors like textiles and IT will certainly contribute, but neither offers the same combination of value addition, regional demand alignment, and industrial linkages that automotive manufacturing does. Without this sector's projected USD 6.5 billion potential from regional corridors alone (see 4.3.), where will the equivalent capacity come from? Will policymakers pivot to a new high-value sector, and if so, how long will it take to replicate the vendor base, supply chain depth, and global certifications already built over decades in auto parts?

### 9.1.7. Why the Focus on High Value Cars when 40% is Middle Class?

Pakistan's emerging middle class represents the largest potential consumer base for the auto sector. Yet most new model launches, including electric and hybrid vehicles, are concentrated in the premium segment, with price tags upwards of PKR 20 million (e.g., BYD Shark). Compare this to the average income per capita of PKR 40,000/month or PKR 500,000 a year. This focus stands in stark contrast to India, where the automotive growth story was built around affordable 800cc vehicles and two- and three-wheelers, enabling mass motorization and vendor scale.

This raises a fundamental question: if policy is genuinely anchored in consumer welfare, why is affordability absent from the government's automotive vision? High-end EVs and premium hybrids may signal technological progress, but they do little for the majority of Pakistani households who remain priced out of ownership. Without affordable options, even well-intentioned green mobility policies risk benefiting only a narrow elite, leaving middle-class consumers — and the parts manufacturers who rely on volume — sidelined.

If AIDEP 2026 is to serve as a people-centered industrial policy, it must realign incentives toward volume-driving, affordable vehicles, especially compact hybrids and EVs. Otherwise, Pakistan risks repeating the mistakes of the past: chasing aspirational models for a few, while missing the transformative economic impact that comes from enabling mobility for the many.

## 9.2. Immediate Policy Actions

The crisis confronting auto parts manufacturers is ongoing and cannot wait until the next policy cycle. While structural reforms must be embedded into AIDEP 2026, immediate actions are needed to halt further distortions and stabilize demand.

### 9.2.1. Suspend NTP 2025-30's Cascading Flattening for Auto Parts

The National Tariff Policy's flat structure has collapsed the protection that once rewarded local value addition. Assemblers can now import parts at duties similar to localized ones, displacing domestic vendors overnight. This requires urgent exemption for the automotive

sector and a temporary return to cascading tariffs until a permanent structure is enshrined in the next auto policy.

### 9.2.2. Practical Approach to Regulate Used Car: JAAI Certification

In light of the Government of Pakistan's proposed policy to open commercial imports of used vehicles PAAPAM recommends a practical and globally tested mechanism to regulate the quality of imported vehicles and prevent the influx of substandard or environmentally harmful cars. Specifically, this proposal calls for mandatory pre-shipment certification of used vehicles through the Japan Auto Appraisal Institute (JAAI). This system, already adopted by multiple countries including Sri Lanka and Kenya, is internationally recognized for its stringent and verifiable certification process that significantly reduces fraud, protects local industry, and ensures environmental compliance.

**Introduction to JAAI**

The Japan Auto Appraisal Institute (JAAI) is an independent, government-accredited inspection body authorized by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) of Japan. Established in 1966, JAAI is responsible for appraising the quality, condition, and compliance of used vehicles exported from Japan.

JAAI's inspections are comprehensive and cover the following:

- Emission compliance
- Odometer verification
- Damage assessment (accident, rust, frame integrity)
- Mechanical condition
- Year of manufacture
- Interior and exterior grading

JAAI certification is tied directly to the **Vehicle Identification Number (VIN)**, making it difficult to forge or circumvent.

**Countries Currently Using JAAI or Similar Certification Bodies**

Several countries rely on JAAI and comparable third-party agencies like JEVIC and QISJ for import regulation:

- **Sri Lanka**: Requires JAAI certification for all Japanese used vehicle imports, with limits on age, mileage, and condition.
- **Kenya**: Uses JEVIC certification, including roadworthiness, odometer verification, and environmental compliance.

- **New Zealand**: Accepts JAAI and JEVIC certifications for compliance with emission and safety standards.
- **Tanzania and Uganda**: Enforce pre-shipment inspection using JAAI/JEVIC to prevent substandard imports.

**Proposed Certification Conditions for Pakistan**

To align with best international practices and protect Pakistan's domestic automotive sector, the following import conditions are recommended for all used vehicle imports under commercial license:

| | |
|---|---|
| Age Limit | Maximum of 5 years from date of manufacture |
| Mileage Cap | • Minimum 10,000 km, and,<br>• Maximum 40,000 km at the time of export |
| Emission Compliance | Minimum Euro 6 standard |
| Damage and Condition | • No accident history<br>• Frame must be rust-free and structurally sound<br>• Interior and exterior must be graded B or higher (based on JAAI grading system)<br>• Auction Grade must be Grade 4.5 of higher |
| Mandatory Certification | Only vehicles with valid, original JAAI certificate issued prior to shipment will be allowed entry. |

**Enforcement and Verification Mechanism**

To ensure robust enforcement, the following verification process is proposed:

1. **Digital Integration with VIN Databases**
    - FBR and Pakistan Customs should integrate with JAAI's certification database using API or web portal access.
    - Customs officers will enter the vehicle's VIN to retrieve the official JAAI certificate and grading details.
2. **Certificate Requirements**
    - JAAI certificate must accompany the import documentation.

- Certificate must include VIN, inspection date, mileage, emissions data, grading, and condition.

3. **Random Physical Audits**
    - A percentage of imports should be randomly audited at port using independent third-party inspectors.
4. **Penalties for Non-Compliance**
    - Vehicles arriving without valid certification should be re-exported at the importer's cost.
    - Repeat violations should result in blacklisting of the importer.

This policy framework offers Pakistan a practical and enforceable solution to regulate the commercial import of used vehicles while aligning with national economic and environmental priorities. By introducing high-quality import filters, it prevents market flooding with low-cost, substandard vehicles that undercut domestic manufacturers, ensuring the survival and growth of local industry. At the same time, it supports climate goals by allowing only fuel-efficient and low-emission vehicles, directly contributing to cleaner air and reduced carbon footprints. Equally important, the framework prioritizes consumer safety by ensuring all imported vehicles meet strict structural and quality standards. Fraud — historically rampant in used vehicle imports — will also be curtailed through VIN-based tracking and third-party certification, minimizing odometer tampering, under-invoicing, and misdeclaration. Administrative efficiency is enhanced by shifting inspections to accredited professionals, easing Customs workload and streamlining processes.

To operationalize this approach, Pakistan should enforce mandatory pre-shipment JAAI certification for all commercial used vehicle imports, coupled with strict age, mileage, emission, and condition standards. Integrating VIN verification into the Pakistan Customs WeBOC system and conducting awareness campaigns and training for Customs officials will further strengthen implementation. Collectively, these steps will create a transparent, quality-focused import regime that safeguards local industry, protects consumers, and positions Pakistan for sustainable industrial growth. Refer to Annexure O for examples and use cases.

### 9.2.3. Pilot Vehicle Scrapping and End-of-Life Policy

Pakistan's auto case is not a case of capability, but rather of volumes, i.e., we have achieved localization levels at par with our peers, however, our volumes fall far behind them. The real challenge is triggering demand in the system, not restricting it through duties.

Pakistan's on-road fleet of 39 million vehicles, many decades old, represents both an environmental liability and an industrial opportunity. If the government introduces a scrapping policy capping maximum vehicle age at 15 years by 2030, even moderate

scrappage rates could unlock unprecedented demand for new vehicles. A modest scrapping rate of 30% could induce additional demand of 1.8 million vehicles per year. This can cumulatively add 9 million vehicles to additional demand over the next five years.

For local parts manufacturers, this volume surge is transformative. Each new vehicle represents not only the assembly of a single product but the deployment of hundreds of localized components. The policy would create predictable scale that drives down unit costs, encourages further investment in tooling and technology, and enables vendors to meet international quality and price benchmarks.

*Table 15: Estimated additional yearly vehicle demand due to vehicle scrapping policy*[40]

| Vehicle Type | Volume on Road | Scrapping Rate | Replacement Rate | Additional Yearly Demand | Additional Demand Cumulative |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Two Wheelers | 30,470,400 | 30% | 80% | 1,462,579 | 7,312,896 |
| Cars | 4,844,700 | 30% | 80% | 232,546 | 1,162,728 |
| Three Wheelers | 871,285 | 30% | 80% | 41,822 | 209,108 |
| Commercial Vehicles | 1,565,800 | 30% | 80% | 75,158 | 375,792 |
| **Total** | **37,752,185** | | | **1,812,105** | **9,060,524** |

This kind of demand uplift aligns directly with the government's Make in Pakistan agenda. Rather than import-dependent growth, scrappage-led replacement anchors industrial gains domestically — feeding localized steel, plastics, and electronics into new vehicle production. India's 2021 scrappage framework demonstrates the viability of this approach: by linking scrapping incentives to tax rebates and registration waivers, India not only replaced unsafe vehicles but also stimulated demand for local parts and created a recycling industry that now supplies raw material back into the automotive value chain. For Pakistan, the multiplier effect would be even greater, given its current underutilized vendor capacity and proximity to high-growth regional markets.

### 9.2.4. Target Auto Financing Support

Car demand in Pakistan is credit-driven, yet credit penetration is just 11% of GDP compared to 50–150% in peers. As a short-term fix, SBP-backed low-interest financing should be introduced for first-time buyers and hybrids/EVs, stabilizing volumes until structural reforms deepen auto finance under AIDEP 2026.

[40] Source: PES, PAAPAM Research

### 9.2.5. Freeze Policy and Tariff Charges Until FY27

Investors and vendors cannot plan in an environment of constant reversals. A moratorium on further duty and localization changes until AIDEP 2026 is finalized will restore predictability and prevent further market paralysis.

Use Case: Thailand's long-term "Eco-Car" program guaranteed duty and incentive frameworks for over a decade, which ensured stability for investors and vendors alike.

### 9.2.6. Provide Immediate Relief to Auto Parts SMEs

Thousands of vendors face closure amid collapsing demand. Working capital guarantees and concessional financing (e.g., Infrazamin facilities) should be deployed immediately to preserve industrial capacity and prevent job losses.

## 9.3. Framework for AIDEP 2026 and Beyond

The next Auto Industry Development and Export Policy cannot be a routine policy update, it must be a structural reset that corrects years of imbalance, safeguards the domestic vendor base, and positions Pakistan's automotive sector for global competitiveness. The future of this sector, and its ability to deliver on Make in Pakistan, export growth, and fiscal stability, hinges on embedding vendor-centric principles into the heart of AIDEP 2026. We believe the framework as outlined below shall set the foundation for sustainable industrialization by aligning three critical pillars: localization, export orientation, and macroeconomic resilience.

It is imperative that this policy moves beyond short-term assemblers' concessions and focuses on deepening value addition within the country. This requires prioritizing technical upgradation of vendors, predictable tariff regimes, and incentives that reward export-linked performance rather than import-dependent assembly. Simultaneously, the policy must shield the local parts ecosystem from policy shocks — such as abrupt duty revisions or permissive used car imports — which have repeatedly undermined investment cycles and destabilized the current account.

### 9.3.1. Permanent Ban on Used Car Imports

Pakistan remains an outlier among auto-producing nations by allowing large-scale used car imports through loopholes such as Gift and Baggage schemes. This single distortion undermines demand for localized parts and floods the market with high-emission vehicles. AIDEP 2026 must codify a permanent ban on used imports, aligning with successful models like Thailand, which instituted a ban in 1978 and built one of Asia's largest vendor ecosystems as a result. Vietnam and India achieved similar outcomes through stringent NTBs and homologation requirements, rendering used imports commercially unviable and forcing OEMs to localize production.

### 9.3.2. Cascading Tariff Structure Codified in Law

The flattening of tariffs under NTP 2025 dismantled the core incentive for localization by narrowing the duty gap between localized parts, CKDs, and CBUs. AIDEP 2026 must reinstate and legislate a cascading tariff structure — raw materials lowest, parts lower than CKDs, and CKDs lower than CBUs — tied to localization milestones such as 60 percent value localization by 2030. Thailand and Vietnam relied on similar duty frameworks, maintaining high CBU tariffs while incentivizing local part production, which allowed their vendor bases to scale and compete globally.

### 9.3.3. Comprehensive Vehicle Scrapping and Recycling Policy

A phased 15-year age cap, combined with a structured scrapping program, could generate replacement demand for over 8.3 million vehicles in five years — an unprecedented boost for OEMs and parts manufacturers. This demand surge would enable vendors to achieve economies of scale, drive down unit costs, and expand investment in tooling and technology. India's 2021 scrappage policy offers a proven model, linking incentives to tax rebates and registration waivers while creating a recycling industry that feeds raw materials back into local production.

### 9.3.4. Use Auto Financing as a Policy Lever

AIDEP 2026 must set ambitious targets to double credit penetration, promote long-tenor leasing and Islamic finance, and work with the State Bank to establish dedicated financing lines for first-time buyers and hybrid/EV purchases. India's mass motorization was enabled by precisely such credit depth, ensuring affordability without compromising vendor margins.

### 9.3.5. Export Integration and Incentives

Pakistan's auto parts exports languish below USD 100 million annually, compared to India's USD 23 billion and Thailand's USD 40 billion. AIDEP 2026 must mandate export integration by setting binding export benchmarks — for example, 10 percent of import value by 2030 — and enabling these through homologation labs, testing facilities, and auto-focused FTAs. Thailand's export-oriented vendor clusters and India's Production-Linked Incentives (PLI) schemes demonstrate the power of linking incentives directly to export performance.

### 9.3.6. Policy Stability and Predictability

Frequent policy reversals have eroded trust and deterred investment. AIDEP 2026 must institutionalize stability through cross-party consensus and parliamentary oversight, embedding a 10-year roadmap for duties, localization targets, and export mandates. Vietnam's automotive strategy demonstrates how predictable frameworks attract sustained OEM and vendor investment.

### 9.3.7. Tax Neutralization through Volumes

Reduced duties need not mean fiscal revenue loss. AIDEP 2026 should embed a fiscal model where duty reductions are offset by scale: higher production volumes generate greater VAT and income tax collection from localized value chains. This approach, absent in previous policies, aligns industrial expansion with IMF revenue benchmarks and ensures fiscal sustainability.

### 9.3.8. EV and Hybrid Localization Mandates

The transition to electric and hybrid mobility must be localized, not imported. AIDEP 2026 should set phased targets for domestic production of batteries, motors, and electronics, aligned with Pakistan's NDC 2021 pledge of 30 percent EV penetration by 2030. India's PLI schemes for advanced chemistry cells and Vietnam's EV tax incentives demonstrate how targeted localization can anchor green industrial growth.

### 9.3.9. Mandate 3S Support for Imported Models

Imported vehicles should not be exempt from aftersales obligations. AIDEP 2026 must require all importers to maintain Sales, Service, and Spare Parts (3S) networks and guarantee 10-year parts availability, protecting consumers and generating downstream opportunities for domestic vendors.

# 10.
# ANNEXURES

## Annexure A: List of Global Auto Producer & Archetype

| Rank | Country | Production Volume | Net Exports (USD Mn) | Archetype |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | China | 31,281,592 | 153,767 | Supplier |
| 2 | USA | 10,562,188 | (1,300) | Domestic Oriented |
| 3 | Japan | 8,234,681 | 127,938 | Supplier |
| 4 | India | 6,014,691 | 13,965 | Supplier |
| 5 | Mexico | 4,202,642 | 95,093 | Supplier |
| 6 | South Korea | 4,127,252 | 72,040 | Supplier |
| 7 | Germany | 4,069,222 | 137,452 | Supplier |
| 8 | Brazil | 2,549,595 | (12,247) | Domestic Oriented |
| 9 | Spain | 2,376,504 | 12,445 | Supplier |
| 10 | Thailand | 1,468,997 | 23,024 | Supplier |
| 11 | Czechia | 1,458,892 | 30,746 | Supplier |
| 12 | Turkey | 1,365,296 | 769 | Supplier |
| 13 | France | 1,357,701 | (24,744) | Domestic Oriented |
| 14 | Canada | 1,342,647 | (33,010) | Domestic Oriented |
| 15 | Indonesia | 1,196,664 | 1,352 | Supplier |
| 16 | Iran | 1,077,839 | (1,899) | Domestic Oriented |
| 17 | Slovakia | 993,000 | 18,784 | Supplier |
| 18 | Russia | 982,665 | (28,555) | Domestic Oriented |
| 19 | United Kingdom | 905,233 | (40,208) | Domestic Oriented |
| 20 | Malaysia | 790,347 | (5,782) | Domestic Oriented |
| 21 | South Africa | 599,755 | 5,429 | Supplier |
| 22 | Italy | 591,067 | (12,556) | Domestic Oriented |
| 23 | Romania | 560,102 | 3,376 | Supplier |
| 24 | Morocco | 559,645 | 2,345 | Supplier |
| 25 | Poland | 555,346 | 1,129 | Supplier |
| 26 | Argentina | 506,571 | (1,126) | Domestic Oriented |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 27 | Hungary | 437,045 | 12,848 | Supplier |
| 28 | Uzbekistan | 429,364 | (5,008) | Domestic Oriented |
| 29 | Portugal | 332,546 | (3,292) | Domestic Oriented |
| 30 | Taiwan | 275,156 | (1,591) | Domestic Oriented |
| 31 | Sweden | 268,487 | 6,592 | Supplier |
| 32 | Belgium | 240,366 | (2,572) | Domestic Oriented |
| 33 | Vietnam | 175,661 | (3,578) | Domestic Oriented |
| 34 | Kazakhstan | 144,624 | (6,069) | Domestic Oriented |
| 35 | Pakistan | 128,449 | (1,625) | Domestic Oriented |
| 36 | Philippines | 126,571 | (8,701) | Domestic Oriented |
| 37 | Austria | 71,785 | (2,450) | Domestic Oriented |
| 38 | Slovenia | 60,903 | (193) | Domestic Oriented |
| 39 | Algeria | 30,108 | (3,987) | Domestic Oriented |
| 40 | Colombia | 23,778 | (4,550) | Domestic Oriented |
| 41 | Finland | 22,384 | (3,379) | Domestic Oriented |
| 42 | Netherlands | 7,403 | (10,175) | Domestic Oriented |
| 43 | Australia | 7,238 | (42,695) | Domestic Oriented |
| 44 | Azerbaijan | 6,695 | (2,005) | Domestic Oriented |
| 45 | Myanmar | 2,711 | (333) | Domestic Oriented |
| 46 | Serbia | 235 | (976) | Domestic Oriented |

## Annexure B: India's Policy Initiatives

## Annexure C: Thailand's Policy Initiatives



## Annexure D: Vietnam's Policy Initiative

## Annexure E: List of JVs

| S.No | Part Name | LOCAL SUPPLIER NAME | TA/JV Facility in Pakistan |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | BELT ASSY,FR BELT,R | PLASTECH AUTOSAFE (PVT) LTD. | AUTOLIV INC. |
| 2 | BELT ASSY,FR BELT,L | | |
| 3 | BELT ASSY,RR BELT,R | | |
| 4 | BELT ASSY,RR BELT,L | | |
| 5 | BELT ASSY,FR BELT,R | TECNO PACK TELECOM (PVT) LTD. | ASHIMORI KOREA |
| 6 | BELT ASSY,FR BELT,L | | |
| 7 | BELT ASSY,RR BELT,R | | |
| 8 | BELT ASSY,RR BELT,L | | |
| 9 | RADIATOR & FAN ASSY | THAL LIMITED ENGINEERING DIVISION | DENSO JAPAN |
| 10 | HARNESS ASSY, ENG | THAL LIMITED ENGINEERING DIVISION | FURUKAWA ELECTRIC-JAPAN, |
| 11 | CABLE COMP,BATTERY | | |
| 12 | HARNESS ASSY, INSP | | |
| 13 | HARNESS ASSY, MAIN | | |
| 14 | WIRE COMP,FR DOOR DR | | |
| 15 | HARNESS ASSY, ENG | BAHAWALPUR ENGINEERING LIMITED | SUMITOMO WIRING SYSTEM |
| 16 | CABLE COMP,BATTERY | | |
| 17 | HARNESS ASSY, INSP | | |
| 18 | HARNESS ASSY, MAIN | | |
| 19 | WIRE COMP,FR DOOR DR | | |
| 20 | ABSORBER (SUB) ASSY, REAR SHOC | AGRIAUTO INDUSTRIES LIMITED | PT KAYABA |
| 21 | STRUT SET,FRONT SUSPENSION, R | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 22 | STRUT SET,FRONT SUSPENSION, L | | |
| 23 | MIRROR ASSY,OUT REAR VIEW,R | AUVITRONICS LIMITED | MUA KAMI |
| 24 | MIRROR ASSY,OUT REAR VIEW,L | | |
| 25 | MIRROR COMP,INSIDE REAR VIEW | | |
| 26 | LAMP ASSY,REAR COMB,R | | KOITO MANUFACTURING COMPANY LTD. |
| 27 | LAMP ASSY,REAR COMB,L | | |
| 28 | SEAT ASSY,FR, R | RAZI SONS (PVT.) LTD. | SNIC Co. Ltd. |
| 29 | SEAT ASSY,FR, L | | |
| 30 | CUSHION ASSY,RR | | |
| 31 | BACK ASSY,RR R | | |
| 32 | BACK ASSY,RR ,L | | |
| 33 | HEADLAMP ASSY, R | ELECTROPOLYMERS (PVT) LTD. | STANLEY ELECTRIC JAPAN |
| 34 | HEADLAMP ASSY, L | | |
| 35 | CABLE ASSY PARKING No, 1 | MASOOD ENGINEERING WORKS PRIVATE LTD | TAIWAN SAFTEY CABLES |
| 36 | CABLE ASSY PARKING No 2 R | | |
| 37 | CABLE ASSY PARKING No 2 R | | |
| 38 | CABLE ASSY CLUTCH | | |
| 39 | CABLE ASSY GEAR SHIFT SLT & CONTROL | | |
| 40 | ANNTENA ASSY | MEHRAN COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES | VLG Wireless Technology Co., Ltd. China |
| 41 | SUNVIOSR ASSY R | | APM ARMADA AUTOPART |
| 42 | SUNVIOSR ASSY L | | |
| 43 | STOP COMP FR DOOR OPEN R | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 44 | STOP COMP FR DOOR OPEN L | TECNO PACK INDUSTRIES (PVT) LTD. | SEHWA AUTOMOTIVE-KOREA |
| 45 | GLASS COMP WIND SHIELD | TECNO AUTO GLASS LIMITED | ASAHI INDIA GLASS LTD |
| 46 | GLASS,FRONT DOOR WINDOW,R | | |
| 47 | GLASS,FRONT DOOR WINDOW,L | | |
| 48 | GLASS,REAR DOOR WINDOW,R | | |
| 49 | GLASS,REAR DOOR WINDOW,L | | |
| 50 | GLASS COMP,QTR WINDOW,R | | |
| 51 | GLASS COMP,QTR WINDOW,L | | |

## Annexure F: Compliance Certification of Window Shield

**A**

**Ministerstvo dopravy České republiky**
**Ministry of Transport of the Czech Republic**
*Nábřeží L.Svobody 12, 110 15 Praha 1, Czech Republic*

E8

| OSVĚDČENÍ o: | COMMUNICATION concerning |
|---|---|
| ~~UDĚLENÍ SCHVÁLENÍ~~ | ~~APPROVAL GRANTED~~ |
| ROZŠÍŘENÍ SCHVÁLENÍ | APPROVAL EXTENDED |
| ~~ODMÍTNUTÍ SCHVÁLENÍ~~ | ~~APPROVAL REFUSED~~ |
| ~~ODEJMUTÍ SCHVÁLENÍ~~ | ~~APPROVAL WITHDRAWN~~ |
| ~~UKONČENÍ VÝROBY~~ | ~~PRODUCTION DEFINITELY DISCONTINUED~~ |

**typu bezpečnostního zasklívacího materiálu podle Předpisu č. 43**
**of a type of safety glazing material pursuant to Regulation No. 43**

Schválení č.:
Approval No.: **E8*43R01/09*13168*01**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | Třída bezpečnostního zasklívacího materiálu:<br>Class of safety glazing material: | **II** Normální vrstvená čelní skla<br>Ordinary laminated-glass windscreens |
| 2. | Popis typu zasklení:<br>Description of the type of glazing: | Prosíme odkázat na dodatek č.:<br>Please refer to appendix No.:<br>~~1, 2~~, 3, ~~4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12~~<br>a v případě čelních skel na seznam podle dodatku č. 13<br>and in the case of windscreens, the list conforming to appendix No. 13 |
| 3. | Obchodní názvy nebo značky:<br>Trade names or marks: | TECNO AUTO GLASS |
| | Typ:<br>Type: | Ordinary laminated-glass windscreen of nominal thickness. 4,56 mm |
| 4. | Název a adresa výrobce:<br>Manufacturer's name and address: | TECNO AUTO GLASS LIMITED<br>255-A, Block 6 PECHS,<br>Off Shahra-e-Faisal,<br>Karachi – Pakistan |
| | Názvy a adresy výrobních závodů:<br>Names and addresses of production plants: | TECNO AUTO GLASS LIMITED<br>Plot# WL01,WL13 & WL29, Block B<br>Industrial Category-BQIP<br>Karachi – Pakistan |
| 5. | Název a adresa příp. zástupce výrobce:<br>If applicable, name and address of manufacturer's representative: | –<br>N/A |

Ministry of Transport UNECE Approval Authority E 8 Type approvals of wheeled vehicles equipment and parts C Czech Republic

6. Ke schválení dodáno dne: / Submitted for approval on: **8 February 2023**

7. Technická zkušebna pověřená prováděním schvalovacích zkoušek: / Technical service responsible for conducting approval tests: **E8/C: TÜV SÜD Czech s.r.o. Novodvorská 994/138 142 21 Praha 4 Czech Republic**

8. Datum protokolu, vydaného touto zkušebnou: / Date of report issued by that service: **20 February 2023**

9. Číslo protokolu, vydaného touto zkušebnou: / Number of report issued by that service: **120189 – 23 – TAC**

10. **SCHVÁLENÍ** ~~**UDĚLENO / ODMÍTNUTO /**~~ **ROZŠÍŘENO** ~~**/ ODEJMUTO**~~
**APPROVAL IS** ~~**GRANTED / REFUSED /**~~ **EXTENDED** ~~**/ WITHDRAWN**~~

11. Důvody pro rozšíření schválení / Reasons for extension of approval:
- **Přidán nový model čelního skla;**
**New windscreen model added;**

12. Poznámky: / Remarks: **–** **N/A**

13. Místo: / Place: **Praha**

14. Datum: / Date: **27 February 2023**

15. Podpis: / Signature:

**Jiří Socha**

16. Schvalovací dokumentace je uložena u schvalovacího orgánu a lze ji obdržet na vyžádání.
The information package lodged with the approval authority may be obtained on request.

Provedení schvalovací značky: / Style of approval mark: *II* E8 43 *R* – 0113168

Ministry of Transport UNECE Approval Authority E 8 Type approvals of wheeled vehicles equipment and parts C Czech Republic

E8*43R01/09*13168*01

Příloha 1 – Dodatek 3 / Annex 1 – Appendix 3

## VRSTVENÁ ČELNÍ SKLA / LAMINATED-GLASS WINDSCREENS

Schválení č.:
Approval No.: **E8*43R01/09*13168*01**

**Hlavní charakteristiky / Principal characteristics:**

| | |
|---|---|
| Počet vrstev skla:<br>Number of layers of glass: | **2** |
| Počet mezivrstev:<br>Number of layers of interlayer: | **1** |
| Jmenovitá tloušťka čelního skla:<br>Nominal thickness of the windscreen: | **4,56 ± 0,4 mm**<br>**(1,8 mm – vnitřní / internal;**<br>**2,0mm – vnější / external)** |
| Jmenovitá tloušťka mezivrstvy(-ev):<br>Nominal thickness of interlayer(s): | **0,76 mm** |
| Speciální úprava skla:<br>Special treatment of glass: | **–**<br>**N/A** |
| Podstata a typ mezivrstvy(-ev):<br>Nature and type of interlayer(s): | **Acoustic PVB** |
| Podstata a typ plastové vrstvy(-ev):<br>Nature and type of plastics coating(s): | **–**<br>**N/A** |
| Jmenovitá tloušťka plastové vrstvy(-ev):<br>Nominal thickness of plastics coating(s): | **–**<br>**N/A** |
| Zbarvení mezivrstvy (úplné / částečné):<br>Colouring of interlayer (total / partial): | **Čiré**<br>**Clear** |

**Vedlejší charakteristiky / Secondary characteristics:**

| | |
|---|---|
| Podstata materiálu (zrcadlové, plavené, tabulové sklo):<br>Nature of the material (plate, float, sheet glass): | **Plavené sklo**<br>**Float glass** |
| Zbarvení skla (čiré / zbarvené):<br>Colouring of glass (colourless / tinted): | **Vnitřní / internal: zelené / green**<br>**Vnější / external: zelené / green** |
| Zbarvení plastových vrstev (vrstvy):<br>Colouring of plastics coating(s): | **–**<br>**N/A** |
| Zatavené elektrické vodiče (ANO / NE):<br>Conductors incorporated (YES / NO): | **NE**<br>**NO** |
| Neprůhledné zastínění (ANO / NE):<br>Opaque obscuration (YES / NO): | **NE**<br>**NO** |
| Poznámky / Remarks: | **N/A** |

| | |
|---|---|
| Přiložené dokumenty:<br>Documents attached: | **Seznam čelních skel (viz dodatek 13)**<br>**List of windscreens (see appendix 13)** |

Ministry of Transport – Approval Authority – E 8 – C – Czech Republic

Příloha 1 – Dodatek 13
Annex 1 – Appendix 13

## OBSAH SEZNAMU ČELNÍCH SKEL */
## CONTENTS OF THE LIST OF WINDSCREENS */

| Extension No. | Vehicle manufacturer and type of vehicle: | Vehicle category: | Developed area: | Height of segment: | Curvature: | Installation angle: | Seat-back angle: | R-point coordinates (A, B, C) relative to the center of the upper edge of the windscreen | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | F ($m^2$) | h (mm) | r (mm) | α (°) | β (°) | A mm | B mm | C mm |
| 00 | TOYOTA (XP15) Sedan | M1 | 1,239 | 50,5 | 2474 | 63,8 | 21 | 424 – 438,4 | 330 | 824,7 – 832,2 |
| 01 | TOYOTA (XG1T) SUV | M1 | 1,35 | 61,2 | 3449 | 61,5 | 19 | 483 – 487 | 352,5 | 858 – 860 |



**B**

**Ministerstvo dopravy České republiky**
**Ministry of Transport of the Czech Republic**
*Nábřeží L.Svobody 12, 110 15 Praha 1, Czech Republic*

E8

| OSVĚDČENÍ o: | COMMUNICATION concerning |
|---|---|
| **UDĚLENÍ SCHVÁLENÍ** | **APPROVAL GRANTED** |
| ~~ROZŠÍŘENÍ SCHVÁLENÍ~~ | ~~APPROVAL EXTENDED~~ |
| ~~ODMÍTNUTÍ SCHVÁLENÍ~~ | ~~APPROVAL REFUSED~~ |
| ~~ODEJMUTÍ SCHVÁLENÍ~~ | ~~APPROVAL WITHDRAWN~~ |
| ~~UKONČENÍ VÝROBY~~ | ~~PRODUCTION DEFINITELY DISCONTINUED~~ |

**typu bezpečnostního zasklívacího materiálu podle Předpisu č. 43**
**of a type of safety glazing material pursuant to Regulation No. 43**

Schválení č.:
Approval No.: **E8*43R01/09*13725*00**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **1.** | Třída bezpečnostního zasklívacího materiálu:<br>Class of safety glazing material: | **Jednotně tvrzené skleněné tabule**<br>**Uniformly-toughened glass panes** |
| | Pravidelný prostup světla:<br>Regular transmittance: | **>70%** |
| **2.** | Popis typu zasklení:<br>Description of the type of glazing: | **Prosíme odkázat na dodatek č.:**<br>**Please refer to appendix No.:**<br>~~1~~, **2**, ~~3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12~~<br>~~a v případě čelních skel na seznam podle dodatku č. 13~~<br>~~and in the case of windscreens, the list conforming to appendix No. 13~~ |
| **3.** | Obchodní název nebo značka:<br>Trade name or mark: | **TECNO AUTO GLASS** |
| **4.** | Název a adresa výrobce:<br>Manufacturer's name and address: | **TECNO AUTO GLASS LIMITED**<br>**255-A, Block 6 PECHS,**<br>**Off Shahra-e-Faisal,**<br>**Karachi – Pakistan** |
| | Název a adresa výrobního závodu:<br>Name and address of production plant: | **TECNO AUTO GLASS LIMITED**<br>**Plot# WL01,WL13 & WL29, Block B**<br>**Industrial Category-BQIP**<br>**Karachi – Pakistan** |
| **5.** | Název a adresa případného zástupce výrobce:<br>If applicable, name and address of manufacturer's representative: | –<br>**N/A** |

Ministry of Transport UNECE Approval Authority E 8 Type approvals of wheeled vehicles equipment and parts C Czech Republic

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 6. | Ke schválení dodáno dne:<br>Submitted for approval on: | **6 October 2022** |
| 7. | Technická organizace pro schvalovací zkoušky:<br>Technical service responsible for conducting approval tests: | **E8/C: TÜV SÜD Czech s.r.o.<br>Novodvorská 994/138<br>142 21 Praha 4<br>Czech Republic** |
| 8. | Datum protokolu, vydaného touto zkušebnou:<br>Date of report issued by that service: | **25 October 2022** |
| 9. | Číslo protokolu, vydaného touto zkušebnou:<br>Number of report issued by that service: | **122025-22-TAC** |

10. **SCHVÁLENÍ UDĚLENO** ~~/ ODMÍTNUTO / ROZŠÍŘENO / ODEJMUTO~~
**APPROVAL IS GRANTED** ~~/ REFUSED /~~ ~~EXTENDED~~ ~~/ WITHDRAWN~~

11. Důvod(y) pro rozšíření schválení: –
Reason(s) for extension of approval: **N/A**

12. Poznámky: –
Remarks: **N/A**

13. Místo: **Praha**
Place:

14. Datum: **31 October 2022**
Date:

15. Podpis:
Signature:

**Oleg S p r u ž i n a**

16. Schvalovací dokumentace je uložena u schvalovacího orgánu a lze ji obdržet na vyžádání.
The information package lodged with the approval authority may be obtained on request.

Provedení schvalovací značky:
Style of approval mark: E8 **43 R – 0113725**

Ministry of Transport UN/ECE Approval Authority E 8 Type approvals of wheeled vehicles equipment and parts C Czech Republic

Příloha 1 – Dodatek 2 / Annex 1 – Appendix 2

## JEDNOTNĚ TVRZENÉ SKLENĚNÉ TABULE
## UNIFORMLY-TOUGHENED GLASS PANES

Schválení č.:
Approval No.: **E8*43R01/09*13725*00**

**Hlavní charakteristiky / Principal characteristics:**

| | |
|---|---|
| Jiné než čelní sklo:<br>Other than windscreens: | **Ano**<br>**Yes** |
| Čelní sklo (skla) pro pomalu se pohybující vozidlo(a):<br>Windscreen(s) for slow moving vehicles: | **–**<br>**N/A** |
| Kategorie podle tvaru:<br>Shape category: | **Rovná a zakřivená okenní skla**<br>**Flat and curved glass panes** |
| Podstata postupu tvrzení:<br>Nature of toughening process: | **Tepelné**<br>**Thermal** |
| Kategorie tloušťky:<br>Thickness category: | **I ( e ≤ 3,5 mm)** |
| Druh a typ plastické vrstvy(-ev):<br>Nature and type of plastics coating(s): | **–**<br>**N/A** |
| Jmenovitá tloušťka plastické vrstvy(-ev):<br>Nominal thickness of plastics coating(s): | **–**<br>**N/A** |

**Vedlejší charakteristiky / Secondary characteristics:**

| | |
|---|---|
| Druh materiálu (ploché, plavené, tabulové sklo):<br>Nature of the material (plate, float, sheet glass): | **Plavené sklo**<br>**Float glass** |
| Zbarvení skla (čiré / zbarvené):<br>Colouring of glass (colourless / tinted): | **Tónované zelené**<br>**Tinted green** |
| Zbarvení plastické vrstvy(-ev):<br>Colouring of plastics coating(s): | **–**<br>**N/A** |
| Elektrické vodiče zataveny:<br>Conductors incorporated: | **Ne**<br>**No** |
| Neprůhledné zastínění:<br>Opaque obscuration incorporated: | **Ano**<br>**Yes** |

*– pokrač. / cont. –*

Příloha **1** – Dodatek **2** *(pokrač.)*
Annex **1** – Appendix **2** *(cont.)*

**Schválená kritéria:**
**Approved criteria:**

| | |
|---|---|
| Největší plocha (u plochého skla):<br>Greatest area (flat glass): | **0,55 m²** |
| Nejmenší úhel:<br>Smallest angle: | **61°** |
| Největší rozvinutá plocha (u zakřiveného skla):<br>Greatest developed area (curved glass): | **0,5 m²** |
| Největší výška segmentu:<br>Greatest height of segment: | **14.1 mm** |

Poznámky: –
Remarks: **N/A**

Přiložené dokumenty: –
Documents attached: **N/A**

Ministry of Transport UNECE Approval Authority E 8 Type approvals of wheeled vehicles, equipment and parts C Czech Republic

E8*43R01/09*13725*00

**C**

**Ministerstvo dopravy České republiky**
**Ministry of Transport of the Czech Republic**
*Nábřeží L.Svobody 12, 110 15 Praha 1, Czech Republic*

E8

| OSVĚDČENÍ o: | COMMUNICATION concerning |
|---|---|
| **UDĚLENÍ SCHVÁLENÍ** | **APPROVAL GRANTED** |
| ~~ROZŠÍŘENÍ SCHVÁLENÍ~~ | ~~APPROVAL EXTENDED~~ |
| ~~ODMÍTNUTÍ SCHVÁLENÍ~~ | ~~APPROVAL REFUSED~~ |
| ~~ODEJMUTÍ SCHVÁLENÍ~~ | ~~APPROVAL WITHDRAWN~~ |
| ~~UKONČENÍ VÝROBY~~ | ~~PRODUCTION DEFINITELY DISCONTINUED~~ |

**typu bezpečnostního zasklívacího materiálu podle Předpisu č. 43**
**of a type of safety glazing material pursuant to Regulation No. 43**

Schválení č.:
Approval No.: **E8*43R01/11*15867*00**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **1.** | Třída bezpečnostního zasklívacího materiálu:<br>Class of safety glazing material: | **II** Normální vrstvená čelní skla<br>Ordinary laminated-glass windscreens |
| **2.** | Popis typu zasklení:<br>Description of the type of glazing: | Prosíme odkázat na dodatek č.:<br>Please refer to appendix No.:<br>~~1, 2~~, 3, ~~4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12~~<br>a v případě čelních skel na seznam podle dodatku č. 13<br>and in the case of windscreens, the list conforming to appendix No. 13 |
| **3.** | Obchodní názvy nebo značky:<br>Trade names or marks: | TECNO AUTO GLASS |
| | Typ:<br>Type: | Ordinary laminated-glass windscreen of nominal thickness. 4,56 mm |
| **4.** | Název a adresa výrobce:<br>Manufacturer's name and address: | TECNO AUTO GLASS LIMITED<br>255-A, Block 6 PECHS, Off Shahra-e-Faisal,<br>Karachi – Pakistan |
| | Názvy a adresy výrobních závodů:<br>Names and addresses of production plants: | TECNO AUTO GLASS LIMITED<br>Plot# WL01,WL13 & WL29, Block B<br>Industrial Category-BQIP<br>Karachi – Pakistan |
| **5.** | Název a adresa příp. zástupce výrobce:<br>If applicable, name and address of manufacturer's representative: | –<br>N/A |

6. Ke schválení dodáno dne: / Submitted for approval on: **16 December 2021, 6 October 2022, 12 December 2022**

7. Technická zkušebna pověřená prováděním schvalovacích zkoušek: / Technical Service responsible for conducting approval tests: **E8/C: TÜV SÜD Czech s.r.o. Novodvorská 994/138 142 21 Praha 4 Czech Republic**

8. Datum protokolu, vydaného touto zkušebnou: / Date of report issued by that Service: **13 February 2025**

9. Číslo protokolu, vydaného touto zkušebnou: / Number of report issued by that Service: **120134 – 25 - TAC**

10. **SCHVÁLENÍ UDĚLENO ~~/ ODMÍTNUTO~~ / ~~ROZŠÍŘENO~~ / ~~ODEJMUTO~~**
**APPROVAL IS GRANTED ~~/ REFUSED~~ / ~~EXTENDED~~ / ~~WITHDRAWN~~**

11. Důvody pro rozšíření schválení / Reasons for extension of approval:
– **N/A**

12. Poznámky: / Remarks: – **N/A**

13. Místo: / Place: **Praha**

14. Datum: / Date: **Viz digitální podpis / See digital signature**

15. Podpis: / Signature:

Elektronický podpis: 25.2.2025
Ověřovatel autora podpisu:
Jméno: Mgr. Pavel Baran
Vydal: PostSignum Qualified CA 4
Platnost do: 21.7.2027 09:33 +02:00

.....

16. K tomuto osvědčení je přiložen soupis dokumentů, uložených u příslušného orgánu, který udělil schválení, a které jsou k dispozici na vyžádání.
The list of documents filed with the Type Approval Authority which has granted approval and available on request is annexed to this communication.

Provedení schvalovací značky: / Style of approval mark: *II* E8 43 *R* – 0115867

Příloha 1 – Dodatek 3 / Annex 1 – Appendix 3

## VRSTVENÁ ČELNÍ SKLA / LAMINATED-GLASS WINDSCREENS

Schválení č.:
Approval No.: E8*43R01/11*15867*00

**Hlavní charakteristiky / Principal characteristics:**

| | |
|---|---|
| Počet vrstev skla:<br>Number of layers of glass: | 2 |
| Počet mezivrstev:<br>Number of layers of interlayer: | 1 |
| Jmenovitá tloušťka čelního skla:<br>Nominal thickness of the windscreen: | 4,56 ± 0,4 mm<br>(1,8 mm – vnitřní / internal;<br>2,0 mm – vnější / external) |
| Jmenovitá tloušťka mezivrstvy(-ev):<br>Nominal thickness of interlayer(s): | 0,76 mm |
| Speciální úprava skla:<br>Special treatment of glass: | –<br>N/A |
| Podstata a typ mezivrstvy(-ev):<br>Nature and type of interlayer(s): | Normal PVB |
| Podstata a typ plastové vrstvy(-ev):<br>Nature and type of plastics coating(s): | –<br>N/A |
| Jmenovitá tloušťka plastové vrstvy(-ev):<br>Nominal thickness of plastics coating(s): | –<br>N/A |
| Zbarvení mezivrstvy (úplné / částečné):<br>Colouring of interlayer (total / partial): | Čiré<br>Clear |

**Vedlejší charakteristiky / Secondary characteristics:**

| | |
|---|---|
| Druh materiálu (ploché, plavené, tabulové sklo):<br>Nature of the material (plate, float, sheet glass): | Plavené sklo<br>Float glass |
| Zbarvení skla (čiré / zbarvené):<br>Colouring of glass (colourless / tinted): | Vnitřní / internal: zelené / green<br>Vnější / external: zelené / green |
| Zbarvení plastových vrstev (vrstvy):<br>Colouring of plastics coating(s): | –<br>N/A |
| Zatavené elektrické vodiče (ano / ne):<br>Conductors incorporated (yes / no): | NE<br>NO |
| Stíniс pás (ano / ne):<br>Opaque obscuration incorporated (yes / no): | NE<br>NO |
| Poznámky / Remarks: | N/A |
| Přiložené dokumenty:<br>Documents attached: | Seznam čelních skel (viz dodatek 13)<br>List of windscreens (see appendix 13) |

Příloha 1 – Dodatek 13 / Annex 1 – Appendix 13

## OBSAH SEZNAMU ČELNÍCH SKEL
## CONTENTS OF THE LIST OF WINDSCREENS

Pro každé čelní sklo, na které se vztahuje touto schválení, musí být uvedeny alespoň tyto podrobnosti:
For each of the windscreens covered by this approval, at least the following particulars shall be provided:

| Extension No. | Výrobce vozidla a typ vozidla / Vehicle manufacturer and type of vehicle: | Kategorie vozidla: Vehicle category: | Rozvinutá plocha: Developed area: | Výška segmentu: Height of segment: | Zakřivení: Curvature: | Úhel montážní: Installation angle: | Úhel opěradla: Seat-back angle: | Souřadnice R-bodu (A, B, C) ve vztahu ke středu horního okraje čelního skla: R-point coordinates (A, B, C) relative to the centre of the upper edge of te windscreen | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | F (m2) | h (mm) | r (mm) | α (°) | β (°) | A mm | B mm | C mm |
| 00 | SUZUKI SWIFT | M1 | 1,211 | 140 | 1250 | 55,6 | 20,1 | 398,8 | 335 | 806,1 |
| 00 | SUZUKI CULTUS | M1 | 1,112 | 52,1 | 1512 | 58,3 | 20,6 | 423,5 | 320 | 832,2 |



## Annexure G: SRO Pertaining to Timely Delivery of Vehicle

**GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN**
MINISTRY OF FINANCE & REVENUE
**(REVENUE DIVISION)**
*****

Islamabad, the 30th June, 2021.

**NOTIFICATION**
(CUSTOMS)

**S.R.O. 837(I)/2021**. - In exercise of the powers conferred by section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969), the Federal Government is pleased to direct that the following further amendments shall be made in its Notification No. S.R.O 656(I)/2006, dated the 22nd June, 2006, namely:-

In the aforesaid Notification, -

(i) In paragraph (2);-

in the condition (xiv), after the expression "measure;" the expression "Furthermore, the importer-cum-assembler or OEM shall comply with shortlisted WP-29 Regulations as determined by EDB and EDB or IOCO shall ensure the compliance" shall be inserted;

(ii) after condition (xiv), the following new conditions, shall be added, namely:-

"(xiva) The concessionary custom duty for various models of new entrants under ADP 2016-21 to continue for five years from date of first manufacturing certificate of respective variant issued by Engineering Development Board or upto 30th June 2026, whichever is earlier"; and

"(xivb) The importer-cum-assembler or OEM shall pay KIBOR plus three percent per annum to the customer against late delivery exceeding 60 days of initial booking on the whole of the deposited amount. Statement/ details of reimbursement @ KIBOR + 3% against deliveries beyond 60 days shall be submitted to EDB or IOCO bi-annually.";

(iii) in Table-I,-

(a) against Serial No (6) in column (1), and entries relating thereto in column

(2), (3) and (4) shall be omitted;

(b) after Serial No. (6), in column (1), new Serial Nos. 6(a) and 6(b), and entry relating thereto in column(1),(2),(3) and (4), shall be added namely:-

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| "6(a) | Vehicle of PCT heading 87.03 upto 850cc (excluding specially designed twin cabin type taxi PCT heading 8703.3227 and 4-stroke Auto Rickshaw of PCT heading 8703.2115) | (i) | Components for assembly / manufacture in any kit form | 30% but 15% for new make or model as certified by EDB for two years from the date of issuance of manufacturing certificate or upto 30th June 2024, whichever is earlier. |
| | | (ii) | Tyres/ Tubes | 16%"; |
| "6(b) | Vehicle of PCT heading 87.03 exceeding 850cc (excluding specially designed twin cabin type taxi PCT heading 8703.3227 and 4-stroke Auto Rickshaw of PCT heading 8703.2115) | (i) | Components for assembly/ manufacture in any kit form | 30% |
| | | (ii) | Tyres/ Tubes | 16%"; and |

(c) against S. No. (10), in column (1) and entry relating thereto in column (4), the figure "10", the figure "5", shall be substituted.

2. This notification shall take effect from the 1st day of July, 2021.

[C. No. 1(6)Tar-III/2016]

**(Syed Hamid Ali)**
Additional Secretary

## Annexure H: List of Locally Produced Parts

| S. No. | Part Number | Part Name | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 09356B58121P24001 | HOSE,RDTR TO DEG TANK | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 2 | 13767B55S01P00001 | HOSE AIR SUCTION | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 3 | 13876B64P00P00001 | PIPE,AIR CLNR SUCT NO.2 | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 4 | 13881B84M00P00001 | HOSE,AIR CLEANER OUTLET | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 5 | 14190B55S00P00001 | PIPE COMP,EXH NO.1 | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 6 | 14300B55S00P00001 | MUFFLER COMP | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 7 | 17200B55S01P00001 | RADIATOR & FAN ASSY | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 8 | 17846B52U00P00001 | HOSE,RADIATOR INLET | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 9 | 17871B71R00P00001 | HOSE,HTR INLET | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 10 | 17872B71R00P00001 | HOSE,HTR OUTLET | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 11 | 17930B84M00P00001 | TANK ASSY,WATER RESERVE | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 12 | 17937B52U00P00001 | HOSE,ENG TO DEG TANK NO.1 | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 13 | 17939B80S60P00001 | HOSE,RDTR TO RSV TANK | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 14 | 27281B52U00P00001 | PROTECTER,PROPELLER SHAFT | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 15 | 33610B52P02P00001 | BATTERY ASSY (34B19L) | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 16 | 35100B55S10P00001 | HEADLAMP ASSY,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 17 | 35300B55S10P00001 | HEADLAMP ASSY,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 18 | 35603B55S00P00001 | LAMP ASSY,REAR COMB,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 19 | 35604B55S00P00001 | LAMP ASSY,REAR COMB,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 20 | 36610B55S30P00001 | HARNESS ASSY,MAIN | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 21 | 36620B71RD0P00001 | HARNESS ASSY,INSTPN | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 22 | 36630B55S30P00001 | HARNESS ASSY,FLOOR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |

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|---|---|---|---|
| 23 | 36650B55S40P00001 | HARNESS ASSY,ENG | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 24 | 36654B52U00P00001 | HARNESS ASSY,BUMP | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 25 | 36680B52U20P00001 | WIRE COMP,BACK DOOR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 26 | 36751B55S10P00001 | WIRE COMP,RR DOOR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 27 | 36756B52U20P00001 | WIRE COMP,FR DOOR DR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 28 | 36757B52U20P00001 | WIRE COMP,FR DOOR PASS | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 29 | 36820B52U20P00001 | HARNESS ASSY,ROOF | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 30 | 36842B71R00P00001 | WIRE COMP,HIGH MT STOP LAMP | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 31 | 36843B55S00P00001 | WIRE COMP,BUMP | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 32 | 38480B55S10P00001 | NOZZLE COMP,WASHER (RH) | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 33 | 38832B55S00P00001 | HOSE ASSY,FR WASHER | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 34 | 38840B52U00P00001 | NOZZLE ASSY,RR WASHER | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 35 | 39101-56LQ0-00001 | ANDROID UNIT | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 36 | 39102B79RA0P00001 | SPEAKER ASSY | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 37 | 41068B55S50P00001 | STRUT SET,FRONT SUSPENSION,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 38 | 41069B55S50P00001 | STRUT SET,FRONT SUSPENSION,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 39 | 41312B74P00P00001 | SEAT, REAR SPRING LOWER | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 40 | 41341B80J00P00001 | SEAT,REAR SPRING UPPER | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 41 | 41810B55S00P00001 | ABSORBER (SUB) ASSY, REAR SHOC | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 42 | 43110B84MB1P00001 | TIRE(165/65R14 79S) | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 43 | 43110B79501P00001 | TIRE(145R12 LT 8PR) | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 44 | 43421B71R00P00001 | HUB,FRONT WHEEL | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 45 | 43511B55S01P00001 | DRUM,BRAKE REAR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 46 | 48400B64P70P00001 | COVER ASSY,STRG COLUMN | LOCAL SUPPLIER |

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|---|---|---|---|
| 47 | 49600B84M30P00001 | PEDAL ASSY,BRAKE | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 48 | 49800B71R20P00001 | PEDAL ASSY,CLUTCH | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 49 | 51410B52U00P00001 | PIPE,MA PRI TO 4 WAY | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 50 | 51420B52U00P00001 | PIPE,MA SEC TO 4 WAY | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 51 | 51430B55S00P00001 | PIPE,HU TO FR BK HOSE,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 52 | 51440B55S00P00001 | PIPE,HU TO FR BK HOSE,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 53 | 51450B52U00P00001 | PIPE,4 WAY TO 4 WAY PRI | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 54 | 51460B52U00P00001 | PIPE,4 WAY TO 4 WAY SEC | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 55 | 51470B84M00P00001 | PIPE,4 JT TO RR BK HOSE,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 56 | 51480B84M00P00001 | PIPE,4 JT TO RR BK HOSE,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 57 | 51491B52U00P00001 | PIPE,HU TO 4 WAY,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 58 | 51492B52U00P00001 | PIPE,HU TO 4 WAY,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 59 | 51493B52U00P00001 | PIPE,4 WAY TO RR BRAKE HOSE,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 60 | 51494B52U00P00001 | PIPE,4 WAY TO RR BRAKE HOSE,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 61 | 51510B52U00P00001 | PIPE,RR BK HOSE TO W/C,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 62 | 51520B52U00P00001 | PIPE,RR BK HOSE TO W/C,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 63 | 54401B84M00P00001 | CABLE COMP,PARKING BRAKE,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 64 | 54402B84M00P00001 | CABLE COMP,PARKING BRAKE,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 65 | 55311B55S00P00001 | DISC,FRONT BRAKE | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 66 | 55321B71R00P00001 | COVER,FR BRAKE DISC DUST | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 67 | 57331B71R00P00001 | HOOD INR YLA | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 68 | 57611B84M20P00001 | FR FENDER R YLA | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 69 | 57711B84M20P00001 | FR FENDER L YLA | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 70 | 58111B52U00P00001 | PANEL,FRONT HOOD OUTER YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |

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|---|---|---|---|
| 71 | 58121B52U00P00001 | PANEL,FRONT HOOD INNER YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 72 | 58270B71R00P00001 | MEMBER COMP,FR BUMPER UPPER | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 73 | 58511B52U00P00001 | PANEL,FRONT FENDER,R YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 74 | 58600B55S00P00001 | MEMBER COMP,FRONT SIDE,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 75 | 58611B52U00P00001 | PANEL,FRONT FENDER,L YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 76 | 58650B68P00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,DASH UPPER,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 77 | 58700B55S00P00001 | MEMBER COMP,FRONT SIDE,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 78 | 58750B68P00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,DASH UPPER,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 79 | 58811B64P00P00001 | PANEL,DASH YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 80 | 58912B52U00P00001 | PANEL,VENT SEALING YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 81 | 59111B74P11P00001 | PANEL,DASH AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 82 | 59220B55S00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,DASH UPPER | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 83 | 59221B68P10P00001 | CROSSMEMBER,DASH UPPER CTR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 84 | 59231B55S01P00001 | PANEL,DASH SIDE,R AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 85 | 59231B71R01P00001 | PNL DASH SIDE R  YLA | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 86 | 59281B55S01P00001 | PANEL,DASH SIDE,L  AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 87 | 59720B64P00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,FRONT FLOOR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 88 | 59721B55S00P00001 | PANEL, COWL FRONT AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 89 | 59730B64P00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,ENG MT REAR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 90 | 59750B52U00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,BUMP STOPPER | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 91 | 59760B52U00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,LTRL ROD BRKT | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 92 | 61111B55S00P00001 | PANEL,MAIN FLOOR, R NEW | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 93 | 61120B55S00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,FLR PAN UPR,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 94 | 61120B71R00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,FL PAN NO.1,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |

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|---|---|---|---|
| 95 | 61125B79A00P00001 | BRACKET,FRONT SEAT | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 96 | 61130B76M00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,FL PAN NO.2 | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 97 | 61154B64P00P00001 | MEMBER,DASH CROSSMEMBER SIDE,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 98 | 61161B74P10P00001 | PANEL,MAIN FLOOR RR L AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 99 | 61170B55S00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,FLR PAN UPR,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 100 | 61170B71R00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,FL PAN NO.1,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 101 | 61184B64P00P00001 | MEMBER,DASH CROSSMEMBER SIDE,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 102 | 61191B55S00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER,FLOOR PAN UPR RR,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 103 | 61192B55S00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER,FLOOR PAN UPR RR,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 104 | 61211B52U00P00001 | PANEL,ENGINE ROOM FRONT YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 105 | 61212B64P00P00001 | PATCH,ENGINE ROOM FRONT | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 106 | 61241B55S00P00001 | MEMBER,FLOOR SIDE R AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 107 | 61261B55S00P00001 | MEMBER,FLOOR SIDE, L AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 108 | 61411B71R00P00001 | MEMBER,FLOOR SIDE REAR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 109 | 61511B55S00P00001 | PANEL,REAR FLOOR FR AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 110 | 61512B55S00P00001 | PANEL,REAR FLOOR RR AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 111 | 61513B84M10P00001 | RR FLOOR RR YLA | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 112 | 61520B84M10P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,RR FLOOR 3RD | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 113 | 61550B71R10P00001 | PANEL COMP,RR FLOOR SEAT MTG | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 114 | 61711B52U00P00001 | PANEL,REAR FLOOR YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 115 | 61811B64P00P00001 | PANEL,REAR WHEEL HOUSE FR,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 116 | 61821B64P00P00001 | PANEL,REAR WHEEL HOUSE FR,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 117 | 61910B52U00P00001 | PANEL S/COMP,REAR FLOOR UPPER | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 118 | 61920B50T00P00001 | PANEL COMP,RR FLOOR UPR SIDE,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |

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|---|---|---|---|
| 119 | 61930B50T00P00001 | PANEL COMP,RR FLOOR UPR SIDE,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 120 | 62100B55S00P00001 | MEMBER COMP,RR FLOOR SIDE,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 121 | 62120B64P00P00001 | PANEL COMP,ROOF SIDE INR FR,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 122 | 62131B64P00P00001 | PANEL,ROOF SIDE INNER REAR,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 123 | 62300B55S00P00001 | MEMBER COMP,RR FLOOR SIDE,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 124 | 62311B64P01P00001 | PANEL,REAR QUARTER INNER,R YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 125 | 62600B55S00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,RR FLR FRONT | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 126 | 62620B64P00P00001 | PANEL COMP,ROOF SIDE INR FR,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 127 | 62631B64P00P00001 | PANEL,ROOF SIDE INNER REAR,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 128 | 62700B55S00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER COMP,RR FLOOR CTR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 129 | 62711B84M10P00001 | CROSSMEMBER,RR FLOOR 2ND | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 130 | 62811B64P01P00001 | PANEL,REAR QUARTER INNER,L YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 131 | 63312B74P00P00001 | PANEL,RR WHEEL HOUSE OUTER,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 132 | 63331B74P00P00001 | PANEL,QTR INNER FRONT,R AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 133 | 63410B74P02P00001 | PANEL COMP,WHEEL HOUSE INNER,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 134 | 63712B74P00P00001 | PANEL,RR WHEEL HOUSE OUTER,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 135 | 63731B74P00P00001 | PANEL,QTR INNER FRONT,L AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 136 | 63810B74P02P00001 | PANEL COMP,WHEEL HOUSE INNER,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 137 | 64111B55S00P00001 | SIDE BODY OUTER,R AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 138 | 64131B84M10P00001 | PANEL,RR LAMP HOUSE OUTER,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 139 | 64211B64P01P00001 | PANEL,ROOF YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 140 | 64221B52U00P00001 | PANEL,ROOF FRONT INNER YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 141 | 64511B55S00P00001 | SIDE BODY OUTER,L AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 142 | 64530B55R00P00001 | PANEL COMP,RR LAMP HOUSE OTR,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |

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|---|---|---|---|
| 143 | 64570B74P01P00001 | LID COMP,FUEL INLET | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 144 | 65111B55S00P00001 | ROOF AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 145 | 65121B55S00P00001 | MEM ROOF FRONT INR AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 146 | 65131B74P00P00001 | MEM ROOF BACK INR AET | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 147 | 65151B55S00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER, ROOF CTR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 148 | 65152B74P00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER, ROOF NO. 2 | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 149 | 65153B74P00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER ROOF NO. 3 | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 150 | 65154B55S00P00001 | CROSSMEMBER,ROOF FRONT | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 151 | 65421B55S00P00001 | MEMBER,TAIL END | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 152 | 65500B80S10P00001 | PANEL COMP,BACK | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 153 | 68111B52U00P00001 | PANEL,FRONT DOOR OUTER,R YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 154 | 68121B52U00P00001 | REINF,FRONT DOOR OUTER,R YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 155 | 68131B52U00P00001 | REINF,FRONT DOOR OUTER CTR,R YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 156 | 68151B52U00P00001 | PANEL,FRONT DOOR INNER,R YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 157 | 68173B52U00P00001 | SUPPORT,FRONT DOOR UPPER,R YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 158 | 68260B55S00P00001 | BEAM COMP,FRONT DOOR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 159 | 68311B52U20P00001 | PANEL,FRONT DOOR OUTER,L YV7 V2 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 160 | 68321B52U00P00001 | REINF,FRONT DOOR OUTER,L YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 161 | 68331B52U00P00001 | REINF,FRONT DOOR OUTER CTR,L YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 162 | 68351B52U00P00001 | PANEL,FRONT DOOR INNER,L YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 163 | 68460B84M00P00001 | BEAM COMP,FRONT DOOR,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 164 | 68511B52U00P00001 | PANEL,REAR DOOR OUTER,R YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 165 | 68551B74P10P00001 | REAR DOOR INNER,R  Y4J GA | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 166 | 68572B74P10P00001 | REINF,RR DOOR WINDOW RR,R Y4J GA | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |

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|---|---|---|---|
| 167 | 68611B52U00P00001 | PANEL,REAR DOOR INNER,R YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 168 | 68621B52U00P00001 | REINF,REAR DOOR OUTER,R YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 169 | 68624B52U00P00001 | REINF,RR DR OUTER CTR NO.2 YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 170 | 68660B74P00P00001 | BEAM COMP,REAR DOOR,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 171 | 68711B52U00P00001 | PANEL,REAR DOOR OUTER,L YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 172 | 68751B74P10P00001 | PANEL,REAR DOOR INNER,L Y4J GA | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 173 | 68772B74P10P00001 | REINF,RR DOOR WINDOW RR,L Y4J GA | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 174 | 68811B52U00P00001 | PANEL,REAR DOOR INNER,L YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 175 | 68821B52U00P00001 | REINF,REAR DOOR OUTER,L YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 176 | 68860B74P00P00001 | BEAM COMP,REAR DOOR,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 177 | 69111B52U00P00001 | PANEL,BACK DOOR OUTER YV7 V2 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 178 | 69151B52U00P00001 | PANEL,BACK DOOR INNER YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 179 | 69166B52U00P00001 | REINF,BACK DOOR OUTER YV7 | IN-HOUSE PRESS SHOP |
| 180 | 691C0B64P10P00001 | BEAM COMP,BACK DOOR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 181 | 71711B53R00P00101 | BUMPER,FRONT | IN-HOUSE PLASTIC SHOP |
| 182 | 71721B84M00P00001 | GRILLE,RADIATOR LOWER | IN-HOUSE PLASTIC SHOP |
| 183 | 71731B55S00P00001 | HOLDER,FR BUMPER SIDE,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 184 | 71732B55S00P00001 | HOLDER,FR BUMPER SIDE,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 185 | 71741B80S00P00001 | GRILLE,RADIATOR UPPER | IN-HOUSE PLASTIC SHOP |
| 186 | 71811B53R00P00101 | BUMPER,REAR | IN-HOUSE PLASTIC SHOP |
| 187 | 71812B55S00P00001 | HOLDER,RR BUMPER SIDE,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 188 | 71813B55S00P00001 | HOLDER,RR BUMPER SIDE,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 189 | 72111B55S00P5PK01 | GARNISH,FRONT BUMPER | IN-HOUSE PLASTIC SHOP |
| 190 | 72321B55S00P00001 | LINING,FRONT FENDER,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |

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|---|---|---|---|
| 191 | 72322B55S00P00001 | LINING,FRONT FENDER,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 192 | 72410B52U00P00001 | INSULATOR,ENG ROOM FRONT | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 193 | 72420B52U00P00001 | INSULATOR,ENG ROOM SIDE,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 194 | 72430B52U00P00001 | INSULATOR,ENG ROOM SIDE,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 195 | 72440B52U00P00001 | INSULATOR,ENG ROOM CTR MEMBER | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 196 | 72450B52U00P00001 | INSULATOR,REAR FLOOR FRONT | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 197 | 72811B76M00P00001 | LINING,REAR WHEEL HSG,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 198 | 72811B53R00P00001 | LINING,REAR FENDER,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 199 | 72821B76M00P00001 | LINING,REAR WHEEL HSG,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 200 | 72821B53R00P00001 | LINING,REAR FENDER,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 201 | 73111B55S00P00001 | PANEL,INSTRUMENT MAIN | IN-HOUSE PLASTIC SHOP |
| 202 | 73112B71R00P00001 | PANEL,INSTRUMENT LOWER | IN-HOUSE PLASTIC SHOP |
| 203 | 73200B55S10P00001 | MEMBER COMP,STEERING SUPPORT | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 204 | 73310B80S00P00001 | PANEL COMP,INSTRUMENT CLUSTER | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 205 | 73311B74P00P5PK01 | PANEL,INSTRUMENT CLUSTER | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 206 | 73410B74P02P00001 | BOX COMP,GLOVE | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 207 | 73611B55S00P00001 | LOUVER,CTR VENT | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 208 | 73630B55S00P00001 | LOUVER COMP,SIDE VENT | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 209 | 73681B52U00P00001 | DUCT,DEMISTER R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 210 | 73691B52U00P00001 | DUCT,DEMISTER L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 211 | 73811B84M00P00001 | COVER,STRG COLUMN HOLE | IN-HOUSE PLASTIC SHOP |
| 212 | 74620B55S00P00001 | DUCT COMP,VENT | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 213 | 74621B71R00P00001 | DUCT,VENT | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 214 | 75110B71R00P00001 | CARPET COMP, FLOOR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |

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|---|---|---|---|
| 215 | 75130B52R10P00001 | CARPET COMP,LUGGAGE FLOOR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 216 | 75140B52U00P00001 | CARPET COMP,ENGINE ROOM FRONT | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 217 | 75410B64P00P00001 | MEMBER COMP,ENGINE ROOM CENTER | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 218 | 75440B84M00P00001 | CARPET COMP, LUGGAGE FLOOR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 219 | 75810B84M00P00001 | BOX COMP,FLOOR CONSOLE | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 220 | 76110B55S00P00001 | TRIM COMP,FRONT PILLAR,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 221 | 76120B55S00P00001 | TRIM COMP,FRONT PILLAR,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 222 | 76210B55S00P00001 | TRIM COMP,CTR PILLAR UPPER,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 223 | 76211B61U00P00001 | TRIM,CENTER PILLAR UPPER,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 224 | 76230B64P00P00001 | TRIM COMP,CTR PILLAR LOWER,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 225 | 76240B64P00P00001 | TRIM COMP,CTR PILLAR LOWER,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 226 | 76250B55S00P00001 | TRIM COMP,QUARTER UPPER,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 227 | 76270B55S00P00001 | TRIM COMP,QUARTER LOWER,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 228 | 76291B55S00P00001 | TRIM,FRONT DOOR OPENING | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 229 | 76295B55S00P00001 | TRIM,REAR DOOR OPENING | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 230 | 76520B80S01P00001 | OPENER COMP,FUEL LID | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 231 | 78110B71R00P00001 | LINING COMP,ROOF | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 232 | 78111B55S00P00001 | LINING,ROOF | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 233 | 82160B55S00P00001 | CABLE COMP,HOOD LATCH RELEASE | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 234 | 83360B55S00P00001 | CABLE COMP,FUEL LID OPENER | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 235 | 83710B55S20P00001 | TRIM COMP,FRONT DOOR,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 236 | 83711B52U10P00001 | BOARD,FR DOOR TRIM,R | IN-HOUSE PLASTIC SHOP |
| 237 | 83720B55S20P00001 | TRIM COMP,FRONT DOOR,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 238 | 83721B52U10P00001 | BOARD,FR DOOR TRIM,L | IN-HOUSE PLASTIC SHOP |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 239 | 83730B74P20P00001 | TRIM COMP,REAR DOOR,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 240 | 83731B52U00P00001 | BOARD,RR DOOR TRIM,R | IN-HOUSE PLASTIC SHOP |
| 241 | 83740B74P20P00001 | TRIM COMP,REAR DOOR,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 242 | 83741B52U00P00001 | BOARD,RR DOOR TRIM,L | IN-HOUSE PLASTIC SHOP |
| 243 | 83770B84M01P00001 | TRIM COMP,BACK DOOR | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 244 | 84501B55S00P00001 | GLASS COMP,FRONT DOOR WINDOW,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 245 | 84502B55S00P00001 | GLASS COMP,FRONT DOOR WINDOW,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 246 | 84503B55S00P00001 | GLASS COMP,REAR DOOR WINDOW,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 247 | 84504B55S00P00001 | GLASS COMP,REAR DOOR WINDOW,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 248 | 84510B55S00P00001 | GLASS COMP, WINDSHIELD | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 249 | 84541B71R00P00001 | GLASS,REAR DOOR WINDOW,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 250 | 84546B71R00P00001 | GLASS,REAR DOOR WINDOW,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 251 | 84551B55S00P00001 | GLASS RR DOOR PARTITION R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 252 | 84556B55S00P00001 | GLASS RR DOOR PARTITION L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 253 | 84580B52U00P00001 | GLASS COMP,QUARTER WINDOW,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 254 | 84590B52U00P00001 | GLASS COMP,QUARTER WINDOW,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 255 | 84641B55S00P00001 | WEATHERSTRIP,FRONT DOOR OPNG,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 256 | 84651B55S00P00001 | WEATHERSTRIP,FRONT DOOR OPNG,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 257 | 84661B55S00P00001 | WEATHERSTRIP,REAR DOOR OPNG,R | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 258 | 84671B55S00P00001 | WEATHERSTRIP,REAR DOOR OPNG,L | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 259 | 84681B55S00P00001 | WEATHERSTRIP,BACK DOOR OPNG | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 260 | 89101B55S00P00001 | TANK ASSY,FUEL | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 261 | 95209-56LP0-00001 | A/C UNIT | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 262 | 95481B80S00P00001 | HOSE,DRAIN | LOCAL SUPPLIER |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 263 | 95710B80SA0P00001 | HOSE,SUCTION | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 264 | 95720B80SA0P00001 | HOSE,DISCHARGE | LOCAL SUPPLIER |
| 265 | 43210B67LB0P09L01 | WHEEL COMP(13X4.00B) (Black) | LOCAL SUPPLIER |

## Annexure I: ADP, AIDP, and AIDEP Targets vs Performance[41]

### Structural Targets

| Target | Status | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **AIDP (2007-12)** | | |
| Structural | | |
| Develop high-value/critical components locally | Unmet | Engines/transmissions remained imported |
| Establish AISDC & HR development centres | Unmet | Never operationalized |
| Vendor cluster development | Met | Cluster initiatives in Karachi & Lahore achieved partial success |
| Tariff and Fiscal | | |
| Five-year pre-announced tariff plan | Partially Met | Announced but later altered; inconsistency eroded credibility |
| Launch Productive Asset Investment Incentive (PAII) and Technology Acquisition Support Scheme (TASS) | Unmet | Both schemes still remain largely unimplemented |
| Maintain TRIMs-compliant Tariff Based System (TBS) | Met | Transition completed; deletion programs phased out |
| **ADP (2016-21)** | | |
| Structural | | |
| Attract new entrants (Greenfield/Brownfield) | Met | KIA, Hyundai, MG, Changan entered; capacity rose to 418,500 units |
| Safety/environment compliance (WP-29, immobilizers) | Partially Met | WP-29 accession complete, enforcement ongoing |
| Establish Pakistan Automotive Institute | Unmet | Institute proposed but not fully operationalized |
| Improve localization of critical components | Unmet | High-value parts still imported; no breakthrough achieved |
| Tariff and Fiscal | | |
| Five-year tariff roadmap for existing & new entrants | Partially Met | Roadmap announced; execution inconsistent |
| Incentives for new entrants (reduced CKD duties) | Met | Attracted multiple OEMs |
| Curb misuse of used car import policy (SRO 52) | Unmet | Reforms implemented however used car imports still exist |
| **AIDEP (2021-26) - Ongoing** | | |
| Structural | | |
| Implement WP-29 safety regulations fully | Partially Met | Phased implementation |
| Promote localization and rationalize aftermarket | Unmet (so far) | High-value components still imported, under-invoicing persists |

[41] Source: PES, PAMA, PAAPAM, AIDP 2007-12, ADP 2016-21. AIDEP 2021-26, News Flow

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Affordable small cars (Meri Garri Scheme) | Unmet (so far) | Affordability eroded by inflation and PKR devaluation |
| Tariff and Fiscal | | |
| Tariff stability for 2021-26 (continuity of ADP incentives) | Partially Met | Continuation pledged but macro crises led to deviations |
| Duty reductions on small cars (Meri Garri) | Unmet | Policy was implemented, however, was partially reversed amid fiscal tightening (GST rose 18%) in FY23. By FY24, the benefit was largely eroded by PKR depreciation and inflation |
| Periodic review of tariffs for replacement parts (aftermarket) | Unmet (so far) | Reviews delayed; under-invoicing unresolved |

### Quantitative benchmarks under Auto Policies (2007-12, 2016-21, 2021-2026)

| Target | Actual | Status |
|---|---|---|
| **AIDP (2007-12)** | | |
| Double auto sector contribution to GDP from 2.8% to 5.6% | 2.30% | Unmet |
| Achieve 500,000 car production (critical mass) | 176,000 | Unmet |
| Increase exports to $650mn | $24.5mn | Unmet |
| Growth in 2/3 wheeler production | 1.5mn | Met |
| **ADP (2016-21)** | | |
| Production Targets | | |
| Cars/Jeeps: 350,000 | 182,389 | Unmet |
| LCVs: 79,000 | 35,912 | Unmet |
| Trucks: 12,000 | 5,346 | Unmet |
| Buses: 2,200 | 631 | Unmet |
| Tractors: 88,000 | 50,700 | Unmet |
| Motorcycles: 2,500,000 | 2,475,894 | Unmet |
| Raise GDP share to 3.8% | 2-3% of GDP | Unmet |
| Raise employment to 4mn | <2mn jobs | Unmet |
| Expand exports (no target set, but implied) | <$100mn | Unmet |
| **AIDEP (2021-26) - Ongoing** | | |
| Capacity Targets | | |
| Cars/LCVs/SUVs: 65,000 | 418,500 | Unmet (so far) |
| Tractors: 100,000 | 70,000 | Unmet (so far) |
| HCVs: 20,000 | 30,000 | Met |
| 2/3 Wheelers: 7,000,000 | 1,750,000 | Unmet (so far) |

## Annexure J: Pakistan's Policy Initiatives

## Annexure K: Summary of Used Car Imports Study & Japanese Auction System

**Significance of the Domestic Automotive Sector**

The automobile industry in Pakistan is one of the country's leading contributors to industrial output, tax revenue, and employment generation. Over the years, it has developed a strong vendor base, with Auto Parts Manufacturers (APMs) supplying between 55–70% of components for locally assembled passenger cars. This ecosystem, built through years of gradual localization, supports thousands of skilled jobs and sustains allied industries such as steel, plastics, and engineering services.

**Disruption from Used Car Imports**

This progress has repeatedly been disrupted by the influx of used vehicles, particularly from Japan. Periodic relaxations in import policies have allowed large volumes of these cars to enter the market, often at prices lower than locally assembled models. Such inflows weaken demand for domestic vehicles, discourage new investment in localization, and erode the sector's competitiveness.

**Japanese Shaken and Auction System**

Central to this inflow is Japan's Shaken system — a mandatory vehicle inspection regime requiring comprehensive checks after three years and every two years thereafter. The high cost of compliance prompts owners to replace their vehicles frequently, creating a steady supply of well-maintained, low-mileage cars for export. These vehicles are sold through Japan's organized auction network, where cars are graded, documented, and traded in transparent bidding processes. Every year, over one million vehicles are exported from Japan, with Pakistan emerging as one of the major destinations alongside African and Middle Eastern markets.

**Import Mechanism in Pakistan**

In Pakistan, these cars enter mainly through overseas Pakistani schemes — transfer of residence, personal baggage, and gift programs. These programs allow imports of cars up to three years old (five years for SUVs), with duties calculated after a 36% depreciation allowance. Originally intended for individual use, weak enforcement has turned these schemes into commercial import channels, enabling bulk inflows at undervalued rates.

The price positioning of Japanese used cars directly competes with domestic models. Even after applicable duties, these vehicles often remain cheaper in key small and mid-sized segments, eroding the viability of local production and halting progress in localizing high-value parts.

**Economic Consequences**

APMs face annual revenue losses of around Rs 10.8 billion as production volumes drop, while the government foregoes approximately Rs 7.6 billion each year in duties and taxes due to undervaluation and concessions. Beyond the immediate fiscal damage, unchecked imports undermine technological upgrading, limit capacity expansion, and prevent the industry from achieving the scale necessary to compete regionally.

Regional automotive hubs such as India, Thailand, and Indonesia protect their domestic markets with strict barriers — ranging from outright bans on used car imports to high tariffs and rigorous inspection regimes. These measures have enabled them to scale production, attract investment, and position themselves as export-oriented manufacturers. Pakistan's permissive policies, by contrast, have left its automotive sector exposed and struggling to evolve into a competitive regional hub.

While used car imports provide short-term relief to consumers grappling with high new-car prices, the long-term consequences include erosion of industrial capability, loss of skilled employment, and higher foreign exchange outflows. Addressing these challenges requires closure of policy loopholes, strict enforcement of age and condition limits, and alignment of regulations with regional best practices. Future automotive development policies must embed Make-in-Pakistan objectives, secure the vendor ecosystem, and create the predictability needed for sustained investment and industrial growth.

## Annexure L: Used Car Auction Price Details

**Daihatsu Mira 2021**






| Date | Bid No Auction | Make | Model | Year Mileage | CC | Chassis ID | Scores | Colour | Start Price | Sold Price | Shaken | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-07-30 | 66 HERO | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 93,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | R | SILVER | 50,000 | 197,000 | | Unsold |
| 2025-07-30 | 537 HERO | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 115,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | R | SILVER | 30,000 | 132,000 | | Unsold |
| 2025-07-30 | 524 HERO | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 133,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4 | SILVER | 50,000 | 119,000 | | Unsold |
| 2025-07-30 | 8509 USS Fukuoka | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 17,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | R | WHITE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-30 | 5252 USS Sapporo | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 26,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4.5 | WHITE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-30 | 5425 USS Sapporo | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 20,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4.5 | BLUE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-30 | 5027 USS Sapporo | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 83,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4.5 | SILVER | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-30 | 5118 USS Sapporo | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 17,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4.5 | BLUE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-29 | 38 ORIX Sendai | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 108,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 3.5 | SILVER | 0 | 262,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-29 | 218 JU Saitama | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 26,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4.5 | BLUE | 150,000 | 669,000 | | Unsold |
| 2025-07-29 | 113 JU Saitama | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 13,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | 3.5 | SILVER | 80,000 | 510,000 | | Negotiate sold |
| 2025-07-29 | 242 JU Saitama | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 82,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | 4 | SILVER | 60,000 | 336,000 | | Unsold |
| 2025-07-29 | 5802 SAA Sapporo | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 25,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | | BLACK | 30,000 | 324,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-29 | 30058 CAA Gifu | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 83,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4.5 | WHITE | 10,000 | 370,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-29 | 30059 CAA Gifu | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 80,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4.5 | WHITE | 10,000 | 373,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-29 | 288 USS Yokohama | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 18,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | 4.5 | L BLUE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-26 | 65112 USS HAA Kobe | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 10,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | 4 | L BLUE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-26 | 60098 USS HAA Kobe | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 44,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | 4.5 | WHITE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-26 | 60270 USS HAA Kobe | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 21,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | 4.5 | SILVER | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-26 | 3122 TAA Yokohama | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 81,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | RA | SILVER | 8,000 | 218,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-26 | 3128 TAA Yokohama | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 79,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 3.5 | SILVER | 8,000 | 302,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-26 | 3063 TAA Yokohama | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 53,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | 4 | SILVER | 8,000 | 365,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-26 | 200 JU Gifu | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 80,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4 | SILVER | 30,000 | 330,000 | | Unsold |
| 2025-07-26 | 114 JU Gifu | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 74,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4.5 | SILVER | 10,000 | 382,000 | | Sold |

| | Date | Bid No Auction | Make | Model | Year Mileage | CC | Chassis ID | Scores | Colour | Start Price | Sold Price | Shaken | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2025-07-26 | 8064 JU Gifu | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 5,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | 4.5 | WINE | 180,000 | 655,000 | | Unsold |
| | 2025-07-26 | 12049 USS Kyushu | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 30,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | 3.5 | L BLUE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-26 | 55150 USS Kyushu | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 24,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | 4.5 | BROWN | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-26 | 55091 USS Kyushu | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 25,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | 4.5 | RED | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-26 | 10257 USS Shizuoka | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 84,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4 | SILVER | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-26 | 10107 USS Shizuoka | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 84,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4 | SILVER | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-25 | 84 MIRIVE Aichi | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 44,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | 4 | SILVER | 100,000 | 604,000 | | Unsold |
| | 2025-07-25 | 90012 ARAI Bayside | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 108,000 KM | 650 | LA350S | *** | SILVER | 7,000 | 100,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-25 | 16 JU Fukuoka | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 34,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | R | BLUE | 80,000 | 212,000 | | Unsold |
| | 2025-07-25 | 50250 USS Osaka | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 93,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4 | SILVER | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-25 | 4050 USS Osaka | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 8,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | R | BLUE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-25 | 11206 USS Nagoya | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 30,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | *** | WHITE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-25 | 80272 USS Nagoya | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 5,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | 3.5 | L BLUE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-25 | 80368 USS Nagoya | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 29,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | 4.5 | WHITE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-24 | 2538 JU Aichi | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 6,000 KM | 660 | LA350S | R | SILVER | 50,000 | 452,000 | | Unsold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 3032 TAA Touhoku | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 73,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4 | SILVER | 8,000 | 305,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 3040 TAA Touhoku | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 111,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 3.5 | SILVER | 8,000 | 197,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 3047 TAA Touhoku | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 99,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4 | SILVER | 8,000 | 245,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 3012 TAA Touhoku | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 160,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 3.5 | SILVER | 8,000 | 155,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 3521 TAA Chubu | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 94,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4 | SILVER | 8,000 | 233,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 74006 TAA Chubu | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 76,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 4 | SILVER | 8,000 | 272,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 4534 TAA Chubu | DAIHATSU | MIRA E:S | 2021 199,000 KM | 660 | LA360S | 3.5 | SILVER | 9,999,000 | 0 | | Unsold |

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## Suzuki Alto 2021

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|---|---|
| 35 | null |
| 36 | null |
| 37 | null |
| 38 | null |
| 39 | null |
| 40 | null |
| 41 | null |
| 42 | null |
| 43 | null |

| Date | Bid No<br>Auction | Make | Model | Year<br>Mileage | CC | Chassis ID | Scores | Colour | Start Price | Sold Price | Shaken | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-07-30 | 10005<br>LUM Tokyo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>160,000 KM | 660 | HA36V | 3 | actual vehicle | 0 | 110,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-30 | 10004<br>LUM Tokyo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>159,000 KM | 660 | HA36V | 3.5 | actual vehicle | 0 | 79,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-30 | 10583<br>LUM Tokyo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>158,000 KM | 660 | HA36V | 3.5 | actual vehicle | 0 | 110,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-30 | 10523<br>LUM Tokyo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>93,000 KM | 660 | HA36V | 3.5 | actual vehicle | 0 | 88,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-30 | 10592<br>LUM Tokyo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>120,000 KM | 660 | HA36V | | actual vehicle | 0 | 76,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-30 | 13103<br>CAA Chubu | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>93,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | RA | SILVER | 50,000 | 302,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-30 | 3120<br>CAA Chubu | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>16,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4.5 | BLUE | 200,000 | 524,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-30 | 3172<br>CAA Chubu | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>26,000 KM | 660 | HA37S | 4.5 | BROWN | 100,000 | 760,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-30 | 4023<br>USS Kobe | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>102,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4 | WHITE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-30 | 4119<br>USS Tohoku | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>122,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 3.5 | SILVER | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-30 | 5197<br>USS Sapporo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>34,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4 | WHITE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-29 | 2612<br>JU Nagano | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>89,000 KM | 660 | HA37S | 4 | two-tone | 80,000 | 533,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-29 | 634<br>JU Nagano | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>13,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | R | BLUE | 80,000 | 200,000 | | Unsold |
| 2025-07-29 | 90196<br>CAA Tokyo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>95,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4.5 | WHITE | 10,000 | 262,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-29 | 212<br>CAA Tokyo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>20,000 KM | 660 | HA37S | 5 | BLUE | 80,000 | 671,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-26 | 62018<br>USS HAA Kobe | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>15,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4.5 | SILVER | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-26 | 65370<br>USS HAA Kobe | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>43,000 KM | 660 | HA97S | 4.5 | BEIGE 2 | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-26 | 65128<br>USS HAA Kobe | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>16,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4.5 | SILVER | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-26 | 60120<br>JU Gifu | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>90,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | R | BEIGE | 100,000 | 300,000 | | Negotiate sold |
| 2025-07-26 | 82188<br>USS Kyushu | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>6,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4.5 | IVORY | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-26 | 97011<br>USS Kyushu | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>163,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | R | WHITE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-26 | 97031<br>USS Kyushu | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>147,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 3.5 | WHITE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-26 | 8245<br>USS Okayama | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>154,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 3.5 | SILVER | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| 2025-07-26 | 75001<br>USS Shizuoka | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>31,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | *** | SILVER | 0 | 0 | | Available |

| | Date | Bid No<br>Auction | Make | Model | Year<br>Mileage | CC | Chassis ID | Scores | Colour | Start Price | Sold Price | Shaken | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2025-07-25 | 60158<br>ARAI Bayside | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>36,000 KM | 650 | HA36V | 4 | WHITE | 0 | 255,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-25 | 60162<br>ARAI Bayside | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>53,000 KM | 650 | HA36V | 3.5 | WHITE | 0 | 255,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-25 | 60081<br>ARAI Bayside | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>14,000 KM | 650 | HA36S | 4 | WHITE | 10,000 | 304,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-25 | 60010<br>ARAI Bayside | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>14,000 KM | 650 | HA36S | 4 | WHITE | 10,000 | 304,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-25 | 60154<br>ARAI Bayside | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>70,000 KM | 650 | HA36V | 3.5 | WHITE | 0 | 255,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-25 | 5335<br>JU Chiba | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>9,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4 | BEIGE | 7,777,000 | 0 | | |
| | 2025-07-25 | 3073<br>JU Chiba | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>9,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | R | BEIGE | 10,000 | 265,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-25 | 3010<br>JU Fukuoka | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>52,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 3.5 | BROWN | 80,000 | 356,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-25 | 512<br>JU Sapporo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>26,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4 | WHITE | 180,000 | 357,000 | | Unsold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 27<br>ZERO Osaka | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>98,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4 | WHITE | 2,000 | 200,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 26<br>ZERO Osaka | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>105,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4 | WHITE | 2,000 | 193,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 1104<br>ARAI Oyama | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>80,000 KM | 650 | HA36V | 3.5 | WHITE | 0 | 147,000 | | Unsold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 4046<br>JU Kanagawa | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>93,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4 | WHITE | 0 | 306,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 6332<br>JU Fukushima | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>20,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4 | BLACK | 80,000 | 257,000 | | Unsold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 35174<br>JU Aichi | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>58,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 3.5 | WINE | 9,000 | 235,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 3507<br>TAA Chubu | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>140,000 KM | 660 | HA36V | R | WHITE | 10,000 | 112,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-24 | 1236<br>USS Tokyo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>34,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4.5 | RED | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-24 | 658<br>USS Tokyo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>149,000 KM | 660 | HA36S | 4 | WHITE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-24 | 3157<br>USS Tokyo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>8,000 KM | 660 | HA36V | 3.5 | WHITE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-23 | 10470<br>LUM Tokyo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>144,000 KM | 660 | HA36V | 3.5 | actual vehicle | 0 | 77,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-23 | 10442<br>LUM Tokyo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>55,000 KM | 660 | HA36V | 4 | actual vehicle | 0 | 152,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-23 | 10429<br>LUM Tokyo | SUZUKI | ALTO | 2021<br>100,000 KM | 660 | HA36V | 3.5 | actual vehicle | 0 | 126,000 | | Sold |

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## Toyota Raize 2021




| Date | Bid No | Auction | Make | Model | Year / Mileage | CC | Chassis ID | Scores | Colour | Start Price | Sold Price | Shaken | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-07-30 | 30273 | MIRIVE Saitama | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 13,000 KM | 1000 | A210A | 5 | PEARL | 1,480,000 | 2,224,000 | | Unsold |
| 2025-07-30 | 30008 | MIRIVE Saitama | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 19,000 KM | 1000 | A210A | 5 | PEARL | 1,390,000 | 2,287,000 | | Unsold |
| 2025-07-30 | 30016 | MIRIVE Saitama | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 28,000 KM | 1000 | A210A | 4.5 | PEARL | 1,480,000 | 2,206,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-30 | 20083 | MIRIVE Saitama | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 76,000 KM | 1000 | A210A | 4 | BLACK | 600,000 | 1,875,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-30 | 60291 | BAYAUC | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 26,000 KM | 1000 | A210A | 5 | PEARL | 1,550,000 | 2,210,000 | | Sold |
| 2025-07-30 | 60397 | BAYAUC | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 43,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | PEARL | 1,190,000 | 1,950,000 | | Sold |




| | Date | Bid No Auction | Make | Model | Year Mileage | CC | Chassis ID | Scores | Colour | Start Price | Sold Price | Shaken | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2025-07-30 | 36377 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 21,000 KM | 1200 | A201A | 5 | CAR . PERSON . WHITE PEARL | 730,000 | 1,745,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36240 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 17,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | PEARL | 630,000 | 1,985,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36193 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 23,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 5 | PEARL | 830,000 | 2,045,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36375 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 23,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 5 | BLACK | 730,000 | 1,965,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36379 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 22,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | SILVER | 730,000 | 1,695,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36350 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 27,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | BLACK | 900,000 | 1,985,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 33281 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 44,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | WINE | 190,000 | 1,430,000 | | Unsold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 10045 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 36,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 5 | PEARL | 288,000 | 1,968,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36088 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 21,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | PEARL | 630,000 | 1,795,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36235 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 21,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 5 | BLACK | 630,000 | 1,535,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36244 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 22,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 5 | PEARL | 630,000 | 2,035,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36242 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 47,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | PEARL | 730,000 | 1,970,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36383 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 24,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 5 | PEARL | 930,000 | 2,075,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36284 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 36,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 5 | NAVY BLUE | 780,000 | 1,940,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36062 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 34,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4 | PEARL two-tone | 1,000,000 | 2,140,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36075 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 41,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | PEARL | 430,000 | 1,615,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36175 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 24,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | PEARL | 730,000 | 1,765,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36495 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 26,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 5 | PEARL | 890,000 | 1,785,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 36210 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 19,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | SILVER | 630,000 | 2,005,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 10161 CAA Chubu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 44,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | PEARL | 288,000 | 2,169,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-30 | 5175 USS Kobe | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 29,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4 | D BLUE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-30 | 10026 USS Tohoku | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 28,000 KM | 1000 | A210A | 4.5 | BLUE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-30 | 70248 USS Sapporo | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 52,000 KM | 1000 | A210A | 4 | BLACK | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-30 | 70072 USS Sapporo | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 5,000 KM | 1000 | A210A | 4.5 | BLUE | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-30 | 70361 USS Sapporo | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 60,000 KM | 1000 | A210A | 4.5 | BLACK | 0 | 0 | | Available |
| | 2025-07-30 | 70345 USS Sapporo | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 28,000 KM | 1000 | A210A | 3.5 | BLACK | 0 | 0 | | Available |

| | Date | Bid No Auction | Make | Model | Year Mileage | CC | Chassis ID | Scores | Colour | Start Price | Sold Price | Shaken | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2025-07-29 | 84 TAA Shikoku | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 45,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | SILVER | 1,200,000 | 1,917,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 70084 TAA Shikoku | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 24,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4 | SILVER 2 | 1,050,000 | 1,917,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 2027 TAA Shikoku | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 68,000 KM | 1200 | A202A | 4.5 | PEARL | 1,000,000 | 1,690,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 2020 TAA Shikoku | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 57,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | LIGHT BLUE 2 | 1,060,000 | 1,780,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 70064 TAA Shikoku | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 40,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4 | BLACK | 1,000,000 | 1,954,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 70070 TAA Shikoku | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 50,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | PEARL | 1,000,000 | 2,017,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 72016 TAA Shikoku | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 53,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | PEARL | 500,000 | 1,613,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 36 TAA Hiroshima | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 119,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4 | BEIGE | 400,000 | 1,336,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 2022 TAA Hiroshima | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 27,000 KM | 1200 | A201A | 4.5 | PEARL | 1,000,000 | 1,909,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 2033 TAA Hiroshima | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 68,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4 | BEIGE | 600,000 | 1,395,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 2098 TAA Kyushu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 48,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | BLACK | 980,000 | 1,829,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 438 TAA Kyushu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 15,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | NAVY BLUE | 1,000,000 | 1,606,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 104 TAA Kyushu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 18,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | BLACK MM/ TURQUOISE . | 800,000 | 2,021,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 115 TAA Kyushu | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 30,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | 4.5 | BLUE | 500,000 | 1,691,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 131 TAA Kinki | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 119,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | R | SILVER | 450,000 | 1,263,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 135 TAA Kinki | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 116,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | RA | SILVER | 450,000 | 1,206,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 2089 TAA Kinki | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 15,000 KM | 1000 | A210A | 5 | SILVER | 1,000,000 | 2,140,000 | | Sold |
| | 2025-07-29 | 83 TAA Kinki | TOYOTA | RAIZE | 2021 108,000 KM | 1000 | A200A | RA | SILVER | 450,000 | 1,263,000 | | Sold |

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## Annexure M: List of Key Part Manufacturers

### AGRIAUTO INDUSTRIES LTD.



**Location: Hub**
**Products:**

- **Axle Assy FR**
- **DIB**
- **RFIP**
- **PWR Window Regulator**
- **Shock Absorber**
- **Stamping Parts**
- **Steering Box**

**Total Land: 18 Acre**
**Manpower: 650**
**Investment Value: 8.5 Bill. PKR**

**Customers:**

- **Indus Motor Co.**
- **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
- **Honda Atlas Cars**
- **Master Motors**
- **Thal Boshoku Pakistan**
- **Hino Pak Motors**

### AGRIAUTO STAMPING COMPANY



**Location: Karachi**
**Products:**

- **Sheet Metal Parts**
- **Fuel Tank (Stamping parts only)**
- **Welding Assy**
- **Catalytic Converter**
- **Sub-Muffler**

**Total Land: 30,000 sq meters**
**Manpower: 269**
**Investment Value: 2.9 Bill. PKR**

**Customers:**

- **Indus Motor Co.**
- **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
- **Honda Atlas Cars**
- **Master Motors**
- **Thal Boshoku Pakistan**
- **Hino Pak Motors**

## A-One Techniques (PVT) LTD.

**Location: Karachi**
**Products:**
- **Extruded Hoses**
- **Rubber Parts**
- **Sheet Metal Components**
- **RFIP**

**Total Land: 8 acres**
**Manpower: 200**
**Investment Value: 2 Bill. PKR**

**Customers:**
- **Indus Motor Co.**
- **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
- **Honda Atlas Cars**
- **Hyundai Nishat Motors**
- **Lucky Motor Corporation**
- **Changan Master Motors**

## ALBA ENGINEERING Co.


**Location: DASKA**
**Products:**
- **Brake Pipes**
- **Fuel Pipes**
- **Stay Hood Open**

- **Total Land: 79,832 sq ft**
- **Manpower: 150**
- **Investment Value: 1 Bill. PKR**

**Customers:**
- **Indus Motor Co.**
- **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
- **Honda Atlas Cars**
- **Master Motors**
- **Lucky Motor Corporation**

## AL-BADAR ENGINEERING COMPANY PVT LTD

**Location:**
**Sheikhupura & Wazirabad**
**Products:**
- **Tool Kit**
- **Brake Pedal**
- **Shock Absorbers (for Motorcycles)**
- **Kick Starter Rod (for Motorcycles)**

**Total Land: 31,500 Sq. Meter**
**Manpower: 1,600**
**Investment Value: 500 Mill. PKR**

**Customers:**
- **Indus Motor Company.**
- **Master Moters**
- **Lucky Motor Corporation**
- **Atlas Honda Limited**
- **Honda Atlas Cars**
- **Millet Tractor**
- **Yamaha**

## ALSONS AUTOPARTS INDUSTRIES



**Location: Karachi**
**Products:**
- **Stamping Parts**
- **Resin Parts**
- **Meter Cluster**
- **Casting Parts**

- **Total Land: 10 Acres**
- **Manpower: 580**
- **Investment Value: 2.5 Bill. PKR**

- **Customers:**
  - **Indus Motor Company.**
  - **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
  - **Atlas Honda Limited**
  - **Honda Atlas Cars**
  - **Millet Tractor**
  - **Al-Ghazi Tractors**
  - **Yamaha**

## Baluchistan Wheels Limited



**Location: Hub**

**Products:**
- **Wheel Disc**

**Total Land: 96,000 Sq. Ft.**
**Manpower: 239**
**Investment Value: 7.12 Bill. PKR**

**Customers:**
- **Indus Motor Co.**
- **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
- **Honda Atlas Cars**
- **Master Motors**
- **KIA Lucky Motors**

## Ghandhara Tyre & Rubber Company

**Location: Karachi**
**Products:**
- **Passenger Car Tyres**
- **Tubes**
- **Flaps**
- **SUV/ Crossovers Tyres,**

**Total Land: 25 Acre**
**Manpower: 2,300**
**Investment Value: 18 Bill. (PKR)**

**Customers:**
- **Indus Motors Company**
- **Hino**
- **Hyundai**
- **Honda**
- **Pak Suzuki**
- **Kia Lucky Motors**

## Landhi Engineering Works

**Location: Karachi**

**Products:**
- **Radiator**
- **Stamping Parts**
- **Leaf Spring**

**Total Land: 36,000 sq. meters**
**Manpower: 300**
**Investment Value: 0.8 Bill. PKR**

**Customers:**
- **Indus Motor Company Ltd.**
- **Hino**
- **Changan**
- **KIA Lucky Motors**
- **Foton**

## LOADS (PVT) LTD.



**Location: Karachi**

**Products:**
- **Mufflers & Exhaust systems**
- **Radiators**
- **Sheet Metal Components**
- **Radiator & Heater Cores**

- **Total Land: 8.5 Acres**
- **Manpower: 677**
- **Investment Value: 4.15 Bill. PKR**

- **Customers:**
  - **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
  - **Indus Motor Co.**
  - **Honda Atlas Cars**
  - **HINO**
  - **NISSAN**

## MECAS ENGINEERING (PVT) LTD.


**Location: Lahore**
**Products:**
- **Brake Disc**
- **Brake Drum**
- **Differential Case**
- **Casted & Forged Hub**
- **Engine Brackets**

- **Total Land: 30298 Sq. Ft.**
- **Manpower: 60**
- **Investment Value: 670 Mill. PKR.**

**Customers:**
- **Indus Motor Co.**
- **Honda Atlas Cars**
- **Agri Auto Industries Ltd,**
- **Al-Haj FAW Motors Ltd**
- **Millat Tractors Ltd.**
- **AL-Ghazi Tractors Ltd.**

## NATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENT (PVT) LTD.



- **Location: Lahore**
- **Products:**
  - **Black ED Parts**
  - **Heat Insulators**
  - **Leaf Spring**
  - **Sheet Metal Parts**

**Total Land: 16,188 sq Meter**

**Manpower: 190**
**Investment Value: 742 Mill. PKR**

**Customers:**
- **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
- **Indus Motor Co.**
- **Honda Atlas Cars**
- **Hyundai Nishat Motors**
- **Lucky Motor Corporation**
- **Changan Master Motors**

## Ravi Forgings (Pvt) Ltd



**Location: Lahore**
**Products:**

- **Bracket Eng. Mounting RH**
- **Fly Wheel S/A 1.3**
- **Cover S/A Disc BRK Dust RH & LH**

**Total Land: 15.7 Kanal ( Appox 70,500 Sq. Foot)**
**Manpower: 96**
**Investment Value: 500 Million PKR**

- **Customers:**
  - **Indus Motor Co.**
  - **Millat Tractors Ltd**
  - **Al-Ghazi Tractors**
  - **Agri-Auto Ltd**
  - **Hino Pak Motors**

## Ravi Autos Sundar (Pvt) Ltd.



**Location: Lahore**
**Products:**

- **Pan Oil**
  **Transmission Housings**
- **Cover Cylinder Heads**
- **Water Pumps**
  **Oil Pumps**
- **Oil Seal Housings**
- **Engine Brackets & Covers**
- **Steering Knuckles**
- **Cranks, Cylinder Body, Cylinder Head & Engine Covers (For 2W)**

- **Total Land: 38,850 Sq Meter**
- **Manpower: 475**
- **Investment Value: 2000 Mill. PKR**

**Customers:**

- **Indus Motor Company Ltd.**
- **Pak Suzuki Motor Company Ltd.**
- **Honda Atlas Cars Pakistan Ltd.**
- **Millat Tractors Ltd.**
- **Agri Auto Industries Ltd.**
- **Thal Engineering**
- **Atlas Honda Ltd.**
- **Yamaha Motor Pakistan**
- **United Motorcycle**

## STANLEY INDUSTRIES



**Location: Lahore**
**Products:**
- **Pipe Bending**
- **Functional Parts**

- **Total Land: 6,300 sq meters**
- **Manpower: 175**
- **Investment Value: 569 Mill. PKR**

**Customers:**
- **Indus Motors Company Ltd.**
- **Pak Suzuki Motors**
- **Honda Atlas Ltd**
- **Hyundai Nishat Motor**
- **United Auto Industries**

## AuVitronics Limited

- **Location: Karachi and HUB**
- **Products:**
  - **Headlamps, Rear Lamps**
  - **Side Mirrors**
  - **Chrome Parts**
  - **Vaccuum Metalizing Parts**
  - **EPP/EPO/EPS Parts**
  - **Steering Wheel**
  - **Injection Molding Parts (Bumpers, radiator grills, pillar garnishes, console box, 2 DIN audio, HVAC parts)**
  - **Painted Parts (Exterior & Interior)**
  - **Vibration Welded Parts**
  - **Ultrasonic Welded Parts**
  - **Hotplate Welded Parts**
  - **HVAC Parts**

- **Total Land:**
  - **PQA Plant: 20,736 $m^2$**
  - **HUB Plant: 13,763 $m^2$**
- **Manpower: 876 (PQA + Hub)**
- **Investment Value: PKR 6 Billions**

- **Customers:**
  - **Indus Motor Co.**
  - **Honda Atlas Cars**
  - **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
  - **Changan Master Motors**
  - **Yamaha Motor**
  - **Atlas Honda Limited**
  - **Thal Engg.**
  - **Thal Boshoku**
  - **SPEL Limited**
  - **Razi Sons**
  - **Procon Engineering**
  - **PCI Automotive**
  - **Omar Jibran**

## G.I. Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd.

- Location: Karachi/Lahore
- Products:
  - Injection Molded Parts (Visors, Mud Guards, Reflectors, & Bike Headlamp Case)
  - Chrome Plated Parts
  - Emblems
  - Side Mirrors
  - Plastic Painted Parts (Cowl, cluster facia)
  - Sheet Metal Parts (Headlight rim, bracket)
  - Sticker/Decals
  - Lights (Headlights, tail light, winkers)

- **Total Land: 220,000 ft²**
- **Manpower: 450**
- **Investment Value: PKR 1.2 Billions**

- **Customers:**
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Atlas Honda Limited
  - Honda Atlas Cars
  - Lucky Motor Corporation
  - Changan Master Motors
  - MG JW Automobile
  - Ghandhara Industries limited
  - Yamaha Motor Pakistan

## Omar Jibran Engineering Ltd.





- Location: Karachi & Lahore
- Products:
  - Injection Molded (Exterior & Interior):
    - Bumpers
    - Instrument Panels
    - Outside Door Handles
    - Radiator Grills
    - Car Fender Liners
    - Engine Under Covers
    - Air Conditioner Casings
    - Air Cleaner Casings
    - Seat Adjustment Parts
    - Glove Compartment
    - Garnishes
    - Motorcycles Fenders, Rims & Fuel Tanks
    - Brackets & Rivets

- **Total Land:**
  Karachi: 5 Acre
  Lahore: 27.6 Kanal
- **Manpower: 550**
- **Investment Value: PKR 4.2 Billions**

- **Customers:**
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Master Changan Motors
  - Yamaha Motor Co.
  - Razi Sons
  - Procon Engineering
  - Atlas Honda Limited
  - Honda Atlas Cars
  - Aftermarket

## Pacific International (Pvt) Ltd.



- Location: Karachi
- Products:
  - Car Speakers
  - Audio Systems
  - Camera Assy
  - USB Charger

- Total Land: 37,180 m²
- Manpower: 180
- Investment Value: PKR 94.6 Millions

- Customers:
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Pak Suzuki Motor Co.
  - Sazgar
  - Gandhara Industries Ltd.
  - Lucky Motor Corporation
  - Changan Master Motors

## Panther Sports & Rubber Industries Pvt Ltd

- Location: Sheikhupura
- Products:
  - Damping Pads/sheets
  - Car Mats
  - Football Bladder
  - Bicycle Tyre Tubes

- Total Land: 15761 m²
- Manpower: 104
- Investment Value: PKR 758 Millions

- Customers:
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Pak Suzuki Motor Co.
  - Honda Atlas Cars
  - Hyundai Nishat Motors
  - Sazgar
  - Dewan Farooq
  - Foton

# PCI Automotive

- Location: Karachi
- Products:
  - Vacuum Formed (Fender Liner)
  - Thermoformed (Floor Carpet, Dashboard Insulator, Fender Liner, Hood Insulator, Tyre Lid, Trunk Lining, Dashboard Insulator Outer)
  - Sheet Metal Assemblies (Wiper Arm & Blade)
  - Blow Molded Parts (Nozzle Defroster, Duct Assy, Trim Centre Pillar, Washer Tank Assy)
  - Injection Molded (Engine Cover, Console Box, Garnish Cowl Top, Trim Backdoor, Trim Centre Pillar, Trim Qtr. Inner Upper)
  - Motorcycle Seat Assy

- **Total Land: 28,400 m²**
- **Manpower: 359**
- **Investment Value: PKR 581.79 Millions**

- Customers:
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Honda Atlas Cars
  - Hinopak Motors Ltd.
  - Nissan
  - Atlas Honda
  - Yamaha
  - KIA
  - Hyundai
  - Foton
  - BYD
  - Pak Suzuki
  - Faw

# Procon Engineering Pvt Ltd.



- Location: Karachi, Lahore & Faisalabad
- Products:
  - Automobile Seats
  - Reclining Mechanism with Side Assy,
  - Automotive Fabric,
  - Roof Headlining (Molded, Suspended & Perforated type)
  - Floor Carpet & Lining Assy Trunk
  - Rear Package Tray
  - Cargo Deck
  - Deck Assy
  - Wiring Harness
  - Sheet Metal / Body Parts
  - Sunvisors
  - Door Trim (Molded & Flat type)

- **Total Land:**
  - Karachi (PQA): 82,000 m²
  - Karachi (SITE): 12,000 m²
  - Lahore: 61,000 m²
  - Faisalabad: 45,000 m²
- **Manpower: 1800**
- **Investment Value: PKR 5.8 Billions**

- **Customers:**
  - **Indus Motor Co.**
  - **Honda Atlas Cars**
  - **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
  - **Hinopak Motors**
  - **Hyundai Nishat Motors**
  - **Lucky Motor Corporation**
  - **Changan Master Motors**
  - **Nissan Motors**

## Thal Boshoku Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd.


- Location: Karachi
- Products:
  - Seat Set
  - Air Cleaner
  - Side Frames
  - Seat Track
- Total Land: 4.44 Acre
- Manpower: 211
- Investment Value: PKR 1.2 Billions
- Customers:
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Procon Engineering
  - Razi Sons

## Thal Limited (Engineering Division)



**Location:** Karachi

**Products:**
Electrical Business: Wiring Harness
Thermal Business: HVAC, Radiator, Starter / Alternator, Condenser, Hoses & Tubes, Plastic Molded Parts, Cooling Sub Module, Heater Core, etc.

**Total Land:**
- Korangi Industrial Area: 435,600 $ft^2$
- Port Qasim Industrial Area: 217,800 $ft^2$

**Manpower:** 1,535

**Investment Value:** PKR 5.27 Billions

**Customers:**
- Indus Motor Corporation
- Pak Suzuki Motor Corporation
- Honda Atlas Cars Pakistan Ltd
- Hyundai Nishat Motor Pakistan Ltd
- Hinopak Motors Limited
- Yamaha Motor Pakistan
- Master Motor Corporation Pvt Ltd

## Thermosole Industries Pvt Ltd.


- **Location: Lahore**
- **Products:**
  - **Air Conditioning Ducts**
  - **Windshield Washers**
  - **Expansion tanks**
  - **Radiator Fans**
  - **Jerry Can**
  - **Jersey Barrier**
- **Total Land: 27,000 ft²**
- **Manpower: 312**
- **Investment Value: PKR 1.51 Billions**
- **Customers:**
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Pak Suzuki Motor Co.
  - Honda Atlas Cars.
  - Hyundai Nishat Motors.
  - Millat Tractors Limited.
  - Sazgar Engineering Works

## SPEL Limited



- **Location: Karachi & Lahore**
- **Products:**
  - **Door Trims**
  - **Door Handles**
  - **Wheel Trims**
  - **Steering Wheels**
  - **Steering Columns**
  - **Panel Instrument Cluster**
  - **Garnishes**
  - **Consoles**
  - **Front Grills**
  - **Steering Wheel Knobs**
- **Total Land: 1,224,291 ft²**
- **Manpower: 1060**
- **Investment Value: PKR 6.5 Billions**
- **Customers:**
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Pak Suzuki Motor Co.
  - Honda Atlas Cars.
  - Millat Tractors Limited.

## ALLCO Transfer Printers (Pvt) Ltd.


- Location: Karachi
- Products:
  - Sticker, Labels
  - ID Plates
  - Graphic Stickers
  - Crystal Drop Emblems

- Total Land: 2778 Sq. Yards
- Manpower: 118
- Investment Value: PKR 1.5 Billions

- Customers:
  - Pak Suzuki Motor Co.
  - Atlas Honda Ltd.
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Honda Atlas Cars
  - Hyundai Nishat Motors
  - Lucky Motor Corporation
  - Changan Master Motors

## Mehran Commercial Enterprises


- Total Land: 5000 sq-yards
- Manpower: 300
- Investment Value: PKR Millions

- Customers:
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Pak Suzuki Motor Co.
  - Hinopak Motors
  - Auvitronics
  - Lucky Motor Corporation
  - Nissan Motors
  - Al Haj Faw Motors

- Location:
  - Karachi (NIP Creek, SITE, Nazimabad Ind. Zone)
- Products:
  - Sunvisor Assy
  - Antenna Assy
  - Floor Carpets
  - Board Assy Deck
  - Insulator Dash Panel
  - Tool Bag
  - Cover Assy Spare Wheel
  - Cover Door Trim
  - Floor Mats
  - Trim Components
  - Cover Luggage Compartment
  - Roof Headlining
  - Insulator Hood
  - Pad Roof Silencer

## JODHALA COMPLEX PVT LTD.




- Location: Gujranwala
- Products:
  - Pedal ASSY Brake
  - Pedal ASSY Clutch
  - Beam Comp STRG HNGR
  - Exhaust Pipes
  - Radiator Pipes (Export)
  - Clamps (Local + Export)
  - Different types of Sheet metal Parts

- Total Land: 64,000 Sq.Ft
- Manpower: 180
- Investment Value: PKR 1.1 Bill.

- Customers:
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Honda Atlas Cars
  - Hyundai Nishat Motors
  - JW-Forland
  - HAIER
  - Hino-Pak Motors
  - Metalcaucho (Export)
  - XXL (Export)

## METALINE INDUSTRIES PVT LTD




- Location: Lahore
- Products:
  - Tunnels
  - Wheel house
  - Fuel Tanks

- Total Land: 27 Canal
- Manpower: 350
- Authorize Share Capital: 4.2 Bill. PKR

- Customers:
  - Pak Suzuki Motor Co.
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Atlas Honda Limited
  - Millat Tractor
  - Lucky Motor Corporation
  - Haval

## MGA Industries Pvt ltd.

- Location: Lahore
- Products:
  - Sheet Metal Parts
  - Lever Assy. Parking Brakes
  - Exhaust System
  - Fuel Tanks
- Total Land: 40470 m²
- Manpower: 463
- Investment Value: 2.1 Bill. PKR
- Customers:
  - Pak Suzuki Motor Co.
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Honda Atlas Cars
  - Hyundai Nishat Motors
  - Millat Tractors Limit
  - Al-Ghazi Tractors Limit
  - Changan Master Motors
  - JW Forland
  - HINO
  - Other OEM's & Export

## UNITED MECHANICAL INDUSTRIES PVT LTD

- Location: Gujranwala
- Products: (Total:140)
  - Pedal Assy Brake
  - Pedal Assy Clutch
  - Panel Comp Front Piller INR
  - Eng MTG
  - Striker Comp front Hood Lock
  - FR Floor CTR
- Customers:
  - Pak Suzuki Motor Co.
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Honda Atlas Cars
  - HINO
  - Master Motor Company
  - Changan Motors
- Total Land: 70,720 sq. ft.
- Manpower: 160
- Investment Value: PKR 1 Bill.

## RAZISONS (PVT) LTD



**Location: Karachi**
**Products:**
- **Stamping Parts**
- **Cross Members**
- **Seat Assy**
- **Roof Headlining**

- **Total Land: 7 ACRE**
- **Manpower: 1,000**
- **Investment Value: PKR 2 Bill.**

- **Customers:**
  - **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
  - **Indus Motor Co.**
  - **Honda Atlas Cars**
  - **Nissan**
  - **FAW.**

## HAWKS ENGINEERING SERVICES (PVT.) LTD.

- **Location: LAHORE**
- **Products:**
  - **Door Hinges, Hood & Trunk**
  - **Door Strikers, Door Impact Beams FR&RR, Sheetmetal Brackets, Lock Hood & Tractor Hydraulic Parts**

- **Total Land: 11,000 sqm**
- **Manpower: 150**
- **Investment Value: PKR 650 Mill.**

**Customers:**
- **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
- **Indus Motor Co.**
- **Honda Atlas Cars**
- **Millat Tractors Ltd.**

## SHAHEEN AUTOMOTIVE (PVT) LTD



- Location: Karachi
- Products:
  - Pipes
  - Rods
  - Jack Assembly
  - Brackets

- Total Land: 2.1 Acres
- Manpower: 184
- Investment Value: PKR 2000 million

- Customers:
  - Pak Suzuki Motor Co.
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Lucky Motor Corporation
  - Changan Master Motors
  - Yamaha Pakistan

## Ahmad Glass Industries (Pvt.) Ltd.


- Location: Lahore and Karachi
- Products: Laminated and Tempered Safety Glass

- Total Land: 15 Acres (combined)
- Manpower: 500
- Investment Value: PKR 10 Bill.

- Customers:
  - Master Changan Motors Ltd.
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Honda Atlas Cars Pakistan Ltd.
  - Hyundai Nishat Motors
  - FAW
  - Dawlance Pakistan
  - New Asia

- Sazgar Engineering Works
- Albayrak Buses & Platforms
- Master Motor Corporation Ltd.
- FUSO Master Motors Ltd.
- Metro Bus Station Glasses
- Pakistan Railways
- HINO Pak Motors
- Razmak Industries

## Supplier Name : Atlas Battery Limited


- Location: Karachi
- Products:
  - Automotive & Motorcycle battery
  - Deep cycle battery
- Total Land: 9.86 Acres
- Manpower: 1,700
- Investment Value: PKR 5.15 Billion
- Customers:
  - Pak Suzuki Motor Co.
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - Honda Atlas Cars Pakistan
  - Atlas Honda Limited

## Supplier Name : Automate Industries

- Location: Karachi
- Products:
  - Audios
  - Speakers
- Total Land: 1824 Sq Ft
- Manpower: 53
- Investment Value: TBC
- Customers:
  - Pak Suzuki Motor Co.
  - Indus Motor Co.
  - KIA Lucky Motors
  - Hyundai
  - Isuzu

## Pearl Packages Pvt Ltd

- **Location**: Karachi
- **Products:**
  - Offset Printing & Packaging

- **Total Land: 1,700 sq yards (3 floors)**
- **Manpower: 70**
- **Investment Value: PKR 500 Mill.**

**Customers:**

- Green Star Pvt ltd
- Shan Foods Pvt ltd
- Medicam Group Of Companies
- Indus Motor Company Ltd
- Golden Harvest Foods(Dawn bread)
- Atco Laboratories ltd
- Rasool Flour Mills(Bake Parlor)
- Sarwana & Sohzium
- Uneek Corporation
- Arsalan foods(Delight)
- Youngs Foods Pvt ltd
- Bay View Academy

## Supplier Name : Rubatech Manufacturing Company (Pvt) Ltd


- **Location: Karachi**
- **Products:**
  - **Weather Strip Doors**
  - **W/S Door Opening Trim**

- **Total Land: 3 Acre**
- **Manpower: 380**
- **Investment Value: 860 Mill. PKR**

- **Customers:**
  - **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
  - **Indus Motor Co.**
  - **Master Motors**
  - **Hyundai Nishat Motors**

## Supplier Name : Tecno Auto Glass




- **Location: Karachi (Port Qasim)**
- **Products:**
  - **Laminated Windshields**
  - **Tempered Door Glasses & Qtr Glasses.**
  - **Tempered Back Glass.**

- **Total Land:** 43,706 m²
- **Manpower:** 299
- **Investment Value:** PKR 3.96 Billion

- **Customers:**
  - **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
  - **Indus Motor Co.**
  - **Master Changan Motors**
  - **Hyundai Nishat Motors**
  - **Lucky Motors Co.**
  - **Honda Atlas Cars Pakistan Ltd.**

## Supplier Name : TECNO PACK TELECOM (PVT) LTD

- **Location: Karachi**
- **Products:**
  - **Safety Seatbelts**
  - **Car Infotainment System**
  - **Car Immobilizer**

- **Total Land: 2,200 square meters**
- **Manpower: 112**
- **Investment Value: PKR 700 million**

**Customers:**
- **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
- **Indus Motor Co.**
- **Honda Atlas Cars**

## Supplier Name : PLASTECH AUTOSAFE

Location: Karachi
Products:
- SEAT BELTS
- AIR REGISTERS
- INTERIOR PARTS

- **Total Land: 5550 SQM**
- **Manpower: 190**
- **Investment Value: PKR 939 Mill.**

- **Customers:**
  - **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
  - **Indus Motor Co.**
  - **KIA Lucky Motors**
  - **PIA**
  - **Isuzu. etc**

## Supplier Name : EXIDE BATTERY



- **Location: Karachi**
- **Products:**
- **Lead Acid Batteries**
- **MF Batteries**
- **Industrial / Locomotive starting / storage batteries**

- **Total Land: 44500 Sq. Mt.**
- **Manpower: 1500**
- **Investment Value: 2.23Bill PKR**

- **Customers:**
  - **Pak Suzuki Motor Co.**
  - **Indus Motor Co.**
  - **Master Motors**
  - **Hyundai Nishat Motors**
  - **Ghandhara Industries**
  - **Hino pak Motors**
  - **Al Ghazi Tractors.**

Name & Designation: Syed Sarfaraz Ali, CEO
Contact No.: 03219224613
Email: info@srp.com.pk

Factory Address:
Plot No. DP-47 sector 12D, North Karachi Industrial Area

| Supplier Name | SHAH RUBBER PRODUCT |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 2003 |
| Registered Address | DP-47 sector 12D, North Karachi Industrial Area. |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 2006 |
| Ownership Type | Sole Proprietorship |
| Technology Type | Sheet Metal (Press/Machine Shop/Weld Shop), Auto Injection, Rubber Press, Powder Coating |
| Key Products | Luggage Tray, Tool Case, Cover Recline, Cup Holder, Gear Box Assy., Footrest Assy, Stand (centre/prop) Bumper Holders, Cover Engine, Mud Guard/Flap, Ventilator |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | Gear Box Assy., Footrest Assy, Stand (centre/prop) Bumper Holders, Cover Engine, Mud Guard/Flap, Ventilator , Bar Com Fr Footrest L/R GD-110 |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | STR, YSB, Y4J, YR9, YLA, YV7, GS-150, GD,110 |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | NO |
| # of Plants | 1 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 4180 m2 |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 3344 m2 |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 70 |
| Main Customers | PSMCL, LMC, K.E, SSSGC, PBL, Master Motors, PCI, Razi Sons, GI, Faw, Hino Pakistan, Crown, Unique, Super Power |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | Jan -2025 to Dec-2025 |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Name & Designation: Mr. Saeed Ahmed (CEO)
Contact No.: 0300-8272362
Email: saeed@styline.org

Factory Address: B-33, S.I.T.E, SUPERHIGHWAY, KARACHI

| Supplier Name | Pacific International (Pvt.) Ltd. |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 2003 |
| Registered Address | B-33, S.I.T.E, Super Highway, Karachi |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 2019 |
| Ownership Type | Private Limited |
| Technology Type | Infotainment and Polymer |
| Key Products | SPEAKERS ASSY, AUDIO AND VIDEO SYSTEM , CAR REAR/ FRONT CAMERA, CAR ANTENNA, CAR USB CHARGER & RESIN PARTS |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | SPEAKERS & RESIN PARTS |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | Y4J, YSB & YY7 |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | TA |
| # of Plants | Two |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 6100 |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 4100 |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | N |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 90 |
| Main Customers | IMC, GIL, GAL, MMCL AND LMC |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | July to June |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Name & Designation: Sheikh Masood Obaid (CEO)
Contact No.: 03316079373
Email: obaid.masood@gmail.com



ADDRESS:E-108 SITE Super Highway SITE Phase-II Karachi

| Supplier Name | MASOOD ENGINEERING WORKS PRIVATE LIMITED |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1989 |
| Registered Address | E-108, SITE Super Highway SITE Phase-II, Karachi |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1991 |
| Ownership Type | Pvt. Ltd |
| Technology Type | Indigenous |
| Key Products | Control Cables |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | Cable Comp Parking Brake, Cable Comp Hood Latch Release, Cable Comp Fuel Lid Opener, Cable Comp Back Door Opener |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | YLA, YR9, Y4J,YSB, YV7, GD110 |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | Indigenous |
| # of Plants | 01 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 2700 Sqr Yard |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 690 Sqr Yard |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 70 |
| Main Customers | Pak Suzuki Motors Company Ltd<br>Hinopak Motors Limited<br>Lucky Motors Corporation |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | July 1st – Jun 30th |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Name & Designation: Qamar Shahzad (Director)
Contact No.: 0321-8202785
Email: hewlpk@gmail.com

**Factory Address:**
DSU-16 Pak Steel Industrial Estate Bin Qasim, Karachi

| Supplier Name | Hussein Engineering Works Pvt Ltd |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1979 |
| Registered Address | DSU-16 Pak Steel Industrial Estate Bin Qasim Karachi. |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1984 |
| Ownership Type: | Private Limited. |
| Technology Type | Casting & Machining |
| Key Products | Brake Drums, Brake Discs, Hub Wheel, Exh-Manifolds, Flywheels, Camshaft, Engine Brackets, Steering Knuckle, Arm Clutch Release, Axle Housing, Drive Plate, Gear Shifter Drum, Pulley Crankshafts, Casting for Dies & Molds |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | Brake Drums, Brake Discs, Exh-Manifolds, Pulley Crankshafts, Flywheel Comp, Arm Clutch Release, Axle Housing, Roof Inner |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | Y88, Y4J, YLA, YR9, YSB, YV7 |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | Indigenous |
| # of Plants | 01 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 20235 sq. Meter |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter): | 12000 Sq. Meter |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Yes |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Yes |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 350 |
| Main Customers: | PSMCL, KIA, Hyundai, Millat Tractor, Al Ghazi Tractor, Atlas Honda, Atlas Engineering, Master Changan, Fuso Master,Procon Engg, Ghandhara, Hinopak, KTDMC |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | July-2023 to June-2024 |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Name & Designation: Abdul Hamid, CEO
Contact No.: 0321-6447777
Email: ahamid@darson-industries.com

Darson Road, GT Road, Wazirabad,
Gujranwala, Panjab-52000, Pakistan

| Supplier Name | Darson Industries Pvt. Ltd. |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1953 |
| Registered Address | Darson Road, GT Road, Wazirabad, Gujranwala, Panjab-52000, Pakistan |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | Year 2001 |
| Ownership Type | Partnership |
| Technology Type | Rubber hoses plant |
| Key Products | Automotive Hoses and Molded parts |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | Radiator Hoses, Heater Hoses |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | Y88, Y4J, YLA, YR9, YSB, YV7 |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | N/A |
| # of Plants | 1 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 245000 (Sq. Feet) |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 200000 (Sq. Feet) |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Yes |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Yes (Solid fuel) |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 635 |
| Main Customers | Suzuki, Honda , Yamaha ,Toyota , Hino |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | July 2023 to June 2024 |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Hasan Naseer Rizvi
CEO
Cell# +92 333 2333912
Email: hasan@ecpl.pk

Factory Address:
DSU-4A, Pakistan Steel Industrial Estate,
Bin Qasim, Karachi - 75000

| Supplier Name | Engineering Excellence Co. (Pvt) Ltd. |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1993 |
| Registered Address | DSU-4A, Pakistan Steel Industrial Estate, Bin Qasim |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1993 |
| Ownership Type | Private Limited Company |
| Technology Type | Stamping & CNC Pipe Bending |
| Key Products | Sheet Metal & Pipe Based Automotive Components |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | Sheet Metal Body Components |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | Alto, Swift, Cultus, WagonR, Every, Ravi, GD110 |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | Indigenous |
| # of Plants | One |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 4,100 Sq Meters |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 2,500 Sq Meters |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Yes, 250 KVa capacity generator |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | No Gas Connection (LPG used in Paint Oven) |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 78 (Jan. 2025) |
| Main Customers | Suzuki, Yamaha, Hino, Agri Stamping, Dewan Motors |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | July to June |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Name & Designation: Muhammad Mohsin Raza (CEO)
Contact No.: 0334-3044649
Email: alhudaengg@gmail.com

Factory Address: Dsu-32/11 Down Stream Estate Bin Qasim Karachi

| Supplier Name | AL-HUDA ENGINEERING PVT LTD. |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1984 |
| Registered Address | DSU-32/11 DOWNSTREAM ESTATE BIN QASIM KHI |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1986 |
| Ownership Type | PRIVATE LIMITED |
| Technology Type | MECHANICAL TYPE |
| Key Products | SHEET MATEL IRON STEEL ARTICLE |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | DECK FLOOR, ROOF AND DOOR |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | STR, YLA, Y4J AND YN3 |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | N//A |
| # of Plants | 1 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 4046.86 SQ METER |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 3546 SQ METER |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | N |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | N |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 35 |
| Main Customers | PAK SUZUKI MOTOR CO LTD |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | JULY TO JUNE |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Name & Designation: Taufiq A. Sherwani (Chief Executive Officer)
Contact No.: 03008483536
Email: ceo@stengineeringservices.com


Factory Address:
Unit 1 = Plot 12 Holiday Park Industrial Estate, 5.5km Raiwind Road Lahore
Unit 2 = Plot 446, Sundar Industrial Estate, Raiwind Road Lahore

| Supplier Name | S.T Engineering Services |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1989 |
| Registered Address | Plot 12 Holiday Park Industrial Estate, 5.5 km Raiwind Road, Lahore |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1989 |
| Ownership Type | Private Limited |
| Technology Type | Press Stamping, Spot / Co2 Welding, Machining |
| Key Products | All assembly/functional body parts |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | Mbr Comp Rr Floor, Pnl Comp Side Sill, Mbr Comp Hood Lock, Cross Member, Pnl Comp Ctr Pillar, Housing RR Comb Lamp Outer |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | Y88,Y4J,YR9,YLA,YSB,YV7 |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | Cangzhou Shengshiweiye Automoblie Accessory Co. Ltd. |
| # of Plants | 2 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 7082 Sq. Meter |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 6070 Sq. Meter |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 350 |
| Main Customers | Suzuki, Honda Car, Honda Motorcycles, Hyundai, Kia |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | July 2023 to June 2024 |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Name & Designation: Rana Mansoor Qadir
Managing Director
Contact No.: 0300-8483919
Email:aqadirind@gmail.com

Factory Address:
19-KM Multan Road Lahore

| Supplier Name | AQ Industries |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1990 |
| Registered Address | 19-KM Multan Road Lahore |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 2000 |
| Ownership Type | 4-Wheel |
| Technology Type | 1 |
| Key Products | Transmission Shaft, Engine Valve, Push Road, Tappet, Valve Guides |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | Transmission Shafts |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | ST, AET306, AIJ310, A5H306 |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | TA |
| # of Plants | 01 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 2000 |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 1900 |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Yes |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Yes |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 100 |
| Main Customers | Suzuki, Millat Tractor, Al Ghazi Tractors |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | July to June |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

SANDEN
INNOVATING COMFORT

Name & Designation: Mr. Masakazu Hattori
(CEO)
Contact No.: 0300 8487823
Email: masakazu.hattori@sanpak.biz

Factory Address:
4-Km Raiwind Manga Road District Kasur.

| Supplier Name | Sanpak Engineering Industries (Pvt) Ltd |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1993 |
| Registered Address | Sanpak Engineering Industries (Pvt) Ltd.<br>4-Km Raiwind Manga Road District Kasur. |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1998 |
| Ownership Type | Private Limited |
| Technology Type | Manufacturing of Air-con Parts. |
| Key Products | HVAC, Evaporator, Condenser, Heater core, Hoses & Pipes. |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | HVAC, Compressor, Condenser, Hoses & Pipes. |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | Y4J (Alto), YSB (Swift), YV7 (Every), YR9 (Wagon-R) |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | JV |
| # of Plants | One |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 8006 (Sq. Meter) |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 6384 (Sq. Meter) |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | N |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 221 |
| Main Customers – Domestic | Pak Suzuki Motors Corporation Ltd, Honda Atlas, Hyundai Nishat, Regal Automobile, Dewan Farooq Motors, J W Forland. |
| Main Customers – Export | Sanden Manufacturing Europe S.A.S., Sanden Corporation Japan |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | July ~ June |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

NES ENGINEERING

Name & Designation: Jawaid Shaikh , COO
Contact No.: 0333 2272729
Email: jawaid@nes.com.pk

Factory Address: DSU 32/3 and 32/10, Down Stream Industrial Estate, Bin Qasim, Pakistan Steel Mills Bin Qasim Town, Karachi

| Supplier Name | Noor Engineering Services (Pvt) Ltd. |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1988 |
| Registered Address | DSU 32/3 and 32/10, Down Stream Industrial Estate, Bin Qasim, Pakistan Steel Mills Bin Qasim Town, Karachi |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1992 |
| Ownership Type | Private |
| Technology Type | Manufacturing Industry |
| Key Products | Propeller Shaft, Lever Gear Shift Control, Brake Disk Assy., Hub Front Wheel, Shaft Comp, Clutch Release. |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | Propeller Shaft (ST-308), Lever Gear Shift Control (ST-308), Hub Front Wheel (YLA & YR9), Shaft Comp, Clutch Release (Y4J & YLA). |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | ST308, YLA, YR9, Y4J, YSB |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | TA |
| # of Plants | One |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 99,372 |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 47,388 |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Yes |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Yes |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 230 |
| Main Customers | PSMCL |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | July to June |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

BEL

Name & Designation: Abdul Rasheed Abbasi/CEO
Contact No.: 0300 868 0081
Email: rabbasi@me.com / info@ayenbee.com

Factory Address:
1. DSU 32/7, Bin Qasim Industrial Estate, Karachi
2. 50-A, Small Industrial Estate, Bahawalpur

| Supplier Name | Bahawalpur Engineering |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | October 1990 |
| Registered Address | 123-A, Industrial Triangle, Humak, Islamabad |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1983 |
| Ownership Type | Pubic Limited (unlisted) |
| Technology Type | In house / TLA with SWS Japan |
| Key Products | Auto Wiring Harness |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | Auto Wire Harness |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | Y4J/Y88/YR9 |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | TA with Sumitomo Corporation, Japan |
| # of Plants | 02 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 13,241 |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 6,347 |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | N |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 330 |
| Main Customers | Pak Suzuki Motor Company |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | July ~ June |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Name & Designation: Muhammad Ashraf Shaikh (Director & CEO )
Contact No.: 0321-2427352
Email:ashraf.shaikh@yusufgroup.com

DSU 38/3, Pakistan Steel Mill Industrial Estate,
Bin Qasim Karachi.

| Supplier Name | YUSUF AUTO INDUSTRIES (PVT) LTD |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1948 |
| Registered Address | DSU 38/3, Pakistan Steel Mill Industrial Estate, Bin Qasim Karachi. |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1987 |
| Ownership Type | Private Ltd |
| Technology Type | Engineering- Metal Stamping Industry |
| Key Products | Fuel Tanks , Sheet Metal Assy. Parts, Body Frame for Motorcycle |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | List Attached |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | Y4J , YLA, STR/STV, SB-308,YN3, SF-410, RA, SA, and SJ |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | In House |
| # of Plants | 1 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 14218.16 sq.meter |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 66,990 Sq.Ft |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | N |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 150 |
| Main Customers | Pak Suzuki Co. Ltd., Atlas Honda Motorcycle and Hino Pak |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | From July to June |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

NAEEM UL HAQ: Director Operation
Contact No.:03214001592
Email:aclvdo@brain.net.pk


Factory Address:
113/7 industrial estate kot lakhpat lahore

| AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENT LTD | |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1984 |
| Registered Address | 113/7 INDUSTRIAL ESTATE KOT LAKHPAT |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1984 |
| Ownership Type | LIMITED COMPANY |
| Technology Type | VDO GERMANY |
| Key Products | SPEEDOMETER |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | SPEEDOMETER |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | ST - GD110 |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | TA |
| # of Plant | 1 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 405 KANAL |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 31860 SFT |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | YES |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | NO |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 150 |
| Main Customers | PSMC,HONDA,AGTL,MTL |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | JULY TO JUNE |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Peracha ENGINEERING CO.

Name & Designation: CEO
Contact No.: 0321 2009043
Email: altaf.paracha@peco.pk

Factory Address: D-162 S.I.T.E KARACHI.

| Supplier Name | PERACHA ENGINEERING CO. |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1971 |
| Registered Address | D-162 SITE KARACHI |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1986 |
| Ownership Type | PARTNERSHIP FIRM |
| Technology Type | AUTOMOTIVE |
| Key Products | CROSS MEM. COMP. FR. SB-308, PEDAL SET BRAKE&CLUTCH STV/STR, PEDAL COMP ACCELERATOR, BRACKET COMP. TENISON ROD, REINF. ROOF SIDE (R+L) AET-306, REINF. ROOF SIDE (R+L) AVK-310, BRACKET,HEAT PROTECTOR MTG RR, TRAY COMP, BATTERY. PANEL,REAR WHEEL HOUSE FR,R+L, MEMBER ROOF NO. 3, BAR ASM BODY RR MT CR, BRACKET TRANSER MONTING LH+RH, BRACKET DUEL FUEL FILTER, TANK ASM;VACUUM, |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | CROSS MEM. COMP. FR. SB-308, PEDAL SET BRAKE&CLUTCH STV/STR, PEDAL COMP ACCELERATOR, BRACKET COMP. TENISON ROD, REINF. ROOF SIDE (R+L) AET-306, REINF. ROOF SIDE (R+L) AVK-310, BRACKET,HEAT PROTECTOR MTG RR, TRAY COMP, BATTERY. PANEL,REAR WHEEL HOUSE FR,R+L, |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | ST308V, SB-308, AET306, AVK310, A5H306, A1J310, YV7, YX0 |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | Tools & Machinery |
| # of Plants | 1 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 21780 Sq. ft |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | Ground + 1, 25000 sq. ft (Head office 2000 sq. ft) |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 80 |
| Main Customers | Pak Suzuki Motors, Ghandhara Nissan, Master Changan Motors, Dawlance Private Limited, Agriauto Industry Private Limited. United Refrigeration |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | 1st June to 31st July |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Electro Polymers

Name & Designation: NARISA DHARANI, CEO
Contact No.: +92-321-8234000
Email:narisadharani@electropolymers.com.pk

Factory Address:
S-88/A, SITE Ext. Hawksbay Rd, Karachi-Pakistan

| Supplier Name | Electropolymers Private Limited |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1984 |
| Registered Address | S-88/A, SITE Ext. Hawksbay Rd, Karachi-Pakistan |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1984 |
| Ownership Type | Private |
| Technology Type | Manufacturer of Automotive Lamps |
| Key Products | Head lamps and tail lamps |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | Y4J Head lamp, Y88 Head lamp, GS150 Head lamp |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | AET306, ST308R/ST308V, GS150 |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | TA and JV with Thai Stanley and Stanley Japan |
| # of Plants | 1 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 4,046.86 |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 2,702.50 |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 255 |
| Main Customers | PSMC, AHL, HACPL, YMPK |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | July to June |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |

Name & Designation:Muhammad Shakir
Contact No.:0333-2356060
Email:halfmaneng@yahoo.com


Factory Address: 1-CI 60,61,62 Sec-12/C
North Karachi Industrial Area Karachi.
2-SITE SuperHighway Ahsanabad Phase 2.

| Supplier Name | HALF MAN |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1980 |
| Registered Address | CI-60-62 Sec12-C North Karachi Industrial Area Karachi |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1980 |
| Ownership Type | Partnership |
| Technology Type | Sheet Metal Parts Manufacturer |
| Key Products | Brace Comp Lamp Support, Lid Comp Fuel Inlet, Box Fuel Inlet, Panel Comp Back Plr Lwr, Pedal Brkt R/L and etc |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | Brace Comp Lamp Support, Lid Comp Fuel Inlet, Box Fuel Inlet, Panel Comp Back Plr Lwr, Pedal Brkt R/L and etc |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | Y4J,YR9,STV/R,YV7,YLA |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | N/A |
| # of Plants | 2 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 1. 4000Sq.m, 2. 1600Sq.m |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 1. 4000Sq.m, 2. 1600Sq.m |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 100 |
| Main Customers | Pak Suzuki Motor Co. |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | From July to June |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Name & Designation: Muhammad Ali Jaliawala COO
Contact No.: 0300-8240402
Email:maliakbani@technofabrik.com

Factory Address: A/118, Road No. 5
Nooriabad District Dadu Sindh.

| Supplier Name | TECHNO FABRIK (PVT) LTD |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1985 |
| Registered Address | 1ST FLOOR, HAJI ADAM CHAMBERS, NEW CHALLI, KARACHI |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1986 |
| Ownership Type | PRIVATE |
| Technology Type | SHEET METAL |
| Key Products | FRONT SHOW, PANEL ROOF, HINGE PILLAR R/L, PANEL COMP SIDE SILL INNER R/L , PANEL COMP FLOOR UPPER,CROSSMEMBER LETRAL ROD BRACKET |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | FRONT SHOW, PANEL ROOF, HINGE PILLAR R/L, PANEL COMP SIDE SILL INNER R/L , PANEL COMP FLOOR UPPER,CROSSMEMBER LETRAL ROD BRACKET |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | YV7,Y4J,YLA,YR9,STV/R |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | INDIGENOUS |
| # of Plants | 1 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 18200 |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 7057 |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Y GENERATOR |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | N |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 200 |
| Main Customers | PAK SUZUKI |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | JULY TO JUNE |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Name & Designation: Tauqeer Dawood (CEO)
Contact No.: 0335-8009109
Email: tauqeerdawood@dawood-engg.com


Factory Address:
245/2-J, BLOCK-6, P.E.C.H.S., KARACHI.

| Supplier Name. | DAWOOD ENGINEERING (PVT.) LTD. |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 2006 |
| Registered Address | 245/2-J, Block-6, P.E.C.H.S, Karachi. |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 2006 |
| Ownership Type | Private Limited |
| Technology Type | Die Casted and Sheet metal parts |
| Key Products | Sheet Metal Parts |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | CTR Pillar, Lamp House, Panel Skirt |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | Y4J, YLA, YR9, YSB, YV7 |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | Indigenous Source |
| # of Plants | 1 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 10,000 Sq. Mtr |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 8,000 Sq .Mtr |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | Yes |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | No |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 442 |
| Main Customers | AHL PSMC, HACPL,YMPK , Atlas Autos, SSGC. |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | 1st Jan to 31st Dec |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Name & Designation: Asad Ali
Chief Executive
Contact No.: 0332-8217020
Email:indusengine14@gmail.com



Factory Address:
Plot # CI-39, Sector-12-C, North Karachi Industrial Area, Karachi.

| Supplier Name | INDUS ENGINEERING |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1980 |
| Registered Address | Plot # CI-39, Sector-12-C, North Karachi Industrial Area, Karachi. |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1989 |
| Ownership Type | Proprietor |
| Technology Type | MANUFACTURER OF SHEET METAL PARTS FOR AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY |
| Key Products | Stamping Parts Sheet Metals |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | Stamping Parts Sheet Metals |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | STR, Y4J,YV7,YR9,YLA,YSB,YXO |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | INDIGENOUS |
| # of Plants | 01 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 1200 |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 1200 |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | YES |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | NO |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 70 |
| Main Customers | PSMCL |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | JUNE TO JULY |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

Name & Designation: SHAHZAD AHMED - CEO
Contact No.: 0300-8255365
Email: shahzad.ahmed@bg.com.pk



FACTORY ADDRESS:
**Unite-1** ADDRESS: B-17, SITE-II, SUPER HIGHWAY INDUSTRIAL AREA, SCHEME 33, KARACHI.

| Supplier Name: | Brothers Engineering Industries |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1974 |
| Registered Address | **Unite-1** ADDRESS: B-17, SITE-II, SUPERHIGHWAY INDUSTRIAL AREA, SCHEME 33, KARACHI. |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1988 |
| Ownership Type | Proprietor |
| Technology Type | Sheet Metal Stamping, Hot Forging & Machining. |
| Key Products | Deep Drawn Oil Pans for Cars, Pickup & Van.<br>• Frame Comp. FR Suspension.<br>• Cover Cyl. Heads for Cars / P-ups.<br>• Stem Steering or Under Bracket for M/cycles.<br>• Swingarm Rear Fork for M/Cycles.<br>• Steering Column and assembly for Cars<br>• Reinforcement Instrument Panel for Front Dashboard of Cars. |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | (1) Cover Cylinder Head (ST & SB)<br>(2) Pan Complete Oil (ST & SB)<br>(3) Frame Comp. Front Suspension ST<br>(4) Cover Comp. Timing Belt INSIDE & OUTSIDE<br>(5) Lid Set, Rear Floor Front SRVCE. ST<br>(6) Frame Roof INNER - FRONT & REAR<br>(7) Panel CTR Pillar Inner – RIGHT & LEFT<br>(8) Housing RR Comb. Lamp INNER & OUTER – R&L<br>(11) Reinf, Pedal Bracket (Y4J)<br>(12) Bracket HVAC No.3 (Y4J)<br>(13) Sealing, Cowl Ventilator (Y4J)<br>(14) Cross member, ROOF FRONT (Y4J)<br>(15) Reinf, ROOF FRONT INNER MBR (Y4J)<br>(16) Band Battery (Y4J)<br>(17) Bracket, HVAC Unit CTR (YV7)<br>(18) Bracket, HVAC Unit SIDE (YV7)<br>(19) Gusset, Rear Floor Center, RIGHT & LEFT (YV7)<br>(20) Reinf, Roof Side FR, RIGHT & LEFT (YV7)<br>(21) Reinf, Roof Side RR, RIGHT & LEFT (YV7) |

Name: Shahid Ahmed
CEO
Cell#: +92 322 2440001
Email: info@shahidengg.com


ADDRESS: CI-104, Sector 12-C, North Karachi Industrial Area, Karachi

| Supplier Name | M/s SEW Engineering Pvt. Ltd.<br>*(formerly M/s Shahid Engineering Works)* |
|---|---|
| Year of Establishment | 1978 |
| Registered Address | D-29, SITE Superhighway, Phase I, Karachi 75950, Pakistan. |
| Year of Registration with PSMCL | 1989 |
| Ownership Type | Private Limited |
| Technology Type | Automobile |
| Key Products | Sheet Metal and Machining Parts |
| Key Products supplied to PSMC | Sheet Metal Parts, Around 60 plus parts including high tensile parts) |
| Models Supplied to PSMC | STV, STR, YR9, YLA, Y4J, YV7, YX0. |
| Technology Source (Indigenous/ TA/ JV) | N/A |
| No. of Plants | 02 |
| Total Area (Sq. Meter) | 2,340 Sq. Meter |
| Covered Area (Sq. Meter) | 2,200 Sq. Meter |
| Alternate Electricity Arrangement ( Y / N ) | YES |
| Alternate Gas Arrangement ( Y / N ) | YES |
| Total Strength Of Employees | 120 |
| Main Customers | PSMC, AHL, AGRI, YAMAHA |
| Fiscal Year (Month to Month) | July to June |
| Total Assets (PKR Million) | |
| Total Owner(s) Equity (PKR Million) | |
| Total Turnover (PKR Million) | |
| Turnover to PSMCL (PKR Million) | |

## Annexure N: Excerpts from IMF Country Report

MEFP 27, IMF Country Report No. 21/73 dated April 2021

- ***Boosting the business environment, job creation, and green development*** (MEFP ¶27) by:
  - *Improving domestic and international competitiveness.* Current priorities include simplifying processes to start businesses and approving FDI by reducing regulations and streamlining red tape. In addition, efforts focus on facilitating trading across borders by advancing further the ongoing enhancement in customs efficiency and simplifying paying taxes through a new simple and fully automated payment system. This would also help boost the formal private sector. Besides, the Companies Law was amended in May 2020 to foster startups while also attracting innovators, including from abroad. However, to expand Pakistan's information technology, digitalization, and outsourcing sectors going forward, it will also be important to invest more in education and human capital, improve product market access, and increase information and communications technology (ICT) adoption.
  - *Implementing the approved national tariff policy.* Tariff rationalization aims to reduce the level of protection while reducing also input costs to promote competition, exports, and domestic production ("Made in Pakistan") for import substitution purposes.
  - *Implementing the National Electric Vehicle Policy.* It provides a framework to achieve ambitious targets for the sale of electric cars until 2030, with the aim to (i) reduce Pakistan's GHG emissions and fuel import bill; and (ii) promote industrial growth and job creation through new investments and the introduction of new technologies.

Extract No. 1 from IMF Report (Page 20)

- ***Trade and Industrial Policy***. Addressing the anti-export bias resulting from restrictive trade policies and an ineffective tariff structure is central to unlocking Pakistan's competitiveness and attracting private investment (MEFP ¶¶26–28). The new National Tariff Policy (FY25–30) should substantially streamline and reduce tariffs (customs and regulatory duties) and reduce nontariff barriers and move away from the regime of special duties applied to imports for particular industries. Trade barriers are particularly extensive in the automotive sector, and the next iteration of the automobile policy (covering FY26–31), on which consultations are still ongoing, should reduce tariffs and preferential support for local production. Ahead of this, the authorities will remove the existing ban on commercial imports of used vehicles (**new end-July 2025 SB** for submission of legislation). Where contractual provisions allow, ineffective incentives for Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Export Processing Zones (EPZs), Special Technology Zones (STZs) and any other industrial zone or park should be phased out (**end-June 2025 SB** and **new end-December 2025 SB** for comprehensive implementation plans for SEZ/EPZ and STZ/other zones, respectively) and no new special zones should be created.

Extract No. 3 from IMF Report (Page 111)

26. **We are committed to substantially reduce barriers to international trade, including through duty elimination under the new National Tariff Policy (NTP) and the next Auto Policy**. The new National Tariff Policy for 2025–30 is expected to come into effect on July 1, 2025, after being approved by cabinet and incorporated into Finance Act for FY26. The policy envisages substantial tariff reductions and simplification of the customs regime, including by phasing out all additional customs duties (ACDs), reducing all regulatory duties (RDs) by 80 percent, and reforming the 5th Schedule to the Customs Act. Together these measures under the NTP will result in a gradual reduction in the weighted average applied tariff from 10.6 percent in FY25 to 7.4 percent by FY30. Going forward, we will avoid introducing any new RDs. We recognize that trade protection for the automobile sector under the Auto Industry Development and Export Policy (AIDEP) 2021–26 is particularly extensive and imposes large welfare costs on Pakistanis and are committed to implementing a substantial reduction in protection for this sector in the next auto policy, which will come into effect and be implemented from July 1, 2026. Specifically, we are committed to addressing vehicle affordability by setting out a path to progressively reduce protection by 2030 in line with the principles and objectives of the NTP 2025–30, including by eliminating all ACDs and RDs in the sector and substantially reducing CDs. When added to the duty reductions envisaged under the new NTP, this will bring the weighted average tariff to below 6 percent by FY30. We will also remove all quantitative restrictions on the commercial importation of used motor vehicles (initially only for vehicles less than five years old, subject to meeting minimum environmental and safety standards) during FY26Q1 and will submit all required legislation to parliament by July 2025 (**new end-July 2025 SB**). During FY26, we will put in place regulation and a testing regime for safety and environmental standards of such imported vehicles, which will replace the vehicle age limit from July 2026 onwards. For FY26, the tariff rates (incorporating CDs, ACDs and RDs) for such used vehicles will initially be set 40 percent above the corresponding rate for new vehicles, with this premium to be reduced by 10 percentage points per year, to reach zero by 2030. More broadly, we are committed to addressing non-tariff measures, and plan to complete an ongoing stock-take of the existing export-import policy order by end-December 2025, with a view to simplifying and eliminating distortionary NTBs.

Extract No. 8 from IMF Report (Page 112)

28. **As part of our ongoing efforts to improve efficiency and provide a level playing field for investment, the government will refrain from providing any fiscal incentives, such as tax breaks or subsidies (including for credit)**.

***b.*** ***Eliminating Preferential Treatment of Local Production***. We are committed to phasing out all additional duties (including through import and sales taxes) currently charged for "localized" items/inputs in the auto sector, and to removing the regime of special duties applied to imports used for the auto sector, including through the 5th Schedule to the Customs Act and SRO 655(I)/2006. These changes will be implemented gradually, as envisaged in the NTP 2025–30. This principle will also apply to any new electric vehicle (EV) production, which will mean an increase and regularization of the tariffs and other protection (including through preferential sales taxes) of some inputs. By July 2026, we will seek to extend the principle of removing the preferential treatment of local production to other industries, to be implemented in a gradual manner over the period until FY30, in consultation with the relevant ministries.



Extract No. 9 from IMF Report (Page 121)

**Table 2. Pakistan: Structural Conditionality (concluded)**

| Actions | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Structural Benchmarks | | Rationale | Date |
| **Trade, Investment Policy, and Deregulation** | | | |
| 10 | Prepare a plan based on the assessment conducted to fully phase out all incentives in relation to Special Technology Zones and other industrial parks and zones by 2035. | Improve efficiency and provide a level playing field for investment. | end-December 2025 |
| 11 | Submit to parliament all required legislation for lifting all quantitative restrictions on the commercial importation of used motor vehicles (initially only for vehicles less than five years old, subject to meeting minimum environmental and safety standards). | Liberalize trade and increase vehicle affordability. | end-July 2025 |

## Annexure O: Regulating Commercial Import of Used Vehicles through Mandatory JAAI Certification

A. Example of less than 4.5 grade used vehicles that should not be allowed for export to Pakistan






B. Example of 4.5 grade vehicle that may be allowed to be imported into Pakistan



C. JAAI Pre-Shipment Inspection Certificate – Sample

JAAI JAAI JAAI JAAI JAAI JAAI

## Pre-Shipment Inspection Certificate

1. We hereby declare that the second-hand motor vehicle, described hereunder to be exported to Sri Lanka has been inspected by our organisation. The particulars of whicth are as follows and this Pre-Shipment Inspection Certificate has been issued to the under-mentioned applicant.

(a) Name of Inspection Organisation JAPAN AUTO APPRAISAL INSTITUTE
(b) Address 2-34-4, NISHI-SHINBASHI, MINATO-KU, TOKYO, JAPAN
(c) Tel No. 03-5776-0901 Fax No. 0906 E-mail info@jaai.or.jp
(d) Place of Inspection OSAKA
(e) Date of Inspection Jul.07.2025

2. Particulars of applicant:

(a) Name WORLD WIDE SHOWA TSUSHO CO.,LTD
(b) Address SAITAMA JAPAN
(c) Tel No. 0489-33-0182 Fax. 0489-36-7029
E-mail showatsu1@gmail.com

3. Particulars of second-hand motor vehicle:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **(1) Type of Vehicle** | | Sedan Car |
| **(2) Make** | | SUZUKI |
| **(3) Model** | | 4AA-MK53S |
| **(4) Commonly Called** | | SPACIA CUSTOM |
| **(5) Grade** | | HYBRID XS |
| **(6) Body Colour** | | White Pearl |
| **(7) Fuel Type** | | Gasoline |
| **(8) Year/Month of First Registration** | | Apr. 2023 |
| **(9) Engine Capacity** | | 650 cc |
| **(10) Chassis Number** | **Original** | MK53S-992341 |
| **(11) Engine Model** | | R06A-WA05A |
| **(12) Engine Number** | | R06A-WA05A-C390729 |
| **(13) Gross Vehicle Mass** | | 1,120 kg |
| **(14) Wheel Base** | | 246 cm |
| **(15) Country of Origin** | | Japan |
| **(16) Tyre Size** | | 165/55R15 |
| **(17) The number of seats** | | 4 |

4. We hereby certify and confirm as follows:

(a) having cross-checked with the Vehicle Registration Authority the original of the last document emanating thereof and having inserted our seal as hereunder on both sides of the document; and
(b) that the vehicle as described above is roadworthy and usable; and

Remarks Hybrid Vehicle
Year of Manufacture 2023

**Certification Number** 612507-0126 **Date of Issue:** Jul.07.2025
**Seal of the Organisation** **Signature**

JAPAN AUTO JAAI APPRAISAL INSTITUTE

**Name:** 桶谷 敏
**Capacity in which acting** Director of Inspection Dept.

JAAI JAAI JAAI JAAI JAAI JAAI
JAPAN AUTO APPRAISAL INSTITUTE
YAE1.10

D. JAAI Odometer Reading Certificate – Sample



JAAI

CERTIFICATE OF ODOMETER READING

JAPAN AUTO APPRAISAL INSTITUTE

Certification Number : 612507-0126
Date of Issue : Jul.07.2025
Date of Inspection : Jul.07.2025

*WE HEREBY CERTIFY* that the vehicle specified below has the following records at the time of the inspection in Japan

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inspected Mileage(Odometer reading) | Date Jul.07.2025 | 21,267 | km |
| Auto Auction Mileage(Recorded at NAK) | Date Jun.21.2025 | 22,000 | km |
| Odometer at Dealer | Date - | - | km |

**Make** SUZUKI **Model** 4AA-MK53S
**Type of Vehicle** Sedan Car
**Engine Capacity(c.c.rating)** 650 cc
**Year of First Registration** Apr.2023
**Chassis Number** MK53S-992341
**Engine Number** R06A-WA05A-C390729

Remarks: THE VEHICLE ODOMETER AND AVAILABLE RECORDS HAVE BEEN INSPECTED ACCORDING TO OUR INSPECTION RESULT THE VEHICLE ODOMETER CORRECTLY SHOWS THE RECORD OF THE DISTANCE THAT THE VEHICLE HAS TRAVELED TILL THE DATE OF ITS INSPECTION.

JAPAN AUTO APPRAISAL INSTITUTE
OSAKA Branch
Director of Inspection Dept 桶谷 敏

YAE1.10 3/3

E. JAAI Vehicle Condition Report and List Accessories Sheet – Sample

JAAI

## VEHICLE CONDITION REPORT AND LIST ACCESSORIES SHEET

Certified Copy

| Equipment and Accessories | | |
|---|---|---|
| Air-Conditioner | Fixed ☑ | None ☐ |
| Power Steering | Fixed ☑ | None ☐ |
| Air Bag | Fixed ☑ | None ☐ |
| ABS | Fixed ☑ | None ☐ |
| GPS Navigation System | Fixed ☑ | None ☐ |
| Alloy Wheel | Fixed ☑ | None ☐ |
| Floor Mat(1.2.3.4.5) | Fixed ☑ | None ☐ |
| Jack, Wrench or Pump | Fixed ☑ | None ☐ |
| Charging Cable | Fixed ☐ | None ☑ |

| Condition of | | |
|---|---|---|
| Battery | Good ☑ | |
| Electrical Instruments | Good ☑ | |
| Exhaust Gas | Good ☑ | |
| Head Lamp | Good ☑ | |
| Engine | Good ☑ | |
| Fan belt | Good ☑ | |
| Cooling System | Good ☑ | |
| Lubricating System | Good ☑ | |
| Exhaust System | Good ☑ | |
| Confirmation of lamplights | Good ☑ | |
| Functional Check of wiper | Good ☑ | |
| Functional Check of horn | Good ☑ | |
| Driving System | 2WD ☑ | 4WD ☐ |
| Transmission | A/T ☑ | M/T ☐ |

Major Accident Yes ☐ No ☑
Minor Accident Yes ☐ No ☑

JAPAN JAAI APPRAISAL INSTITUTE



EXPLANATION OF MARKING

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| A : Scratch | S : Rust | XM: Replaced |
| U : Dent | C : Corrode | P : Painted |
| B : Bend | T : Tear | L : Letter |
| W : Wave | H : Hole | |

Remarks

We hereby certify that this vehicle is not damaged by water.


**Chassis Number :** MK53S-992341

**Certification Number :** 612507-0126 **Date of Issue :** Jul.07.2025

Japan Auto Appraisal Institute

OSAKA Branch

Director of Inspection Dept. 桶谷 敏

(10714) YAE1.10 2/3

F. JAAI Export Certificate – Sample



輸出予定届出証明書

Export Certificate

番号 00664

整理番号 509011582252461 1

令和 7 年 2025 7月 month 1日 day

軽自動車検査協会

Light Motor Vehicle Inspection Organization

| 車両番号 / Motor vehicle number | 交付年月日 / Grant Date | 初度検査年月 First Grant Date | 自動車の種別 Classification of Vehicle | 用途 Use | 自家用・事業用の別 Purpose | 車体の形状 / Type of Body |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 福岡 582 け 2461 | 令和 7 年 2025 7月 month 1日 day | 令和 5 年 2023 4月 month | 軽自動車 | 乗用 | 自家用 | 箱型 [001] |
| 車台番号 Maker's serial number | | 乗車定員 Fixed Number | 最大積載量 Maxim. Carry | 車両重量 Weight | 車両重量 GrWeight | 長さ Length / 幅 Width / 高さ Height |
| MK53S-992341 | | 4人 | -kg | 900kg | 1120kg | 339cm / 147cm / 178cm |

| 車名 / Trademark of the maker of the vehicle | 型式 / Model | 原動機の型式 Engine Model | 燃料の種類 Classification of Fuel | 総排気量又は定格出力 Engine Capacity | 前軸重 F Weight | 後軸重 R Weight | 型式指定番号 Specification No. | 類別区分番号 Classification No. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| スズキ [131] | 4AA-MK53S | R06A-WA05A | ガソリン | 0.65L | 530kg | 370kg | 19042 | 0021 |

使用者の氏名又は名称 Name of User: 株式会社 WECARS [47281]

使用者の住所 Address of User: 東京都千代田区霞が関3丁目2－5

所有者の氏名又は名称 Name of Owner: 使用者に同じ

所有者の住所 Address of Owner: 使用者住所に同じ

使用の本拠の位置 Locality of principal abode of use: 福岡県福岡市西区今宿青木1046－2 [40054] [0098]

輸出予定日 (証明書有効期間満了日) Export scheduled day: 令和 7(2025)年 12月 25日

備考 【騒音】 返納 令和12年度燃費基準70%達成車 令和2年度燃費基準102%達成車 ハイブリッド自動車 マフラー無

近接排気騒音値75dB / 測定回転数3,750rpm*

騒音規制適用車 * 平成28年騒音規制適用車 騒音カテゴリM12A / 近接排気騒音値75dB / 測定回転数3,750rpm* (旧基準適用時測定回転数4,500rpm) *

輸出に係る届出をした所有者は、輸出予定届出証明書に係る自動車が輸出されることなく、該当輸出届出証明書の別紙が返付されたとき又は、該当有効期間が満了した日から15日以内に、最寄の事務所等に該当輸出証明書を返付しなければならない。 * *

【一時使用中止中所有者】 [所有者氏名] ワールドワイド昭和通商株式会社 [所有者住所] 埼玉県草加市青柳8－7－13－1

申請日] 令和7(2025)年7月1日 * *

JAPAN AUTO APPRAISAL INSTITUTE

Certified Copy

JAPAN AUTO APPRAISAL INSTITUTE

OCR01-7245

G. JAAI vehicle Emission Standard & Safety Measures Certificate – Sample

JAAI

JAPAN AUTO APPRAISAL INSTITUTE
2-34-4, NISHISHINBASHI, MINATO-KU, TOKYO JAPAN
Tel 03-5776-0901 Fax 03-5776-0906 Email info@jaai.or.jp

Certified Copy

JAPAN AUTO JAAI APPRAISAL INSTITUTE

Date of Issue : July 7, 2025
Certificate No. 612507-0126

## Emission Standard & Safety Measures Certificate

As per the Sri Lanka Department of Import and Export Control Extraordinary Gazette No. 2107/45 dated 25.01.2019:

1. THE VEHICLE MEETS THE VEHICULAR EXHAUST EMISSION STANDARDS PUBLISHED IN THE SCHEDULE III OF THE EXTRAORDINARY GAZETTE NO. 2079/42 DATED 12.07.2018 OR THE SCHEDULE V OF THE EXTRAORDINARY GAZETTE NO. 2083/3 DATED 06.08.2018 UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ACT NO. 47 OF 1980.

Schedule III ☐ OR Schedule V ☑

CO 1.92 g/km NMHC 0.08 g/km NOx 0.08 g/km PM 0.007 g/km

2. SAFETY MEASURES / STANDARDS PUBLISHED IN THE EXTRAORDINARY GAZETTE No.2107/45 DATED 25.01.2019 UNDER THE IMPORTS AND EXPORTS (CONTROL) ACT NO.1 OF 1969.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Seat Belts | : ☑ | Three point seat belts for driver & front passengers. | | |
| | : ☑ | Minimum two point seat belts for other passengers. | | |
| Air Bags | : ☑ | Driver ☑ | Front Passengers | |
| ABS | : ☑ | | | |

MAKE : SUZUKI
MODEL : 4AA-MK53S
CHASSIS NO. : MK53S-992341
PLACE OF INSPECTION : OSAKA
DATE OF INSPECTION : July 7, 2025

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE :
Director of Inspection Dept

JAPAN AUTO APPRAISAL INSTITUTE
OSAKA Branch

JAPAN AUTO JAAI APPRAISAL INSTITUTE

## Annexure P: Detailed Car Price Comparison Pakistan vs Peers

A. 1,000 cc or below

**Comparison of Car Prices (1,000cc or below)**
**Net of Value Added Tax**

| Country | | | Pakistan | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vehicle | Suzuki Alto | Suzuki Alto | Suzuki Cultus | Suzuki Cultus | Kia Piccanto |
| Variant | VXR | VXR AGS | VXR 1.0L | VXL 1.0L | 1.0L |
| Transmission | Manual | Automatic | Manual | Automatic | Automatic |
| Factory Price | PKR 2,995,000 | PKR 3,167,000 | PKR 4,090,000 | PKR 4,591,000 | PKR 4,090,000 |
| Less VAT | 18% | 18% | 18% | 18% | 18% |
| Price Excluding Tax | PKR 2,455,900 | PKR 2,596,940 | PKR 3,353,800 | PKR 3,764,620 | PKR 3,353,800 |
| Exchange Rate to USD | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 |
| Price (net of tax) USD | $ 8,617 | $ 9,112 | $ 11,768 | $ 13,209 | $ 11,768 |

| Country | Indonesia | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vehicle | Toyota Raize | Toyota Raize | Daihatsu Ayla | Daihatsu Ayla |
| Variant | 1.0T G | 1.0T G | 1.0 X | 1.0 X |
| Transmission | Manual | Automatic | Manual | Manual |
| Factory Price | IDR 262,000,000 | IDR 277,100,000 | IDR 151,400,000 | IDR 138,500,000 |
| Less VAT | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% |
| Price Excluding Tax | IDR 230,560,000 | IDR 243,848,000 | IDR 133,232,000 | IDR 121,880,000 |
| Exchange Rate to USD | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 |
| Price (net of tax) USD | $ 14,059 | $ 14,869 | $ 8,124 | $ 7,432 |

| Country | India | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | |
| Vehicle | Suzuki Alto K10 | Suzuki Alto K10 | Suzuki Celerio | Suzuki Celerio | Hyundai i20 N Line | Hyundai i20 N Line |
| | | | | | | |
| Variant | 1.0T G | 1.0T G | 1.0T G | 1.0T G | 1.0 Turbo | 1.0 Turbo |
| | | | | | | |
| Transmission | Manual | Automatic | Manual | Automatic | Manual | Automatic |
| | | | | | | |
| Factory Price | INR 423,000 | INR 609,500 | INR 564,000 | INR 737,000 | INR 999,500 | INR 1,118,800 |
| | | | | | | |
| Less VAT | 28% | 28% | 28% | 28% | 28% | 28% |
| | | | | | | |
| Price Excluding Tax | INR 304,560 | INR 438,840 | INR 406,080 | INR 530,640 | INR 719,640 | INR 805,536 |
| | | | | | | |
| Exchange Rate to USD | INR 87 | INR 87 | INR 87 | INR 87 | INR 87 | INR 87 |
| | | | | | | |
| Price (net of tax) USD | $ 3,501 | $ 5,044 | $ 4,668 | $ 6,099 | $ 8,272 | $ 9,259 |

B. 1,001cc to 1,300cc

**Comparison of Car Prices (1,001cc to 1,300cc)**
**Net of Value Added Tax**

| Country | Pakistan | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vehicle | Suzuki Swift | Suzuki Swift | Toyota Yaris | Toyota Yaris | Honda City |
| Variant | GL | GL | GLI | GLI | LS |
| Transmission | Manual | Automatic | Manual | Automatic | Automatic |
| Factory Price | PKR 4,460,000 | PKR 4,591,000 | PKR 4,649,000 | PKR 4,809,000 | PKR 4,737,000 |
| Less VAT | 18% | 18% | 18% | 18% | 18% |
| Price Excluding Tax | PKR 3,657,200 | PKR 3,764,620 | PKR 3,812,180 | PKR 3,943,380 | PKR 3,884,340 |
| Exchange Rate to USD | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 |
| Price (net of tax) USD | $ 12,832 | $ 13,209 | $ 13,376 | $ 13,836 | $ 13,629 |

| Country | Indonesia | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vehicle | Toyota Agya | Toyota Agya | Toyota Raize | Toyota Raize | Honda Brio | Honda Brio | Daihatsu Sirion |
| Variant | 1.2G | 1.2G | 1.2G | 1.2G | 1.2 i-VTEC | 1.2 i-VTEC | 1.3 CVT |
| Transmission | Manual | Automatic | Manual | Automatic | Manual | Automatic | Automatic |
| Factory Price | IDR 180,900,000 | IDR 197,100,000 | IDR 242,200,000 | IDR 257,300,000 | IDR 170,400,000 | IDR 202,500,000 | IDR 233,850,000 |
| Less VAT | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% |
| Price Excluding Tax | IDR 159,192,000 | IDR 173,448,000 | IDR 213,136,000 | IDR 226,424,000 | IDR 149,952,000 | IDR 178,200,000 | IDR 205,788,000 |
| Exchange Rate to USD | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 |
| Price (net of tax) USD | $ 9,707 | $ 10,576 | $ 12,996 | $ 13,806 | $ 9,143 | $ 10,866 | $ 12,548 |

| Country | Thailand |
|---|---|
| | |
| Vehicle | Toyota Yaris |
| | |
| Variant | ATIV 1.2L |
| | |
| Transmission | Automatic |
| | |
| Factory Price | THB 699,000 |
| | |
| Less VAT | 7% |
| | |
| Price Excluding Tax | THB 650,070 |
| | |
| Exchange Rate to USD | THB 32.50 |
| | |
| Price (net of tax) USD | $ 20,002 |

| Country | India | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | |
| Vehicle | Hyundai i10 | Hyundai i10 | Honda Amaze | Honda Amaze | Toyota Glanza | Toyota Glanza | Suzuki Dzire | Suzuki Dzire |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Variant | 1.2 L | 1.2 L | 1.2 L | 1.2 L | 1.2 L | 1.2 L | 1.2 L Zxi | 1.2 L Zxi |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Transmission | Manual | Automatic | Manual | Automatic | Manual | Automatic | Manual | Automatic |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Factory Price | INR 709,000 | INR 748,900 | INR 999,900 | INR 1,119,900 | INR 982,000 | INR 999,900 | INR 894,000 | INR 1,019,000 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Less VAT | 28% | 28% | 28% | 28% | 28% | 28% | 28% | 28% |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Price Excluding Tax | INR 510,480 | INR 539,208 | INR 719,928 | INR 806,328 | INR 707,040 | INR 719,928 | INR 643,680 | INR 733,680 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Exchange Rate to USD | INR 87 | INR 87 | INR 87 | INR 87 | INR 87 | INR 87 | INR 87 | INR 87 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Price (net of tax) USD | $ 5,868 | $ 6,198 | $ 8,275 | $ 9,268 | $ 8,127 | $ 8,275 | $ 7,399 | $ 8,433 |

## C. 1,301cc to 1,600 cc

**Comparison of Car Prices (1,301cc to 1,600cc)**
**Net of Value Added Tax**

| Country | Pakistan | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vehicle | Toyota Yaris | Honda City | Toyota Corolla | Toyota Corolla | Honda Civic | Honda HRV | Honda HRV | Honda HRV | Hyundai Elantra | Honda Civic |
| Variant | ATIV | LAS | 1.6MT | 1.6AT | 1.5 Oriel | 1.5 VVTi | 1.5 VVTi-S | 1.5 HEV Hybrid | 1.6 Hybrid | 1.5 Turbo |
| Transmission | Automatic | Automatic | Manual | Automatic | Automatic | Manual | Automatic | Automatic | Automatic | Automatic |
| Factory Price | PKR 6,389,000 | PKR 5,969,000 | PKR 6,099,000 | PKR 6,699,000 | PKR 8,834,000 | PKR 7,549,000 | PKR 7,799,000 | PKR 8,999,000 | PKR 9,895,000 | PKR 10,100,000 |
| Less VAT | 25% | 25% | 25% | 25% | 25% | 25% | 25% | 25% | 25% | 25% |
| Price Excluding Tax | PKR 4,791,750 | PKR 4,476,750 | PKR 4,574,250 | PKR 5,024,250 | PKR 6,625,500 | PKR 5,661,750 | PKR 5,849,250 | PKR 6,749,250 | PKR 7,421,250 | PKR 7,575,000 |
| Exchange Rate to USD | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 |
| Price (net of tax) USD | $ 16,813 | $ 15,708 | $ 16,050 | $ 17,629 | $ 23,247 | $ 19,866 | $ 20,524 | $ 23,682 | $ 26,039 | $ 26,579 |

| Country | Indonesia | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vehicle | Toyota Vios | Toyota Yaris | Toyota Yaris | Honda City | Honda WR-V | Honda WR-V | Honda HRV |
| Variant | 1.5G CVT | 1.5G MT | 1.5G CVT | 1.5 iVTEC | 1.5 iVTEC | 1.5 iVTEC | 1.5 iVTEC |
| Transmission | Automatic | Manual | Automatic | Automatic | Manual | Automatic | Automatic |
| Factory Price | IDR 374,800,000 | IDR 358,700,000 | IDR 371,900,000 | IDR 402,000,000 | IDR 280,700,000 | IDR 310,700,000 | IDR 399,900,000 |
| Less VAT | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% |
| Price Excluding Tax | IDR 329,824,000 | IDR 315,656,000 | IDR 327,272,000 | IDR 353,760,000 | IDR 247,016,000 | IDR 273,416,000 | IDR 351,912,000 |
| Exchange Rate to USD | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 |
| Price (net of tax) USD | $ 20,111 | $ 19,247 | $ 19,956 | $ 21,571 | $ 15,062 | $ 16,672 | $ 21,458 |

| Country | Thailand | |
|---|---|---|
| | | |
| Vehicle | Toyota Corolla | Toyota Corolla |
| | | |
| Variant | 1.6G | 1.8 Sport |
| | | |
| Transmission | Automatic | Automatic |
| | | |
| Factory Price | THB 894,000 | THB 979,000 |
| | | |
| Less VAT | 7% | 7% |
| | | |
| Price Excluding Tax | THB 831,420 | THB 910,470 |
| | | |
| Exchange Rate to USD | THB 32.50 | THB 32.50 |
| | | |
| Price (net of tax) USD | $ 25,582 | $ 28,014 |

| Country | India | |
|---|---|---|
| | | |
| Vehicle | Honda City | Honda City |
| | | |
| Variant | 1.5 iVTEC | 1.5 iVTEC |
| | | |
| Transmission | Manual | Automatic |
| | | |
| Factory Price | INR 1,539,900 | INR 1,664,900 |
| | | |
| Less VAT | 28% | 28% |
| | | |
| Price Excluding Tax | INR 1,108,728 | INR 1,198,728 |
| | | |
| Exchange Rate to USD | INR 87 | INR 87 |
| | | |
| Price (net of tax) USD | $ 12,744 | $ 13,778 |

D. 1,601cc – 2,000cc

**Comparison of Car Prices (1,601cc to 2,000cc)**
**Net of Value Added Tax**

| Country | Pakistan | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vehicle | Toyota Corolla | Corolla Cross | Corolla Cross |
| Variant | 1.8CVT | 1.8CVT | 1.8 Hybrid |
| Transmission | Automatic | Automatic | Automatic |
| Factory Price | PKR 7,029,000 | PKR 7,235,000 | PKR 8,535,000 |
| Less VAT | 25% | 25% | 18% |
| Price Excluding Tax | PKR 5,271,750 | PKR 5,426,250 | PKR 6,998,700 |
| Exchange Rate to USD | PKR 285 | PKR 285 | PKR 285 |
| Price (net of tax) USD | $ 18,497 | $ 19,039 | $ 24,557 |

| Country | Indonesia | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vehicle | Toyota Corolla | Toyota Corolla Cross | Honda Civic |
| Variant | 1.8V | 1.8 Hybrid | 2.0 Hybrid |
| Transmission | Automatic | Automatic | Automatic |
| Factory Price | IDR 583,300,000 | IDR 603,800,000 | IDR 699,000,000 |
| Less VAT | 12% | 12% | 12% |
| Price Excluding Tax | IDR 513,304,000 | IDR 531,344,000 | IDR 615,120,000 |
| Exchange Rate to USD | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 | IDR 16,400 |
| Price (net of tax) USD | $ 31,299 | $ 32,399 | $ 37,507 |

| Country | Thailand |
|---|---|
| | |
| Vehicle | Toyota Corolla Cross |
| | |
| Variant | 1.8 Hybrid |
| | |
| Transmission | Automatic |
| | |
| Factory Price | THB 1,254,000 |
| | |
| Less VAT | 7% |
| | |
| Price Excluding Tax | THB 1,166,220 |
| | |
| Exchange Rate to USD | THB 32.50 |
| | |
| Price (net of tax) USD | $ 35,884 |